Harless v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Harless v. State

622 So. 2d 619, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8424, 1993 WL 306750

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedAugust 13, 1993

DocketNo. 92-2175

StatusPublished

This text of 622 So. 2d 619 (Harless v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Harless v. State, 622 So. 2d 619, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8424, 1993 WL 306750 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinion

COBB, Judge.

A hearing was held before the trial court at which the appointed public defender, at the behest of his client, the defendant Harless, moved to withdraw as counsel because Harless had a lack of confidence in the office of the public defender. The trial judge saw the problem merely as a “personality conflict” between Harless and a particular public defender, and urged that another assistant handle this case. The assistant handling the case correctly pointed out to the trial judge that, as an administrative matter, their office simply could not function if their clients could pick and choose which assistant public defender, or which special public defender, they might prefer.

The public defender’s position is consistent with our opinion in Frazier v. State, 453 So.2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), wherein we held that a defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel of his choice. Once the trial judge concludes that there is no showing of ineffective counsel, a motion to discharge that counsel should be denied — absent a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). There was no such clear and unequivocal request in this case. See Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla.1992); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198 (Fla.1992); Capehart v. State, 583 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1991).

The trial judge was correct in his ultimate denial of the defendant’s motion to discharge.

AFFIRMED.

W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.

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COBB, Judge.

A hearing was held before the trial court at which the appointed public defender, at the behest of his client, the defendant Harless, moved to withdraw as counsel because Harless had a lack of confidence in the office of the public defender. The trial judge saw the problem merely as a “personality conflict” between Harless and a particular public defender, and urged that another assistant handle this case. The assistant handling the case correctly pointed out to the trial judge that, as an administrative matter, their office simply could not function if their clients could pick and choose which assistant public defender, or which special public defender, they might prefer.

The public defender’s position is consistent with our opinion in Frazier v. State, 453 So.2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), wherein we held that a defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel of his choice. Once the trial judge concludes that there is no showing of ineffective counsel, a motion to discharge that counsel should be denied — absent a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). There was no such clear and unequivocal request in this case. See Hunt v. State, 613 So.2d 893 (Fla.1992); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198 (Fla.1992); Capehart v. State, 583 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1991).

The trial judge was correct in his ultimate denial of the defendant’s motion to discharge.

AFFIRMED.

W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

622 So. 2d 619, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8424, 1993 WL 306750, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harless-v-state-fladistctapp-1993.

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