UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMON HARO-ARTEAGA
Petitioner, No. 99-4201 v. (D.C. No. 99-CV-593) (D. Utah) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
ORDER Filed December 28, 1999
Before HENRY, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges
On the court’s own motion, the December 15, 1999 order disposing of this
matter shall be published. A copy of the published order is attached.
Entered for the Court
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By:
Keith Nelson Deputy Clerk F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH DEC 15 1999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, No. 99-4201 v. (D.C. No. 99-CV-593) (D. Utah) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the transfer by the district court of Ramon
Haro-Arteaga’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the subsequent motion for permission to
file a successive § 2255 motion in the district court, and the government’s response.
See Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997). The issue
presented is whether the motion which Mr. Haro-Arteaga seeks to file in the district
court should be treated as a second or successive motion under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). We determine that the motion is not
a second or successive motion and remand the matter to the district court. Mr. Haro-Arteaga seeks to challenge his 1995 conviction and sentence entered
by the District of Utah for distribution of a controlled substance.
Mr. Haro-Arteaga has filed two previous § 2255 motions. The first was filed
on March 28, 1996. In that proceeding, the government filed its response on June
3, 1996. Mr. Haro-Arteaga filed a motion to withdraw on June 24 stating that
“several of his grounds for relief are improperly presented in his presently submitted
Motion to Vacate Sentence, and that the presently submitted Motion omits other
valid grounds which Movant would also care to raise.” The court granted the motion
on June 28.
The second motion was filed on March 26, 1997. The government filed its
response on June 13, 1997. On July 31, the district court ordered Mr. Haro-Arteaga
to file a responsive pleading by August 22. On January 1, 1998, the district court
ordered Mr. Haro-Arteaga to show cause by February 9 as to why his motion should
not be dismissed for failure to respond to the July 31 order. On February 6, Mr.
Haro-Arteaga filed an unopposed notice of voluntary dismissal stating that he was
making the motion to “avoid any delay in his pending transfer application to
Mexico.” The matter was closed on February 10 by the district court pursuant to the
voluntary dismissal.
Mr. Haro-Arteaga then filed a § 2255 motion on August 2, 1999 and one on
August 27. The magistrate judge to whom the matters had been referred consolidated
2 the motions and transferred them to this court pursuant to Coleman.
The government argues that the § 2255 motions filed in 1996 and 1997 should
count as prior motions under AEDPA, that this is a successive motion, and therefore
Mr. Haro-Arteaga must meet the requirements set forth in AEDPA to file a
successive motion. We disagree.
In upholding the gatekeeping function of the courts of appeals set forth in
AEDPA, the Supreme Court noted that, as to similar restrictions on § 2254 petitions,
“[t]he new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule,
a restraint on what is called in habeas practice ‘abuse of the writ.’” Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996). In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct.
1618 (1998), the Court was presented with the issue of whether a § 2254 petition was
successive where the only claim being presented had been dismissed as premature
and unripe in a prior § 2254 petition, although the rest of the earlier petition had
been resolved on the merits. The Court held that the second petition was not second
or successive for purposes of AEDPA. Part of the Court’s rationale was that those
claims “would not be barred under any form of res judicata.” Id. 118 U.S. at 1622.
Accordingly, this court, as well as the other circuits, have followed the pre-
AEDPA cases on abuse of the writ to determine whether a petition is second or
successive for purposes of AEDPA. See Tapia v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 1193, 1195
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 192 (1999); United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d
3 1328, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997); Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (10th Cir.
1997). The following types of cases have been held not to be subject to the
gatekeeping restrictions: where the previous petitions have been dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, see, e.g., McWilliams v. Colorado,
121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997); where the first post-conviction remedy was used
solely to reinstate the right to a direct appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Scott, 124
F.3d at 1330; where the first petition was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee,
see, e.g., Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1996); where the
first § 2255 motion is dismissed without prejudice because it was filed while the
direct criminal appeal was pending, see Flores v. United States, No. 97-8080, 1997
WL 525596 (8th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition); and where the first petition
is returned for being insufficient for failing to comply with the Rules Governing
Section 2244 Cases or Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, see O’Connor v.
United States, 133 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Seventh Circuit appears to be the only circuit to have dealt with the
situation where the previously filed petitions have been voluntarily withdrawn. In
Felder v. McVicar, 113 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 1997), a case relied on by the government,
the earlier petition had been dismissed without prejudice upon a voluntary motion to
dismiss filed before a ruling on the merits but after the district court had set a date
for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the second, identical petition was
4 successive because the petitioner had moved to dismiss the first as soon as it became
evident that the district court was going to dismiss on the merits. The petitioner’s
attorney conceded defeat in her motion to withdraw as she had admitted that she
would be unable to sustain the petitioner’s burden of proof at the upcoming hearing.
See also Hurd v.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMON HARO-ARTEAGA
Petitioner, No. 99-4201 v. (D.C. No. 99-CV-593) (D. Utah) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
ORDER Filed December 28, 1999
Before HENRY, LUCERO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges
On the court’s own motion, the December 15, 1999 order disposing of this
matter shall be published. A copy of the published order is attached.
Entered for the Court
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By:
Keith Nelson Deputy Clerk F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH DEC 15 1999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, No. 99-4201 v. (D.C. No. 99-CV-593) (D. Utah) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the transfer by the district court of Ramon
Haro-Arteaga’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the subsequent motion for permission to
file a successive § 2255 motion in the district court, and the government’s response.
See Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997). The issue
presented is whether the motion which Mr. Haro-Arteaga seeks to file in the district
court should be treated as a second or successive motion under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). We determine that the motion is not
a second or successive motion and remand the matter to the district court. Mr. Haro-Arteaga seeks to challenge his 1995 conviction and sentence entered
by the District of Utah for distribution of a controlled substance.
Mr. Haro-Arteaga has filed two previous § 2255 motions. The first was filed
on March 28, 1996. In that proceeding, the government filed its response on June
3, 1996. Mr. Haro-Arteaga filed a motion to withdraw on June 24 stating that
“several of his grounds for relief are improperly presented in his presently submitted
Motion to Vacate Sentence, and that the presently submitted Motion omits other
valid grounds which Movant would also care to raise.” The court granted the motion
on June 28.
The second motion was filed on March 26, 1997. The government filed its
response on June 13, 1997. On July 31, the district court ordered Mr. Haro-Arteaga
to file a responsive pleading by August 22. On January 1, 1998, the district court
ordered Mr. Haro-Arteaga to show cause by February 9 as to why his motion should
not be dismissed for failure to respond to the July 31 order. On February 6, Mr.
Haro-Arteaga filed an unopposed notice of voluntary dismissal stating that he was
making the motion to “avoid any delay in his pending transfer application to
Mexico.” The matter was closed on February 10 by the district court pursuant to the
voluntary dismissal.
Mr. Haro-Arteaga then filed a § 2255 motion on August 2, 1999 and one on
August 27. The magistrate judge to whom the matters had been referred consolidated
2 the motions and transferred them to this court pursuant to Coleman.
The government argues that the § 2255 motions filed in 1996 and 1997 should
count as prior motions under AEDPA, that this is a successive motion, and therefore
Mr. Haro-Arteaga must meet the requirements set forth in AEDPA to file a
successive motion. We disagree.
In upholding the gatekeeping function of the courts of appeals set forth in
AEDPA, the Supreme Court noted that, as to similar restrictions on § 2254 petitions,
“[t]he new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule,
a restraint on what is called in habeas practice ‘abuse of the writ.’” Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996). In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct.
1618 (1998), the Court was presented with the issue of whether a § 2254 petition was
successive where the only claim being presented had been dismissed as premature
and unripe in a prior § 2254 petition, although the rest of the earlier petition had
been resolved on the merits. The Court held that the second petition was not second
or successive for purposes of AEDPA. Part of the Court’s rationale was that those
claims “would not be barred under any form of res judicata.” Id. 118 U.S. at 1622.
Accordingly, this court, as well as the other circuits, have followed the pre-
AEDPA cases on abuse of the writ to determine whether a petition is second or
successive for purposes of AEDPA. See Tapia v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 1193, 1195
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 192 (1999); United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d
3 1328, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997); Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (10th Cir.
1997). The following types of cases have been held not to be subject to the
gatekeeping restrictions: where the previous petitions have been dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, see, e.g., McWilliams v. Colorado,
121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997); where the first post-conviction remedy was used
solely to reinstate the right to a direct appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Scott, 124
F.3d at 1330; where the first petition was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee,
see, e.g., Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1996); where the
first § 2255 motion is dismissed without prejudice because it was filed while the
direct criminal appeal was pending, see Flores v. United States, No. 97-8080, 1997
WL 525596 (8th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition); and where the first petition
is returned for being insufficient for failing to comply with the Rules Governing
Section 2244 Cases or Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, see O’Connor v.
United States, 133 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Seventh Circuit appears to be the only circuit to have dealt with the
situation where the previously filed petitions have been voluntarily withdrawn. In
Felder v. McVicar, 113 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 1997), a case relied on by the government,
the earlier petition had been dismissed without prejudice upon a voluntary motion to
dismiss filed before a ruling on the merits but after the district court had set a date
for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the second, identical petition was
4 successive because the petitioner had moved to dismiss the first as soon as it became
evident that the district court was going to dismiss on the merits. The petitioner’s
attorney conceded defeat in her motion to withdraw as she had admitted that she
would be unable to sustain the petitioner’s burden of proof at the upcoming hearing.
See also Hurd v. Mondragon, 851 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding, in a pre-
AEDPA case, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss
without prejudice a § 2254 petition which counsel attempted to withdraw after the
magistrate judge had filed findings and recommended that the petition be dismissed).
In Garrett v. United States, 178 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit,
however, limited Felder. The court determined that a § 2255 motion filed after two
earlier motions had been voluntarily dismissed was not a second or
successive motion. The first motion was withdrawn after the government had filed
its response but before the movant had received the response. The basis of the
withdrawal was that the motion was the “‘artless’” effort of a layperson without legal
training.” Garrett, 178 F.3d at 941. The second motion was withdrawn four months
after it was filed, but before the government filed its response. The movant again
asserted that he needed someone with legal training to help him clarify the issues for
presentation. The court distinguished Felder by noting that, unlike in Felder, the
movant never conceded defeat. The court held:
Our cases have required that, in order for a habeas petition to be considered successive, the previous motion must
5 have been denied on the merits. The district court must have engaged in substantive review.
Garrett, 178 F.3d at 942.
We agree with the reasoning of Garrett. Accordingly, because none of the
earlier motions filed by Mr. Haro-Arteaga conceded any claim or were decided on
the merits or after the district court engaged in substantive review, the present
motion is not subject to the gatekeeping provisions of AEDPA.
The district court order is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.
PER CURIAM