Hare v. Flanagan

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Hare v. Flanagan

663 So. 2d 4, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11591, 1995 WL 642849

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 3, 1995

DocketNos. 94-01671, 94-03628

StatusPublished

This text of 663 So. 2d 4 (Hare v. Flanagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hare v. Flanagan, 663 So. 2d 4, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11591, 1995 WL 642849 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

WHATLEY, Judge.

The appellant, Ernest Russell Hare, the husband in this marital dissolution case, challenges both the final judgment of dissolution and a postjudgment order as to an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the appellee, Judith Flanagan, f/k/a Judith Hare, the wife herein. We find merit only in the husband’s contention that the trial court, in its post-judgment order, exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction when it designated the fee award as additional support for the wife. We, therefore, strike from the postjudgment order the provision designating the fee award as support. See Hurley v. Hurley, 644 So.2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Harman v. Harman, 523 So.2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The final judgment of dissolution and the postjudgment order are otherwise affirmed.

Affirmed in part; stricken in part.

THREADGILL, C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.

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WHATLEY, Judge.

The appellant, Ernest Russell Hare, the husband in this marital dissolution case, challenges both the final judgment of dissolution and a postjudgment order as to an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the appellee, Judith Flanagan, f/k/a Judith Hare, the wife herein. We find merit only in the husband’s contention that the trial court, in its post-judgment order, exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction when it designated the fee award as additional support for the wife. We, therefore, strike from the postjudgment order the provision designating the fee award as support. See Hurley v. Hurley, 644 So.2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Harman v. Harman, 523 So.2d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The final judgment of dissolution and the postjudgment order are otherwise affirmed.

Affirmed in part; stricken in part.

THREADGILL, C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.

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663 So. 2d 4, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11591, 1995 WL 642849, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hare-v-flanagan-fladistctapp-1995.

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