Harmon v. Corlean Realty Co.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Harmon v. Corlean Realty Co.

78 A.D.2d 634, 433 N.Y.S.2d 741, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 6, 1980

StatusPublished

This text of 78 A.D.2d 634 (Harmon v. Corlean Realty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harmon v. Corlean Realty Co., 78 A.D.2d 634, 433 N.Y.S.2d 741, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 7, 1979, which dismissed their complaint on the ground that the action is barred by subdivision 6 of section 29 of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision of Mr. Justice Pittoni at Trial Term. We would add, however, that plaintiffs’ contention that subdivision 6 of section 29 of the Workers’ Compensation Law does not bar this action insofar as it is based on a theory of respondeat superior, rather than on section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, need not be resolved in this case since the stipulated facts did not establish, inter alia, that the allegedly negligent driver, at the time of the accident, was acting in furtherance of the duties he owed to the defendant. (See Lundberg v State of New York, 25 NY2d 467.) Damiani, J. P., Gibbons, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 7, 1979, which dismissed their complaint on the ground that the action is barred by subdivision 6 of section 29 of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision of Mr. Justice Pittoni at Trial Term. We would add, however, that plaintiffs’ contention that subdivision 6 of section 29 of the Workers’ Compensation Law does not bar this action insofar as it is based on a theory of respondeat superior, rather than on section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, need not be resolved in this case since the stipulated facts did not establish, inter alia, that the allegedly negligent driver, at the time of the accident, was acting in furtherance of the duties he owed to the defendant. (See Lundberg v State of New York, 25 NY2d 467.) Damiani, J. P., Gibbons, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

78 A.D.2d 634, 433 N.Y.S.2d 741, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harmon-v-corlean-realty-co-nyappdiv-1980.

Opinion

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