Hardy v. Board of Supervisors
This text of 387 F. Supp. 1252 (Hardy v. Board of Supervisors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff asserts the Court’s jurisdiction over this complaint seeking declaratory injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 coupled with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)(4). Plaintiff is an adult citizen of the United States residing in Dinwiddie County, Virginia. The defendant Board of Supervisors is the local governing body of Dinwiddie County and the defendant Dinwiddie County Board of Elections is the local board authorized by statute to conduct elections in Dinwiddie County.
In March of 1973 the Board of Supervisors, acting under authority contained in Va.Code Ann. §§ 15.1-37.4-15.1-37.7, 15.1-571, 15.1-571.1 (Repl.1973) 1 enacted an ordinance reapportioning the County of Dinwiddie into four electoral districts from which members of the [1254]*1254Board of Supervisors would stand for election.
The ordinances adopted set up four electoral districts with the populations of electoral districts one, three and four substantially equal. The population of electoral district two was slightly over twice as large as the population of each of the other districts. To compensate for the disparity electoral district two was awarded two members of the Board of Supervisors while one member each was to be elected from the other three districts. The number of registered voters in each of the four districts is approximately the same.
The parties agree that approximately one-half of the population of election district two consists of patients at Central State Hospital and Petersburg Training School. These institutions are State operated and are intended for the care, treatment and cure of persons with mental and emotional difficulties. In an earlier day these institutions would have been known as an insane asylum and a school for the feeble-minded.
It is clearly manifest, then, that electoral district two has two members of the board of supervisors, with whatever advantages that gives its populace, solely because that electoral district has within its boundaries the unassimilated population of the Hospital and of the Training School. The' records of the Electoral Board indicate that only one person included within the inmate population has registered to vote and that no person has voted who is an inmate.
In their joint answer and in their answers to interrogatories the defendants, in effect, admit all the above but maintain that they are required to take into account, without distinction, the population of Central State Hospital and Petersburg Training School. This is so, they say, because of the mandate of the Virginia statutes cited above, particularly where the statutes say that in effecting a redistricting the Board shall “give, as nearly as practicable, representation on the basis of population,” and in so doing the Board “shall use population figures of the most recent decennial United States census.” Va.Code Ann. § [1255]*125515.1-37.5 (Repl.1973). Thus, defendants say, the ordinance adopted by the Board and attacked by the plaintiff is merely the child of the State statute. The defendants say, then, that it is a State statute which plaintiff, in fact, seeks to declare unconstitutional and that plaintiff’s action should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b) (1) for plaintiff’s failure to apply for a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
Plaintiff has not favored the Court with a brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court must consider defendants’ motion and brief on its merits without the benefit of the scrutiny and criticism afforded by the adversary system.
28 U.S.C. § 22812 is not “a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such.” Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S.Ct. 480, 483, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941); cf. Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 95 S.Ct. 289, 42 L.Ed.2d 249 (1974). The enactment requires the convening of a three-judge court only when the conditions set forth in the Act are met. Examined in the light of the requirements of the three-judge statute, plaintiff’s complaint falls short of requiring the convening of a three-judge court.
It will first be noted that the convening of a three-judge court is not required unless the constitutionality of a State statute is called into question. In the instant case it is a local ordinance cited by plaintiff to be unconstitutional. It is true that the local ordinance was adopted pursuant to, by authority of, and in compliance with a State statute. It is also true that the State statute has “general and statewide application” in the language of Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101, 87 S.Ct. 1544, 18 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967). But the application given the general State statute by the Dinwiddie Board of Supervisors is, in a practical sense, peculiar to Dinwiddie County. The Court accepts the fact that there are no more than a half-dozen other localities in Virginia containing public mental hospitals. Only these localities could be concerned by a decision in this case with the remaining 126 Virginia localities being affected by it only inferentially, if at all.
The Court takes the position then, that even if it be considered that it is the State statute, not the ordinance, the application of which plaintiff seeks to have enjoined, the aspect of the statute attacked has no general and statewide application.
A second requirement of the three-judge court statute is that the defendant shall be an officer of the State. The Board of Supervisors of Dinwiddie County and the Electoral Board of Dinwiddie County are, without doubt, local officials and not officers of the State. Defendants cite Sailors v. Board of Education of the County of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967) for the proposition that even though the named defendants are, strictly speaking, local officials, a three-judge court is required if the local officials are functioning pursuant to a statewide policy and performing a State function.
It is undeniable that in the instant case the defendants are functioning pursuant to a statewide policy — insuring the implementation of “one man — one vote” for local governing bodies — but it [1256]*1256is doubtful that it can be claimed they are performing a State function. The re-apportionment of a county by the County Board of Supervisors is a function specifically delegated to the local governing body by the Commonwealth. See Va.Code Ann. § 15.1-37.5 (Repl. 1973).
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387 F. Supp. 1252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardy-v-board-of-supervisors-vaed-1975.