Hardy v. Dept. Of the Navy

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit·Decided January 4, 2005·No. 2004-3086·Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-3086

WILLEMA HARDY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Respondent.

Richard H. Semsker, Lippman & Semsker, PLLC, of Bethesda, Maryland, argued for petitioner. With him on the brief was S. Micah Salb.

Claudia Burke, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; and James M. Kinsella, Deputy Director.

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 04-3086

WILLEMA HARDY,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Respondent.

DECIDED: January 4, 2005

Before MICHEL∗, Chief Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and SCHALL, Circuit Judge.

MICHEL, Chief Judge.

Willema Hardy (“Hardy”) petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), upholding the Department of the Navy’s (“Navy’s”) reassignment offer to Hardy during a reduction in force (“RIF”) after her former position was abolished and she was reached for release. Hardy v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. DC0351030294-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 27, 2003) (“Decision”).1 The appeal was

*

Chief Judge Paul R. Michel assumed the position of Chief Judge on December 25, 2004.

1 Because Hardy did not challenge the initial decision, it became the final decision of the Board on October 1, 2003. See Wood v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 938 F.2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. Accordingly, we refer to the initial decision herein as “Decision.”

submitted after oral argument on November 4, 2004. Because the Board correctly construed the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM’s”) RIF regulations and properly concluded that the Navy complied with those regulations in offering to place Hardy in a vacancy at a lower grade when higher-graded positions were also vacant, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Hardy worked as a Telecommunications Specialist GS 391-11 (“Specialist 11”)

for the Navy at the Naval District Washington. In May 2002, the Navy initiated a functional analysis study of the information technology and telecommunications divisions at its Washington, D.C. location. Based upon the results of that study, the Navy decided to eliminate the entire telecommunications division, which consisted of five employees, including Hardy.

On October 16, 2002, the Navy notified Hardy that her position was being abolished pursuant to a RIF. The Navy offered to place Hardy in a vacant Secretary GS 310-07 position (“Secretary 07”). Hardy challenged this offer by requesting review by the Board, contending that she was qualified for and therefore entitled to the higher-graded vacant positions of Customer Relations Manager 2210-11 (“Manager 11”) and Secretary GS 318-09 (“Secretary 09”).

The Administrative Judge (“AJ”) assigned to her case conducted a hearing at Hardy’s request and issued an initial determination that Hardy was not entitled to either the Manager 11 or the Secretary 09 positions. The AJ observed that a released employee does not have assignment rights to a vacant position. Decision at 4. The AJ recognized that an agency may, however, implement a mandatory policy or promulgate

its own regulation to offer vacant positions to RIF-displaced employees. Id. Nevertheless, the AJ noted that it was undisputed that the Navy did not have such a policy or such an agency regulation. Id. at 5. Thus, the AJ concluded that the Navy could exercise complete discretion in considering RIF-displaced employees for vacancies and that Hardy was not entitled to either the vacant Manager 11 position or the vacant Secretary 09 position. Id.

Despite reaching this conclusion, the AJ went on to address the hypothetical situation where the Navy had adopted such a policy. The AJ considered whether in that event Hardy would be entitled to either the vacant Manager 11 position or the vacant Secretary 09 position. Id. In doing so, the AJ evaluated whether Hardy could exercise bump or retreat assignment rights under 5 C.F.R. § 351.701(b) or (c), respectively, ultimately concluding that Hardy could not meet the criteria for exercising these rights. Id. at 6. The AJ found that Hardy did not have bump rights under section 351.701(b) because there was no assertion that Hardy had higher tenure group or subgroup standing than another employee assigned to the vacant positions. Id. The AJ also found that Hardy did not have retreat rights under section 351.701(c) because neither the Manager 11 position nor the Secretary 09 position was the same, or essentially identical to, her former Specialist 11 position. Id. at 15, 18. Accordingly, the AJ concluded that the Navy properly applied the applicable RIF procedures in offering to place Hardy in the vacant Secretary 07 position. Id. at 18.

As noted above, Hardy did not challenge the AJ’s initial decision, whereby it became the final decision of the Board. Hardy now petitions for review of the Board’s decision, asserting she is qualified for the Manager 11 and Secretary 09 positions.

Hardy seeks to be placed into the position of either Manager 11 or Secretary 09 and to be awarded back pay starting from the date that she was not offered these positions. We have jurisdiction over a final Board decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). II. DISCUSSION Hardy recognizes that under part 351 of 5 C.F.R., the Navy had discretion in choosing whether to fill vacant positions with RIF-displaced employees. She argues, however, that once the Navy decided to fill vacancies with RIF-displaced employees, she was entitled to an offer of placement in either the Manager 11 or Secretary 09 positions if she established her qualifications for those positions by satisfying the requirements set forth in section 351.703.2 In this regard, Hardy claims that the substantial weight of the evidence readily demonstrates that she met both the education requirement and the capacity, adaptability, and special skills requirements contained within section 351.703. Thus, in essence, Hardy appears to contend that section 351.703 alone establishes entitlement to a vacancy of her choosing.

Hardy’s argument is entirely off the mark. Section 351.703 does not independently confer any assignment rights to vacancies on a RIF-displaced employee. Rather, section 351.703 is a dependent provision that only comes into play during a RIF

2 Section 351.703 states:

An agency may assign an employee to a vacant position under § 351.201(b) or § 351.701 of this part without regard to OPM’s standards and requirements for the position if:

(a) The employee meets any minimum education requirement for the position; and (b) The agency determines that the employee has the capacity, adaptability, and special skills needed to satisfactorily perform the duties and responsibilities of the position.

action by way of 5 C.F.R. §§ 351.201, 351.704, and 351.701. Nevertheless, Hardy entirely ignores these sections, relying exclusively on section 351.703.

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