Hardy v. Inhabitants of Yarmouth

88 Mass. 277
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1863
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 88 Mass. 277 (Hardy v. Inhabitants of Yarmouth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hardy v. Inhabitants of Yarmouth, 88 Mass. 277 (Mass. 1863).

Opinion

Dewey, J.

This case presents a question arising between several different towns, each claiming the right to assess taxes upon the personal estate of the late Joshua Sears, of whose estate the plaintiffs were appointed by his will executors and trustees.

The subject of taxation is a matter entirely governed by the statutes; and such statute provisions, unless in conflict with the constitution, are alone to furnish the rule to be applied by this court in cases like the present. The right of towns to assess taxes upon personal property is to be found in the Rev. Sts. c. 7. The general provision is, that all personal estate shall be assessed to the owner in the town where he shall be an inhabitant on the 1st of May. But to this general rule the statute has itself introduced various exceptions. That which particularly applies to the present case is found in § 10, cl. 7: “ The [280]*280personal estate of deceased persons, which shall be in the hands of their executors or administrators and not distributed, .shall be assessed to the executors and administrators, in the town where the deceased person last dwelt, until they shall give notice to the assessors that the estate has been distributed and paid over to the parties interested therein.” This provision was particularly designed to meet cases like the present. Under it the authority was clearly given to tax the personal estate of the testator upon its coming into the hands of the executors, and while in their hands as executors, in the town of Yarmouth.

The further inquiry is, when did the right of taxation by Yarmouth under this section of the statute terminate? On the part of the city of Boston, it is urged that this estate was properly assessed in Boston on the 1st of May 1859 and 1860, because it had passed into the hands of the trustees, and therefore it was not liable to be assessed to the executors of the will in Yarmouth. To maintain the right to assess the same in May 1859, the city of Boston rely upon the fact that the executors transferred from themselves as executors to themselves as trustees on their books the amount of all personal estate held by them, and their final account was duly filed in the probate office on the 31st of March 1859. But it appears that there was no final action on the account, or allowance or acceptance thereof by the probate court, until the 17th of May 1859.

In reference to the tax assessed on the 1st of May 1860, the city of Boston relies upon the additional fact that on the 17th of May 1859 the judge of probate allowed a final account of the executors, in which they credited themselves as executors with the transfer of the personal estate to themselves as trustees.

In reference to the tax of 1859 by the city of Boston, the objection is properly taken that the-estate had not been legally transferred by the executors until their account had been duly filed, allowed and approved in the probate court. Until that was done, it was only an initiatory step on the part of the executors to make such account; and the status of the property, and the liability of the executors to be assessed therefor in Yarmouth, [281]*281were not changed. The necessity of a decree of the probate court was directly decided in the case of Conkey v. Dickinson, 13 Met. 51. It was there held that where the same person is executor and trustee under a will, the funds are to be considered in the hands of the party as executor, unless he has rendered an account in the probate court charging himself as trustee, and that account has been allowed. In the present case, the account was not allowed until after the 1st of May 1859, and this would be quite sufficient as an answer to any claim of right to tax the same in Boston in the year 1859, or to any objection to taxing them in Yarmouth in that year.

The more difficult question arises as to the right of taxation in 1860. Prior to this period, the account of the executors had not only been rendered, but the same had been duly allowed and approved by the probate court. This was a sufficient change and transfer of the property to the trustees to authorize its future taxation to them if there was no other duty required of the executors as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of the property from liability to taxation in Yarmouth. The legislature might have made this change in the mode and place of taxation dependent solely upon the fact of the actual distribution of the estate by the executors, or, as in the present case, upon the transfer by them to themselves in their new capacity of trustees. But they deemed it proper, in fixing the place where and the persons to whom such estate should be taxed, to add the provis» on that such estate shall be assessed in the town where the deceased person last dwelt, until the executors shall give notice to the assessors that the estate has been distributed and paid over to the parties interested therein.

This provision was a new one, introduced into the Rev. Sts. upon the suggestion of the commissioners to revise the statutes. The object of the provision and the reasons for introducing it are fully stated in the commissioners’ report on this chapter. It is there said: “ The provision of this section is intended as a practical rule for assessors, who, whatever diligence and care they may exercise, often find that they have assessed property to executors and administrators after it has gone from their hands, [282]*282and been distributed among the heirs and legatees. It is suggested that some provision is necessary on this subject to point out the respective duties of the assessors and the representatives of deceased persons.” Both the language of the statute and the declared purpose of making this new provision forbid us to give any other construction to it than that of authorizing and requiring the taxation of the personal property of deceased persons in the hands of their executors to continue in the town where the deceased last dwelt, until the executors shall give .notice to the assessors of such town that the estate has been distributed and paid over to the parties interested therein. The practical rule provided by the statute is, therefore, for the assessors to continue to assess such estate in the town where the deceased person last dwelt, until the notice required by the statute is actually given to them by the executors. The statute will not admit of the construction that this provision as to notice only applies to that part of the personal estate which has not in fact been distributed. The right of taxation is to continue “ until they shall give notice to the assessors that the estate has been distributed.”

The phraseology of this statute is somewhat changed by Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 12, cl. 7 : The personal estate of deceased persons shall be assessed in the place where the deceased last dwelt. After the appointment of an executor or administrator, it shall be assessed to such executor or administrator, until he gives notice to the assessors that the estate has been distributed and paid over to the parties interested therein.” This language is certainly more precise and less open to any question as to its construction than that of the Rev. Sts., but, as we understand it, was not intended to create any change in the existing law, but only to express in a more clear and concise manner the law as it already existed. Although these taxes were assessed under the Rev. Sts., this legislative exposition of the old law, as found in the Gen. Sts. c. 11, is proper for our consideration. Such being the statute provision on this subject, we must give it full effect.

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Bluebook (online)
88 Mass. 277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardy-v-inhabitants-of-yarmouth-mass-1863.