Hardtop Pavers, Inc. v. Brown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hardtop Pavers, Inc. v. Brown

46 A.D.2d 732, 360 N.Y.S.2d 795, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3784

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 31, 1974

StatusPublished

This text of 46 A.D.2d 732 (Hardtop Pavers, Inc. v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hardtop Pavers, Inc. v. Brown, 46 A.D.2d 732, 360 N.Y.S.2d 795, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3784 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).

Pincite

Opinion

Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: The complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for malicious interference with a [733]*733prospective contract. For that reason the motion to dismiss made pursuant to CFLR 3211 (suhd. [a], par. 7) should have been denied. However, since plaintiff failed to make any evidentiary showing to support the allegation that defendants “knowingly, intentionally and maliciously” interfered with its right to receive the paving contract in opposition to defendants’ demonstration of justification for their conduct, there was no triable issue of fact and the court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint (Indig v. Finkelstein, 23 N Y 2d 728; Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457). (Appeal from order of Onondaga Special Term dismissing complaint.) Present — Marsh, P. J., Cardamone, Simons, Goldman and Del Vecehio, JJ.

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Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: The complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for malicious interference with a [733]*733prospective contract. For that reason the motion to dismiss made pursuant to CFLR 3211 (suhd. [a], par. 7) should have been denied. However, since plaintiff failed to make any evidentiary showing to support the allegation that defendants “knowingly, intentionally and maliciously” interfered with its right to receive the paving contract in opposition to defendants’ demonstration of justification for their conduct, there was no triable issue of fact and the court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint (Indig v. Finkelstein, 23 N Y 2d 728; Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457). (Appeal from order of Onondaga Special Term dismissing complaint.) Present — Marsh, P. J., Cardamone, Simons, Goldman and Del Vecehio, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

46 A.D.2d 732, 360 N.Y.S.2d 795, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardtop-pavers-inc-v-brown-nyappdiv-1974.

Opinion

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