Harness v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 24, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-00210
StatusUnknown

This text of Harness v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Harness v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harness v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., (S.D. Miss. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

TOMMY HARNESS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:23-cv-210-HSO-MTP

CHEVRON U.S.A., INC. DEFENDANT

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Tommy Harness’s Motion to Compel Discovery [39]. The Court, having carefully considered the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, finds that the Motion to Compel [39] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below. BACKGROUND This action arises from Plaintiff’s claim that, despite being Defendant’s employee for forty-two years,1 he has never been promoted to a managerial position based on the color of his skin. See [2] at 1. Since the inception of this lawsuit, the parties have made little discovery progress, and from all appearances, have failed to cooperate in good faith. In December of 2023, both parties propounded written discovery requests. Neither party timely responded, nor did they request additional time to do so. Seizing the opportunity, Defendant moved for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to Defendant’s requests for admissions defeated Plaintiff’s claims. While Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [24] was pending, the parties became embroiled in a discovery dispute.

1 Plaintiff began working for Defendant in January of 1982. See [2] at 3. Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s “forty-year” tenure at times. See, e.g., [48] at 21. The Court will refer to Plaintiff’s tenure as “forty-two years.” Defendant served its tardy responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests on February 6, 2024. See [32] [33]. Unhappy with Defendant’s “boilerplate objections,” Plaintiff informed Defendant that it sought more substantive responses to several of its requests on March 28, 2024. See [39-3]. Defendant then unilaterally imposed a moratorium on discovery, answering that it had no intention to “engage in further discovery or substantively respond to [Plaintiff’s] letter

until the Court has ruled on [Defendant’s] dispositive motion.” [39-4]. The legal basis for shutting down the discovery allowed by the Case Management Order [18] was not revealed. On April 11, 2024, the Court held a telephonic discovery conference that addressed Defendant’s position, reminded Defendant that a pending dispositive motion does not serve as a self-executing stay, and allowed Defendant seven days to supplement its responses. Defendant timely supplemented its responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests on April 18, 2024. See [37] [38]. By an email letter sent that same date, Defendant pointed out a number of its concerns with several of Plaintiff’s requests. Rather than cooperate in a good-faith effort to perhaps resolve the parties’ concerns and avoid the unnecessary briefing and further expenses

associated with this dispute, Plaintiff hastily filed the instant Motion to Compel [39] the following day. The Motion [39] is riddled with inaccuracies and incomplete in many respects.2 To be clear, Plaintiff certainly had the authority to file a motion to compel.3 It is equally clear, however, that Plaintiff failed to engage in good faith to resolve any remaining issues and to

2 Many of Plaintiff’s discovery requests appear to be either boilerplate discovery requests or copied from other lawsuits. For example, Plaintiff persistently inquires as to issues relating to sexual harassment and gender discrimination, which are entirely irrelevant to this lawsuit. See Interrogatories 2, 3, and 4. Elsewhere, Plaintiff seeks information relating to his “date of termination,” though Plaintiff has not been terminated by Defendant. See Request for Production No. 6.

3 See Minute Entry 04/11/2024. address Defendant’s mostly well-founded objections. Defendant responded to the Motion [39]. See [47]. Plaintiff did not file a rebuttal or reply. ANALYSIS The Court has broad discretion over the scope of discovery. See Hernandez v. Causey, 2020 WL 5412486, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 9, 2020); Freeman v. United States, 566 F.3d 326,

341 (5th Cir. 2009). Rule 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(1) also requires that discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Id. The party resisting discovery must specifically object and show that the requested discovery does not fall within Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of proper discovery. Itron, Inc. v. Johnston, 2017 WL 11372352, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 17, 2017). “General or boilerplate objections are invalid, and ‘[o]bjections to discovery must be made with specificity, and the responding party has the obligation to explain and supports is objections.’” Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 578 (N.D. Tex. 2018); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2).

As a preliminary matter, Defendant urges the Court to deny the Motion to Compel [39] for Plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with the Local Rules. Local Rule 37(b) requires that motions regarding discovery propounded “must quote verbatim each interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission to which the motion is addressed and must state: (1) the specific objection; (2) the grounds assigned for the objection (if not apparent from the objection itself), and (3) the reasons assigned as supporting the motion.” L.U. Civ. R. 37(b). “The objections, grounds and reasons must be written in immediate succession to the quoted discovery request. The objections and grounds must be addressed to the specific interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission and may not be general in nature.” Id. Plaintiff misrepresents Defendant’s responses to his discovery requests throughout the Motion to Compel [39]. Defendant supplemented its responses to Plaintiff’s propounded discovery on April 18, 2024. See [47-2]. That day, counsel for Defendant also emailed Plaintiff’s counsel and explained its remaining concerns with the propriety of certain requests. See [39-5].

In support of his Motion to Compel [39], Plaintiff often conflates the two, citing to Defendant’s email as a “response” rather than Defendant’s responses or supplemental responses. For example, Defendant’s “responses,” as quoted by Plaintiff to Interrogatories Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, and 16 in the Motion [39], are provided from Defendant’s email, [39-5]—not the actual discovery responses served upon Plaintiff. See [39-2] [47-2]. Plaintiff did not list the objections, grounds, and reasons in immediate succession to the quoted discovery requests as required by L.U. Civ. R. 37(b). This violation of the rules leaves the Court and Defendant to sift through numerous documents and engage in guesswork to verify the information conveyed in the Motion to Compel

[39], which is the very issue the rule sought to eliminate. Additionally, Plaintiff did not trouble to file a rebuttal to clarify or respond to the issues raised by Defendant and to assist the Court in addressing the Motion [39]. Plaintiff’s violation of L.U. Civ. R. 37(b) provides a sufficient basis for denying the Motion to Compel [39]. See L.U. Civ. R. 37(c). By not following the Local Rules in presenting what is already a complex and in some respects an unnecessary Motion to Compel [39], Plaintiff transfers its responsibilities to everyone else and creates undue expense and confusion. In the interests of advancing this dispute to a resolution and eliminating further delay and expense, the Court will nevertheless address the merits of many of the requests that are addressed in the Motion [39]. I. Interrogatories Interrogatory No.

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Bluebook (online)
Harness v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harness-v-chevron-usa-inc-mssd-2024.