Harley Lea Ray v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al

District Court, W.D. Kentucky·Decided August 18, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-00536·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-0536-CRS

HARLEY LEA RAY PLAINTIFF

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, et al DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case. It arises from plaintiff Harley Ray’s failure to repay a car loan assigned to defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo ultimately charged off the delinquent loan balance and cancelled the debt. Thereafter, it informed certain credit agencies that the account was charged off and had a zero balance. As a result, this information appeared on Ray’s credit report. Ray alleges that while reporting the balance as zero was a correct statement, Wells Fargo nonetheless violated the FCRA because cancelling the debt required Wells Fargo to report his account status as “closed” and to ensure that the charged-off information was deleted. Its refusal to do so, according to Ray, resulted in an inaccurate credit report. Wells Fargo contends that the opposite is true. It asserts that Ray has not stated a claim because the FCRA permits it to report the account as charged-off for a period of seven years and its reporting was otherwise accurate. Wells Fargo has moved to dismiss on these grounds. PLAINTIFF RAY’S ALLEGATIONS In July 2018, plaintiff Ray and his spouse bought a 2015 Buick Regal. 07/25/25 Complaint, DN 3-1, at ¶ 13. They executed a retail installment sales contract which was later assigned to Wells Fargo. Id. About a year and half later and to avoid repossession, Ray surrendered the car. Id. at ¶ 14. In 2020, Wells Fargo sold the car at auction but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the outstanding debt. Id. at ¶ 15. Ultimately, Wells Fargo “voluntarily waived the charged-off balance on the loan that Wells Fargo “was reporting inaccurate credit information concerning him and the waived and cancelled” debt. Id. at ¶ 18. More specifically, Ray alleges that Wells Fargo was inaccurately reporting his “‘account status’” as “‘charged off.’” Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. In Ray’s view, the report was inaccurate because Wells Fargo had voluntarily waived the debt. Id. Ray claims that this “false account status information,” furnished by Wells Fargo, “constitutes derogatory credit information that negatively impacted” his “credit score and creditworthiness.” Id. at ¶ 22. Ray disputed this allegedly “false negative account status” by sending a letter to certain

credit reporting agencies. Id. at ¶ 23. Ray’s letter triggered Wells Fargo’s duty to investigate as well as the credit reporting agencies’ like duty. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. According to Ray, “[a] reasonable investigation would have found at once that the account status information Wells Fargo was furnishing . . . could not possibly be correct in light of Wells Fargo’s own voluntary cancellation and waiver of the alleged remaining debt.” Id. at ¶ 27. Thus, Ray alleges that Wells Fargo failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Id. at ¶ 37. He also alleges that Wells Fargo “willfully failed to direct the [credit reporting agencies] to delete inaccurate information about Mr. Ray contained in the Wells Fargo Tradeline as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(C).” Id. at ¶ 38. Ray seeks actual, statutory and punitive damages as well as attorney fees for Wells Fargo’s alleged willful violation of the FRCA. Id. at ¶ 40. In the alternative, Ray alleges that Wells Fargo’s conduct was

negligent, entitling him to actual damages as well as attorney fees and costs. Id. at ¶ 41. Wells Fargo contends that these allegations fail to state a claim for an FCRA violation because the information it reported was accurate, a fact that is evident from Ray’s own allegations. As a result, it has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ANALYSIS When presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must read the complaint “‘as a whole,’” construe it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all fact allegations as true. Barton v. Neeley, 114 F.4th 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2024). At the same time, to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). In other words, to state a valid claim, a complaint “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material

elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).1 In this case, Wells Fargo asserts that Ray’s allegations fail to present a viable legal theory. First, Wells Fargo points out that Ray has pleaded the fact of the charge-off itself. 09/22/25 Mem. of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, DN 13-1, at PageID# 76. Second, Wells Fargo points out that the FCRA permits creditors to report a charge-off for a period of seven years. Id. at PageID# 75 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681c) (additional citation omitted). Thus, according to Wells Fargo, Ray cannot plausibly allege that Wells Fargo’s reporting that event was either false or misleading. Id. at PageID# 76. Next, Wells Fargo contends that there is nothing misleading in its having reported the charge-off as the loan status along with a zero-dollar balance because Ray never made a

payment after Wells Fargo charged off the debt. Id. at PageID# 75.-76 Wells Fargo maintains that it did not have an obligation to update the account-status information unless Ray made a payment or payments after Wells Fargo charged off the debt. Id. And, because Ray has not pleaded that he

1Ray attached some correspondence to his Response to the Motion to Dismiss (DN 15-1). It regards Wells Fargo’s cancellation of Ray’s debt. The Court may not consider such extrinsic documents in resolving a motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). That concern does not arise here, however, given that Ray has pleaded that Wells Fargo waived and cancelled the debt. Those are fact allegations which the Court must accept as true for purposes of resolving the Motion, rendering it unnecessary for the Cour to consider the correspondence which is to the same effect. Thus, the Court has excluded any consideration of the correspondence made one or more payments after the charge-off, there are no allegations which show that Wells Fargo’s reporting as to Ray’s account status is false or inaccurate; thus, the Complaint fails to state a claim against Wells Fargo for an FCRA violation. Id. Ray’s Response does not address a creditor’s lawful ability to report a charge-off for a period of seven years. Nor does he contend that Wells Fargo reported the charge-off after the seven-year period expired. Rather, Ray argues that Wells Fargo’s reporting is inaccurate because charging off a debt and cancelling it are “legally and substantively distinct from one another.”

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Harley Lea Ray v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al, (W.D. Ky. 2026).

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