Harker v. Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. (In Re E. G. Hoover Co.)

16 B.R. 435, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 906, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5067
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 14, 1982
DocketBankruptcy No. 1-80-00133, Adv. No. 1-80-0194
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 16 B.R. 435 (Harker v. Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. (In Re E. G. Hoover Co.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harker v. Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. (In Re E. G. Hoover Co.), 16 B.R. 435, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 906, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5067 (Pa. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DETERMINING ENTITLEMENT TO SALE PROCEEDS

THOMAS WOOD, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust Company (the Bank), four consignors, and the trustee of the debtor’s estate claim entitlement to share in the proceeds of the sale of the debtor’s inventory and equipment. The Bank claims a security interest in the entire proceeds. The consignors claim a portion of the proceeds equal to the aggregate value of jewelry they sent or delivered to the debtor on consignment. The trustee contends that neither the Bank nor any.consignor is entitled to prevail over the claim of the bankrupt estate.

The Bank’s claim is dependent upon a determination that it effected perfection of the security interest provided in its agreement with the Debtor and that its interest covered the consignment merchandise. The consignors’ claims are dependent upon proof that the debtor was generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others. The trustee’s claim is based upon the rights of a trustee as provided by the Bankruptcy Code.

FACTS

The debtor formerly conducted business from two locations as two separate corporations. E. G. Hoover Co. (East store) operated a store located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and E. G. Hoover Co. — West (West store) operated a store located in Lemoyne, Pennsylvania. Prior to the closing of the Harrisburg store, but after the Bank had loaned money on two separate notes to E. G. Hoover Co. — West, the two corporate entities merged. The surviving corporation is E. G. Hoover, Co., Inc., debtor herein. Only the Lemoyne store was in operation at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.

On July 20,1977, West borrowed $150,000 from the Bank on a promissory note in that amount, and executed a security agreement and financing statement in favor of the Bank. The financing statements were duly filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Prothonotary of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, on July 27, 1977. The loan documents provided that the Bank’s security interest would extend to inventory, equipment, fixtures, furnishings, accounts receivable, proceeds and all existing and future inventory, accounts receivable, and proceeds of the West store.

On August 14, 1979, the Bank advanced new money on a second note in the sum of $60,000. This transaction created some ambiguity as to the identity of the borrower, due to evident error in preparation of the note involved. The obligor was set forth as “E. G. Hoover Co.” However, the address set forth was that of the West entity and other incidents of the transaction confirmed that the West store was the obligor.

The consignors delivered their jewelry to the debtor. With each delivery there was a memorandum as to terms of delivery. The jewelry was displayed on the debtor’s premises in the same manner as jewelry purchased by the debtor for resale. Transactions with customers concerning the consigned jewelry did not vary from those concerning jewelry purchased for resale. The arrangement between the consignors and consignee called for return of the merchandise to the consignors on demand and imposed other obligations on the debtor, but these arrangements were not a matter of either constructive or actual notice either to customers or to creditors. In fact, according to the evidence, only other consignors knew of the debtor’s consignment transactions.

There was no written or printed notice of the consignment practice on the premises, no notice thereof attached to the jewelry, and no mode of display or handling which was devised or which tended to bring attention to the fact that, as to some of the merchandise, there were restraints and conditions, which, if known, might inhibit transactions common to retail trade. Under the circumstances as they existed, the debtor routinely sold consignment merchandise and later notified the consignors by copies of the sales invoices. This procedure was evidently accepted and condoned by the *437 consignors as a commercially feasible incident of the consignment system. A reasonable inference would be that the consignors knowingly elected to do business in this manner rather than under the protective provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code of Pennsylvania first enacted in 1953. The four consignment creditors knew that the West store sold goods on memorandum or consignment, but the store was not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling consignment goods.

The inventory and equipment of the debtors was sold by the trustee under a stipulation that the interests of the claimants in the proceeds amounting to approximately $263,000 would be determined later.

The above summary constitutes the findings of fact required by Rule 752 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

DISCUSSION

The Consignors

The Pennsylvania Commercial Code classifies a consignment or memorandum sale as a “sale or return. ..,” and thus “the goods are delivered primarily for resale.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2326. Goods held on consignment are deemed to be on “sale or return” and as such are subject to the claims of the consignee’s creditors unless the consignor provides protection by conforming to one of the following exceptions under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2326(c):

(1) complies with an applicable law providing for the interest of a consignor or the like to be evidenced by a sign;
(2) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; or
(3) complies with the filing provisions of Division 9 (relating to secured transactions).

The first and third exceptions are not in issue because the consignors did not file financing statements, nor did they display signs. The question is whether the debtor was generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.

We conclude that the facts do not support the consignors’ claims to a portion of the sale proceeds. The four consignors knew that the debtor was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, but they were the only creditors shown to have such knowledge, from among approximately 200 creditors. Both logic and precedent require that a larger proportion of creditors must have knowledge of a debtor’s trade in consignment goods. In re Novak, 7 U.C.C. 196 (1969) (Knowledge of only two creditors is insufficient to apply the exception); In re Webb, 13 U.C.C. 394 (1973) (In a bankruptcy case, 15 out of 84 creditors was held to be insufficient); Vonins Inc. v. Roff, 5 U.C.C. 433 (1968) (Where 10 out of 60 creditors had knowledge the exception did not apply). Four out of approximately 200 creditors are insufficient to prove that a substantial number of the debtor’s creditors knew that the debtor was selling the goods of others. Also, it is significant that these four creditors knew of the debtor’s practice because they were participants in the practice. Also, the evidence presented does not support an inference that the Bank knew or should have known that the debtor’s inventory was partially comprised of consignment goods.

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Bluebook (online)
16 B.R. 435, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 906, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 5067, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harker-v-dauphin-deposit-bank-trust-co-in-re-e-g-hoover-co-pamb-1982.