Harley C. Loney Co. v. Ravenscroft

162 F.2d 703, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 23, 1947
DocketNo. 9079
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 162 F.2d 703 (Harley C. Loney Co. v. Ravenscroft) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harley C. Loney Co. v. Ravenscroft, 162 F.2d 703, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781 (7th Cir. 1947).

Opinion

SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, the respective owners of the patents here involved, charged appellees with infringing claims 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of United States patent No. 2,036,757 to Hume, and claim 1 of United States patent [704]*704No. 2,029,561 to DuSang. The former was issued April 7, 1936, on an application filed December 3,. 1932. ' The latter was issued February 4, 1936, on an application filed April 4, 1934. Infringement of neither patent is denied, and the only issues presented are whether either patent discloses patentable invention. The District Court held that neither did, and dismissed the action for lack of merit. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

At the outset we call attention to the fact that this ruling is based upon the court’s alleged conclusions of law, numbers 5 and 6, that each claim in issue is invalid for lack of invention. It is fair to say that the factual findings and conclusions of law, as usual, were prepared by counsel, and of this we make no issue. However, there seems to be a growing tendency to give words a different meaning from that to which they are entitled, which at times is quite confusing, in distinguishing between a finding of fact and a conclusion of law.

There are four ultimate facts required to be established by an applicant before he can obtain a patent. They are invention or discovery, authorship, novelty, and utility. Other specific requirements are set forth in the statute, 35 U.S.C.A. § 31, but they all pertain to the question of novelty or authorship. If all ultimate facts are found and are substantially supported by evidentiary facts, which of course need not be incorporated in the findings of fact, then the court should conclude as a matter of law that the disclosure is patentable, otherwise not.

Invention does not connote patentability. True, all patents are, or ought to be, based upon inventions or discoveries, but all inventions or discoveries are not patentable. It has many times happened that two or more persons, each unknown to the other, and unacquainted with the other’s work, have discovered or invented precisely the same thing. True, each is not entitled to a patent, for that goes to the earlier and more diligent inventor or discoverer, but each is as truly an inventor or discoverer as the other, for that is the unambiguous reading of the statute, and it is supported by all our lexicographers, and by the root meaning of the words from which the English words are derived.

Of course, if there be no invention or discovery there can be no patentability, but there may be invention or discovery which is not patentable. Again, the invention or discovery must be new to the one making it, otherwise he would be a copier rather than an inventor or discoverer. If the disclosure is new to him, he is an inventor or a discoverer, regardless of the fact that others may have invented or discovered the same thing. However, he would not be entitled to a patent. unless it was established by evidentiary facts that, among other facts, including utility, he was the first inventor or discoverer. Invention and utility are questions of fact; pateutable invention is a question of law because the statute defines what is patentable, and it does not define the words “invention” or “discovery.”

The prior art does not reveal the identical disclosures of these patents, nor did the court find, in so many words, that there was no invention. However, it was found that when the patentees entered this field, a mechanic skilled in this art could have produced the structures coming under the claims in issue without the exercise of invention. This, in effect, is a finding that no invention was disclosed, provided the respective patentees were skilled in the art. The evidence, by inference, might well indicate that both patentees were skilled in this art, yet there is no specific finding to that effect. If it be true, neither will be heard to say that he did not know, at the time of filing his application, what those skilled in the art already knew at that time. They are presumed to have known it, hence they disclosed no novelty, if such disclosures did not exceed the skill of the art. However, if at that time either patentee was not aware- of what those skilled in the art then knew, he was not skilled in the art, and while he might invent or discover something in the art which was new to him, yet it would not possess novelty, hence would not be patentable, for patentability depends upon the knowledge of those skilled in the art, while invention or dis[705]*705co very depends entirely upon the knowledge of the party making the disclosure.

The predominant theory of the findings of the court and of appellees’ argument is that the disclosures of each patent were old in the art or did not exceed the then skill of the art, regardless of ■whether the patentees were versed in the art, and each, if true, would be a good defense. We therefore regard of no moment the inclusion in the conclusions of law, of the factual reasons for concluding as a matter of law that each claim was invalid. The conclusions of law must be supported by the factual findings, and if in this case the legal conclusion of invalidity or, if preferred, the lack of patentable invention, is supported by the findings, and if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, the conclusions of law are sufficient to support the judgment.

These patents relate to the very old art of balancing rotating bodies, and specifically, the balancing of automobile wheels. The Hume patent states:

“The present invention relates to an improvement in the balance of vehicle wheels provided with a pneumatic tire.

“At the present time, the increasing speed at which motor vehicles are driven has resulted in the necessity of dynamically balancing the wheels. It is not enough to attempt to balance the wheel, rim, and tire, constituting the complete unit, during the fabrication thereof, but it is necessary to balance the entire assembly thereafter upon its axis of rotation. Shifting of the rim during the rolling action resulting in variation in thickness of the flanges; welding of the rims; variation in tire construction; and the concentrated weight of the valve stem of the inner tube are some of the factors which result in unbalanced wheel assemblies and have to be overcome.

“Heretofore attempts have been made to balance the wheel assembly by removing material from certain localities and adding material in other localities. These attempts for the most part have been cumbrous, expensive, and ineffective and * * * are either of a permanent character or are limited to a particular and specified point of application and lack any degree of flexibility and ease of installation.

“It becomes the primary object of my invention * * * to provide a balancing mass for vehicle wheels of the pneumatic tire type, which is inexpensive, effective and may be readily and adjustably positioned along the flange of the wheel rim to balance the wheel, rim, and tire assembly.”

The DuSang patent states:

“This invention relates to the art of balancing weights to be applied to rotating members particularly in automobile wheels. With the advent of high speed performance of automobiles and tires of considerable relative weight with large diameters, difficulty is frequently encountered in keeping the automobile traveling in a straight line.

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162 F.2d 703, 74 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harley-c-loney-co-v-ravenscroft-ca7-1947.