IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Harold E. Chastain, Oct 28 2025, 8:58 am
Appellant-Petitioner CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
October 28, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-XP-1105 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth A. Bellin, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D04-2101-XP-7
Opinion by Judge Mathias Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 1 of 10 Mathias, Judge.
[1] Indiana’s expungement statutes generally provide petitioners with a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to expunge records relating to convictions and adverse
juvenile delinquency adjudications, but they also provide liberal amendment
rules to allow petitioners to supplement petitions at any time with additional
expungement requests that were omitted from the initial petition due to the
petitioner’s excusable neglect or due to circumstances beyond the petitioner’s
control. Ind. Code § 35-38-9-9(k) (2025). 1 Here, Harold E. Chastain filed a
petition to expunge records relating to arrests and convictions he had acquired
under six case numbers. More than two years after the trial court granted his
request, he sought to include with his initial petition an additional request to
expunge the records of a seventh case number that was not eligible for
expungement at the time he had filed his initial petition.
[2] On this question of first impression, we agree with the trial court that Chastain’s
request to belatedly include the seventh case number with the other six was not
permitted under our expungement statutes. The records of Chastain’s seventh
case number were not omitted from his initial petition due to his excusable
neglect or to circumstances beyond Chastain’s control; they were omitted
because, at the time he chose to file his initial petition, those records were not
1 We understand the State’s brief to concede that Chastain is procedurally allowed to supplement his initial petition under the current language of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(k) (2025). We accept the State’s concession and limit our analysis to the merits of Chastain’s claim accordingly.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 2 of 10 eligible for expungement. If Chastain wished to include the records of his
seventh case number with an initial petition, he was required to wait the
requisite amount of time for those records to become eligible for expungement
before he filed that petition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Chastain’s motion to amend his expungement petition.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2015, a jury found Chastain guilty of Class C felony intimidation and
Class B misdemeanor battery in case number 20D02-1303-FC-75 (“case number
FC-75”). The trial court entered its judgment of conviction accordingly and
sentenced Chastain to an aggregate term of six years suspended to probation.
We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court
denied Chastain’s petition for transfer. He then sought post-conviction relief,
which was denied.
[4] In January 2021, Chastain filed his initial petition to expunge the records of
arrests, criminal charges, and convictions relating to six case numbers between
1993 and 2009. At the time he filed his initial petition, the records of case
number FC-75 were not eligible for expungement and would not become
eligible until about thirty months later. See I.C. § 35-38-9-4(c). In March, the
trial court entered a final judgment granting Chastain’s petition and expunging
the records of the six identified case numbers.
[5] In October 2024, Chastain filed a new petition in which he sought to expunge
the records of case number FC-75. The State objected to Chastain’s new
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 3 of 10 petition on the ground that it was inconsistent with the once-per-lifetime filing
requirements. See I.C. § 35-38-9-9(i). Chastain then withdrew his petition and,
in December, instead moved to amend his January 2021 petition to include the
records from case number FC-75. After a hearing, the trial court denied
Chastain’s request to amend his January 2021 petition.
[6] This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review [7] The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Indiana’s expungement statutes
permit Chastain to belatedly include the records of case number FC-75 with his
initial petition when those records were not eligible for expungement at the time
of Chastain’s original filing. When a trial court’s ruling involves a pure question
of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, our standard of review is de novo.
Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2022).
[8] As our Supreme Court has made clear:
When interpreting a statute, the first step is to give the statute’s words their plain and ordinary meaning, considering the structure of the statute in its entirety to promulgate a harmonious reading. See Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Saint, 258 N.E.3d 972, 980 (Ind. 2025). In addition, “we consider both what the statute does—and does not—say, because we cannot ‘add words or restrictions.’” Id. (quoting WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022)). Ultimately, the end goal of construing any statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. N.L. [v. State], 989 N.E.2d [773,] 777 [(Ind. 2013)] (citing Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 4 of 10 D.W. v. State, 263 N.E.3d 151, 157 (Ind. 2025).
Indiana’s expungement statutes exist to help those who have remained law-abiding obtain a “second chance.” [9] Before reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments in this appeal, we first
emphasize the purposes of Indiana’s expungement statutes. As we have
previously recognized:
the overall objective [of Indiana’s expungement statutes] is clear: our legislature intended to provide assistance to those who remained law-abiding. Cf. Taylor, which . . . discussed the overall public policy of the expungement statutes:
The legislature intended to give individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes a second chance by not experiencing many of the stigmas associated with a criminal conviction—especially where an individual has completed the requirements established by the trial court and has since been a law-abiding citizen.
Taylor[ v. State], 7 N.E.3d [362,] 367 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2014)] (emphasis added). Similarly, in Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), . . . the court opined that the intent of the General Assembly “was to allow those persons who had successfully completed their sentences without incident to petition the court after the passage of a certain amount of time . . . to expunge the records of their conviction.”
Marshall v. State, 52 N.E.3d 41, 44-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (emphases and last
omission original to Marshall).
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Harold E. Chastain, Oct 28 2025, 8:58 am
Appellant-Petitioner CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
October 28, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-XP-1105 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Elizabeth A. Bellin, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D04-2101-XP-7
Opinion by Judge Mathias Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 1 of 10 Mathias, Judge.
[1] Indiana’s expungement statutes generally provide petitioners with a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity to expunge records relating to convictions and adverse
juvenile delinquency adjudications, but they also provide liberal amendment
rules to allow petitioners to supplement petitions at any time with additional
expungement requests that were omitted from the initial petition due to the
petitioner’s excusable neglect or due to circumstances beyond the petitioner’s
control. Ind. Code § 35-38-9-9(k) (2025). 1 Here, Harold E. Chastain filed a
petition to expunge records relating to arrests and convictions he had acquired
under six case numbers. More than two years after the trial court granted his
request, he sought to include with his initial petition an additional request to
expunge the records of a seventh case number that was not eligible for
expungement at the time he had filed his initial petition.
[2] On this question of first impression, we agree with the trial court that Chastain’s
request to belatedly include the seventh case number with the other six was not
permitted under our expungement statutes. The records of Chastain’s seventh
case number were not omitted from his initial petition due to his excusable
neglect or to circumstances beyond Chastain’s control; they were omitted
because, at the time he chose to file his initial petition, those records were not
1 We understand the State’s brief to concede that Chastain is procedurally allowed to supplement his initial petition under the current language of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(k) (2025). We accept the State’s concession and limit our analysis to the merits of Chastain’s claim accordingly.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 2 of 10 eligible for expungement. If Chastain wished to include the records of his
seventh case number with an initial petition, he was required to wait the
requisite amount of time for those records to become eligible for expungement
before he filed that petition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Chastain’s motion to amend his expungement petition.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2015, a jury found Chastain guilty of Class C felony intimidation and
Class B misdemeanor battery in case number 20D02-1303-FC-75 (“case number
FC-75”). The trial court entered its judgment of conviction accordingly and
sentenced Chastain to an aggregate term of six years suspended to probation.
We affirmed his convictions on direct appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court
denied Chastain’s petition for transfer. He then sought post-conviction relief,
which was denied.
[4] In January 2021, Chastain filed his initial petition to expunge the records of
arrests, criminal charges, and convictions relating to six case numbers between
1993 and 2009. At the time he filed his initial petition, the records of case
number FC-75 were not eligible for expungement and would not become
eligible until about thirty months later. See I.C. § 35-38-9-4(c). In March, the
trial court entered a final judgment granting Chastain’s petition and expunging
the records of the six identified case numbers.
[5] In October 2024, Chastain filed a new petition in which he sought to expunge
the records of case number FC-75. The State objected to Chastain’s new
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 3 of 10 petition on the ground that it was inconsistent with the once-per-lifetime filing
requirements. See I.C. § 35-38-9-9(i). Chastain then withdrew his petition and,
in December, instead moved to amend his January 2021 petition to include the
records from case number FC-75. After a hearing, the trial court denied
Chastain’s request to amend his January 2021 petition.
[6] This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review [7] The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Indiana’s expungement statutes
permit Chastain to belatedly include the records of case number FC-75 with his
initial petition when those records were not eligible for expungement at the time
of Chastain’s original filing. When a trial court’s ruling involves a pure question
of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, our standard of review is de novo.
Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2022).
[8] As our Supreme Court has made clear:
When interpreting a statute, the first step is to give the statute’s words their plain and ordinary meaning, considering the structure of the statute in its entirety to promulgate a harmonious reading. See Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Saint, 258 N.E.3d 972, 980 (Ind. 2025). In addition, “we consider both what the statute does—and does not—say, because we cannot ‘add words or restrictions.’” Id. (quoting WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2022)). Ultimately, the end goal of construing any statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. N.L. [v. State], 989 N.E.2d [773,] 777 [(Ind. 2013)] (citing Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 4 of 10 D.W. v. State, 263 N.E.3d 151, 157 (Ind. 2025).
Indiana’s expungement statutes exist to help those who have remained law-abiding obtain a “second chance.” [9] Before reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments in this appeal, we first
emphasize the purposes of Indiana’s expungement statutes. As we have
previously recognized:
the overall objective [of Indiana’s expungement statutes] is clear: our legislature intended to provide assistance to those who remained law-abiding. Cf. Taylor, which . . . discussed the overall public policy of the expungement statutes:
The legislature intended to give individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes a second chance by not experiencing many of the stigmas associated with a criminal conviction—especially where an individual has completed the requirements established by the trial court and has since been a law-abiding citizen.
Taylor[ v. State], 7 N.E.3d [362,] 367 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2014)] (emphasis added). Similarly, in Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), . . . the court opined that the intent of the General Assembly “was to allow those persons who had successfully completed their sentences without incident to petition the court after the passage of a certain amount of time . . . to expunge the records of their conviction.”
Marshall v. State, 52 N.E.3d 41, 44-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (emphases and last
omission original to Marshall).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 5 of 10 [10] As relevant here, Indiana’s expungement statutes balance the need to help those
who have earned a second chance against recidivists in two key ways. First,
they establish mandatory waiting periods before certain records become eligible
for expungement. For example, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4(c) requires
petitioners convicted of certain felonies to wait “the later of eight (8) years from
the date of conviction[] or three (3) years from the completion of . . . sentence”
before they may file their petitions to expunge records related to their
convictions. Second, a petitioner seeking to expunge records relating to a
conviction “may file a petition for expungement only one (1) time during the
petitioner’s lifetime.” 2 I.C. § 35-38-9-9(i). The mandatory waiting periods
coupled with the once-in-a-lifetime filing requirement operate together to create
a clear plan of attack for a petitioner who seeks to maximize the benefits of
Indiana’s expungement statutes: get through the relevant waiting period
without additional convictions, then file a petition to expunge all records, and
then avoid new offenses.
[11] Further, the once-in-a-lifetime requirement has some give. For example,
petitioners actually have 365 days to file various petitions across multiple
counties. I.C. § 35-38-9-9(i). And, most significantly, our General Assembly
expressly permits petitioners to supplement an initial petition with omitted
expungement requests where the petitioner’s initial petition was filed “in good
2 There is no once-in-a-lifetime requirement to expunge records of interactions with the criminal justice system that do not result in a conviction or an adverse juvenile delinquency adjudication. I.C. §§ 35-38-9-1, - 9(i).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 6 of 10 faith”; the omission of the information now being sought to be included was
“due to: (A) excusable neglect; or (B) circumstances beyond the petitioner’s
control”; and allowing the belated request “is in the best interests of justice.”
I.C. § 35-38-9-9(k).
When a petitioner chooses to file his initial petition is a circumstance within the petitioner’s control. [12] We thus turn to whether Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(k) prohibited Chastain
from seeking to expunge the records of case number FC-75 as a supplementary
request to his January 2021 petition. On this issue, section 35-38-9-9(k) provides
that a request to expunge records not included in the initial expungement
petition is permitted
only if the court finds that:
(1) the petitioner intended in good faith to comply with subsections (h) and (i);[ 3]
(2) the petitioner’s failure to comply with subsections (h) and (i) was due to:
(A) excusable neglect; or
3 Again, Indiana Code subsections 35-38-9-9(h) and (i) establish the county and lifetime requirements for expungement requests.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 7 of 10 (B) circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control; and
(3) permitting the petitioner to file a subsequent petition for expungement is in the best interests of justice.[ 4]
[13] We agree with the State that Chastain’s failure to include the records of case
number FC-75 in his initial petition was not due to excusable neglect or to
circumstances beyond his control, as required under subsection (k)(2). Chastain
does not suggest that excusable neglect applies here, and he did not omit case
number FC-75 from his initial petition due to a circumstance beyond his
control, such as his inability to identify or locate relevant records due to some
disaster. Chastain failed to include his request to expunge the records from case
number FC-75 in his initial petition because, at the time he filed that petition,
those records were not eligible for expungement because the requisite time had
not passed. See I.C. § 35-38-9-4(c).
[14] Chastain does not dispute that he could not have included his request to
expunge the records from case number FC-75 in his initial petition at the time
he filed it. See Appellant’s Br. at 16. Rather, he asserts that the “legal
impediment” that the records from case number FC-75 were not eligible for
expungement at the time he filed his initial petition qualifies as a
4 The quoted language here is identical in both the 2024 and 2025 versions of section 35-38-9-9(k).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 8 of 10 “circumstance[] beyond [his] control” under subsection (k)(2)(B). We do not
agree.
[15] Our General Assembly has established certain timeframes that must lapse
before records may be expunged; those timeframes ensure that petitioners have
established that they have “been . . . law-abiding citizen[s]” when they file their
petitions. Marshall, 52 N.E.3d at 45 (quoting Taylor, 7 N.E.3d at 367) (emphasis
removed). Thus, Chastain had the opportunity to include the records from case
number FC-75 in an initial petition—but he had to wait the requisite timeframe
for those records to be eligible for expungement before he filed that initial
petition. Stated another way, the timing of when Chastain chose to file his
initial petition was not a “circumstance[] beyond [his] control.” To the
contrary, only he controlled the timing of his initial petition.
[16] Accepting Chastain’s argument on this issue would undermine the statutory
constraints our General Assembly has determined to be necessary to ensure that
the purposes of our expungement statutes are best fulfilled. In particular, if a
petitioner can file an initial petition at any time and then seek to supplement
that petition at any later time with ensuing case numbers as those ensuing case
numbers become eligible for expungement, the once-in-a-lifetime requirement
would be meaningless. Chastain’s argument also undermines ensuring that
those who petition for expungement have spent a requisite amount of time
living law-abiding lives; under his theory for relief, a petitioner can simply
supplement an already-filed petition on a rolling basis forever and despite being
a recidivist. We reject his argument accordingly.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 9 of 10 Conclusion [17] For all of these reasons, we conclude that Chastain’s request to supplement his
January 2021 petition to expunge the records from case number FC-75 was not
permitted under Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(k). We therefore affirm the
trial court’s denial of Chastain’s request.
[18] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT David Wemhoff South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-XP-1105 | October 28, 2025 Page 10 of 10