Harman v. Yeager Et Ux.

134 P.2d 695, 103 Utah 208, 1943 Utah LEXIS 100
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 4, 1943
DocketNo. 6549.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 134 P.2d 695 (Harman v. Yeager Et Ux.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harman v. Yeager Et Ux., 134 P.2d 695, 103 Utah 208, 1943 Utah LEXIS 100 (Utah 1943).

Opinions

LARSON, Justice.

This appeal turns on a question of pleading. For several years defendants had been the owners of certain lands in Salt Lake County, including the N% of Lot 8, Block 22, Plat “A” Big Field Survey. In 1932 defendants sold part of said property to plaintiff, and executed and delivered a deed therefor. Several years later a dispute arose between the parties as to the exact location of the boundary line between their properties. On March 18, 1939, plaintiff instituted this action to quiet title to the property described in her deed from defendants. In their answer defendants set forth what was denominated as an “Affirmative Defense and a Basis for Affirmative Relief.” Plaintiff filed no reply, and when the matter came on for trial, defendants moved for “Judgment on the Pleadings.” The motion was denied and the cause heard on the merits. Judgment quieting plaintiff’s title was entered. Defendants’ appeal turns upon the ruling of the court denying judgment on the pleadings. If defendants’ answer was such as to require a reply, defendants were entitled to judgment. If no reply was required the judgment must be affirmed. As to whether a reply was required in this cause, depends upon the question as to whether the matters set up in the so-called “Affirmative Defense” set up in defendants’ answer constitutes a coun *210 terclaim. We need not consider the various circumstances under which a reply may be required. That matter is discussed at length in Dunham v. Travis, 25 Utah 65, 69 P. 468; and Tate v. Rose, 85 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003.

A reply must be filed to a counterclaim, or the allegations thereof are taken as true and defendant entitled to judgment accordingly. Dunham v. Travis, supra; Smith v. Faust, 1 Utah 90; Dickert v. Weise, 2 Utah 350, 354. If the matters set out as an affirmative defense do not constitute a counterclaim it is admitted defendants are not entitled to judgment thereunder and their assignment must fail. A counterclaim, is viewed as an original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint. Dunham v. Travis, supra.

Let us examine defendants’ so-called “Affirmative Defense” and see if it states a cause of action against plaintiff. If it states a cause of action it matters not that it was not designated as a counter-claim. Its character will be determined by the court by the facts set out in the pleading. Dunham v. Travis, supra, and cases therein cited. Defendants contend they state a cause of action on two different theories: (1) A cause of action for reformation of the deed given by defendants to plaintiff; (2) a cause of action to quiet title by adverse user. We will examine them in order. Do defendants state a cause of action for reformation of the deed? The matters alleged, as far as pertinent to this claim, are as follows: That in 1932 defendants were the owners of the North ½ of Lot 8, Block 22, 10 Acre Plat “A,” Big Field Survey; on November 19th of that year they executed and delivered to plaintiff a deed to a part of such property which deed was recorded and contained the following description:

“Beginning at a point 8.7 rods South of the Northwest corner of Lot 8, Block 22, Ten Acre Plat “A,” Big Field Survey, and running thence North 4.35 rods; thence East 46 rods; thence South 4.35 rods; thence West 46 rods to the place of beginning, being the South % of *211 the North Vz of said Lot 8, together with 1% shares of stock in Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company.”

That there was a fence “at or near the north side” of the property defendants owned before the sale to plaintiff, and another fence “at or near the south side” of said property; at the time of the sale to plaintiff there existed a fence “equidistant from the north and south fences” mentioned above; that “plaintiff intended to and did accept the south half of the property between said fences [the north and the south fences] as the property she was purchasing”; that plaintiff intended to and did accept the partition fence as the dividing line; that it was only just prior to commencement of this action that plaintiff discovered there was a dispute as to the lands she had purchased. “That the parties hereto understood and agreed that said fence on or near the north boundary of Lot 8 was the measuring point and understood and agreed at the time of said conveyance and thereafter for many years that the partition fence between said properties was the boundary line, and understood and agreed that the same should be the partitioning line and eliminate any dispute or uncertainty concerning said boundary, and was accepted as such.” That the parties believed that fences “were on the true boundary lines”; that defendants are the owners and occupants of the property contained between the fences on or near the north boundary of Lot 8 and the partition fence, being described as the north 4.35 rods of Lot 8, measured from the fence line on or near the north boundary of Lot 8; that plaintiff asserts some interest, therein, without right; and prays for a decree quieting their title thereto and reforming the deed if the partition fence is not the true boundary. These are all the facts set out which could tend to support a cause of action for reformation of the deed. Do they state a cause of action? We shall state here the facts which are missing the allegation of some of which is essential to stating a cause of action.

*212 There is. no allegation that the description in the deed does not describe the land sold and intended to be conveyed; Auerbach v. Healy, 174 Cal. 60, 161 P. 1157; there is no allegation that the land described is not the land between the fences; there is no allegation setting forth the correct description of the land actually sold by defendants to the plaintiff, if the description in the deed is not correct. Sellwood v. Henneman, 36 Or. 575, 60 P. 12; Ramsay v. Loomis, 6 Or. 367. There is no allegation to show any difference between the lands plaintiff claims and the lands defendants say were sold to plaintiff; Peninsula Lumber Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 93 Or. 684, 184 P. 562; there is no allegation that the description in the deed is not the description that it was intended to put into the deed; Thraves v. Greenlees, 42 Okl. 764, 142 P. 1021; there is no allegation that any mistake was made in describing the property intended to be conveyed; there is no allegation that the written instrument fails to express the intention of the parties; Carr v. King, 24 Cal. App. 713, 142 P. 131; there is no allegation that a mistake was made by the parties or either one of them; Carlson v. Druse, 79 Wash. 542, 140 P. 570; nor is it pointed out wherein the writing fails to embody the real agreement. Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632, 87 Am. Dec. 142; Strauss v. Monitor Specialty Co., 89 Neb. 176, 131 N. W.

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Bluebook (online)
134 P.2d 695, 103 Utah 208, 1943 Utah LEXIS 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harman-v-yeager-et-ux-utah-1943.