Hargrove v. Hargrove

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hargrove v. Hargrove

196 A.D.2d 541, 601 N.Y.S.2d 157, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7998

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 9, 1993

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 196 A.D.2d 541 (Hargrove v. Hargrove) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hargrove v. Hargrove, 196 A.D.2d 541, 601 N.Y.S.2d 157, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7998 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

Pincite

Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4 for an upward modification of child support established in the parties’ judgment of divorce, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Lubow, J.), dated May 1, 1991, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Rood, H.E.), dated March 1, 1991, which, after a hearing, increased his weekly child support obligation from the sum of $90 to the sum of $264 per week for his two sons retroactive to May 8, 1990, and directed him to pay an additional $15 per week to satisfy arrears.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the appellant’s objections to the order of the Hearing Examiner are sustained, and the proceeding for upward modification of child support is dismissed.

We find that the petitioner mother failed to demonstrate an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances or that the agreement entered into by the parties was unfair when entered into (see, Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 NY2d 210), or that her income and the amount of the original child support agreed to were insufficient to meet the children’s present needs (see, Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132). The petitioner’s income had risen from approximately $14,500 at the time the 1987 judgment of divorce was entered to approximately $27,500 at the time of the hearing in 1991. Moreover, the increased expenses claimed were attributable either to the petitioner’s own schooling and other personal expenses or to the normal growth of the children (see, Brevetti v Brevetti, 182 AD2d 606; Matter of Bernstein v Goldman, 180 AD2d 735; May May Cheng v McManus, 178 AD2d 906). Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Family Court and dismiss the petition. Thompson, J. P., Balletta, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4 for an upward modification of child support established in the parties’ judgment of divorce, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Lubow, J.), dated May 1, 1991, which denied his objections to an order of the same court (Rood, H.E.), dated March 1, 1991, which, after a hearing, increased his weekly child support obligation from the sum of $90 to the sum of $264 per week for his two sons retroactive to May 8, 1990, and directed him to pay an additional $15 per week to satisfy arrears.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the appellant’s objections to the order of the Hearing Examiner are sustained, and the proceeding for upward modification of child support is dismissed.

We find that the petitioner mother failed to demonstrate an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances or that the agreement entered into by the parties was unfair when entered into (see, Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 NY2d 210), or that her income and the amount of the original child support agreed to were insufficient to meet the children’s present needs (see, Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132). The petitioner’s income had risen from approximately $14,500 at the time the 1987 judgment of divorce was entered to approximately $27,500 at the time of the hearing in 1991. Moreover, the increased expenses claimed were attributable either to the petitioner’s own schooling and other personal expenses or to the normal growth of the children (see, Brevetti v Brevetti, 182 AD2d 606; Matter of Bernstein v Goldman, 180 AD2d 735; May May Cheng v McManus, 178 AD2d 906). Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Family Court and dismiss the petition. Thompson, J. P., Balletta, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

196 A.D.2d 541, 601 N.Y.S.2d 157, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7998, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hargrove-v-hargrove-nyappdiv-1993.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack