Harnois v. SSA

2004 DNH 140

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 21, 2004
• Docket: CV-01-360-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Harnois v . SSA CV-01-360-SM 09/21/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Michael J. Harnois, Petitioner

v. Civil N o . 01-360-SM Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 140 Jo Anne B . Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Respondent

O R D E R

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Michael J.

Harnois, moves to reverse the Commissioner’s decision denying his

application for Social Security disability insurance benefits

under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The

Commissioner, in turn, moves for an order affirming her decision.

For the reasons given below, the Commissioner’s decision is

affirmed.

The applicable standard of review in this case provides, in

pertinent part:

The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the court “must uphold a denial of

social security disability benefits unless ‘the [Commissioner]

has committed a legal or factual error in evaluating a particular

claim.’” Manso-Pizarro v . Sec’y of HHS, 76 F.3d 1 5 , 16 (1st Cir.

1996) (quoting Sullivan v . Hudson, 490 U.S. 8 7 7 , 885 (1989)).

Michael Harnois received disability insurance benefits for

the period from July 2 8 , 1995, until November 1 , 1996. As of

November 1 , 1996, he was no longer under a disability.

On April 1 4 , 1998, Harnois re-applied for disability

insurance benefits. Ultimately, he claimed a closed period of

disability running from November 1 5 , 1997, to August 4 , 1998, the

date on which he returned to work. The application was denied,

on grounds that claimant was not under a disability because he

“ha[d] not been unable to engage in substantial gainful activity

for any continuous period of at least 12 months.”

(Administrative Transcript at 17.)

2 According to claimant, the decision of the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) should be reversed because it is legally

incorrect. Specifically, claimant faults the ALJ for failing to

count nine months of work claimant did between January and

October of 1997 as a “period of trial work,” 42 U.S.C. § 422(c),

that made his 1997-98 period of disability a continuation of the

1995-96 disability, rather than an independent disability period

that had to meet the twelve-month durational requirement.

Respondent contends that the statutory trial-work provision is

inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.

Because the disputed work took place when claimant was not

under a disability, the trial-work provision of the Social

Security Act is simply not implicated.

The 1980 amendments to the [Social Security] Act . . . provide a trial work period as an incentive for individuals with disabling impairments to try to return to work. See Pub. L . N o . 96-265, 94 Stat. 453, 457 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 422(c) (1991)). Work and earnings during the trial work period, which may last up to nine nonconsecutive months, are disregarded in determining whether the individual’s disability ceased during the trial work period. See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c); [Harvey L.] McCormick, [Social Security Claims and Procedures] § 409 [(4th ed. 1991)].

3 Flaten v . Sec’y of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995)

(emphasis added); see also Conley v . Bowen, 859 F.2d 2 6 1 , 262

(2nd Cir. 1988) (“Title II of the Social Security Act . . .

permits recipients of disability insurance benefits to retain

their disabled status while they test their ability to work

during a nine-month ‘trial work period’ . . . .”) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted); Fabel v . Shalala, 891 F. Supp. 2 0 2 ,

204 (D.N.J. 1995) (“An individual who is ‘entitled’ to disability

insurance benefits may also engage in a trial work period. . . .

The purpose of the trial work period is to give the disabled

person an opportunity to test [his] ‘ability to work and still be

considered disabled.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 422(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a)).

Flaten, Conley, Fabel, and the plain language of 42 U.S.C.

§ 422(c) make it clear that “trial work” is something engaged in

by individuals who are under a disability and who wish to test

their ability to work without losing their status as disabled.

Here, however, as of November 1 , 1996, Harnois had no disabled

status to preserve; all agree that his period of disability ended

because he had recovered from his disability. For that reason,

4 the work he did in 1997 was not trial work, as defined by 42

U.S.C. § 422(c). Because the work Harnois did in 1997 was not

trial work, it did not serve to extend his 1995-96 period of

disability to include his disability in 1997-98, which was,

therefore, subject to the twelve-month durational requirement.

And, because the 1997-98 period of disability amounted to less

than twelve months, the ALJ correctly decided that claimant was

not eligible for disability insurance benefits.

For the reasons given, claimant’s motion to reverse the

decision of the Commissioner (document n o . 10) is denied, and the

Commissioner’s motion to affirm her decision (document n o . 13) is

granted. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in

accordance with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

September 2 1 , 2004

cc: David L . Broderick, Esq. Francis M . Jackson, Esq. Karen B . Nesbitt, Esq.