FIRST DIVISION April 19, 2010
No. 1-09-1291
WILLIAM HARDLANNERT, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 06 L 4660 ) ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, ) The Honorable ) Eileen Mary Brewer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff, William Hardlannert, filed this suit under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §51
through 60 (2000)) and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA)
(49 U.S.C. §20301 et seq. (2000)) after he sustained a back
injury while working on defendant Illinois Central Railroad
Company's switching tracks. Hardlannert, a railroad conductor,
injured his back while attempting to open an allegedly defective
train knuckle, the device that allows railcars to be coupled.
Following discovery, Hardlannert moved for partial summary
judgment on liability under the FSAA; Judge Eileen Mary Brewer
entered an order granting the motion and finding no just reason
to delay appeal. Illinois Central appeals, contending that 1-09-1291
whether Hardlannert's injury was caused solely by his own
negligence is an open question of material fact that precludes
summary judgment. Illinois Central also contends that as a point
of law, the railcar Hardlannert was working on was not "in use"
under the FSAA, to trigger its application. Based on the record
evidence, no conclusion could reasonably be drawn other than
Illinois Central's violation of the FSAA played a causal role in
Hardlannert's injury. We also find that as an issue of law, the
railcar involved was "in use" under the statute. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 1999, Illinois Central hired Hardlannert as a
railroad conductor, a position he continuously held during his
employment. On October 10, 2005, Hardlannert was working at
Illinois Central's Glen Yard on the switching tracks, where
railcars are assembled with locomotives to form trains for
movement. His first task that day was to switch certain railcars
out of track 4.
According to his deposition, upon arriving at track 4
Hardlannert successfully coupled railcar WC 84867 to the
locomotive. He then walked to the next railcar he needed to
couple and opened its knuckle. To do so, he pulled on the handle
of the pin lifter, which unlocks the knuckle so that it can be
manually opened. He then noticed that the connecting knuckle on
2 1-09-1291
railcar WC 84867 was closed. Hardlannert approached that knuckle
and attempted to open it; he testified that "it's best to have
both knuckles open to ensure a successful coupling because what
sometimes will happen is if one knuckle is closed and one knuckle
is open, [the two knuckles] will hit and close both knuckles
without a tie."
According to Hardlannert, he stood facing the knuckle on
railcar WC 84867 with his left foot outside the outer track and
his right foot between the tracks. He then pulled on the pin
lifter handle with his left hand while using his right hand to
push open the knuckle. Hardlannert "was taught" to open knuckles
in this fashion. When Hardlannert pulled on the pin lifter, it
"stopped suddenly" and he "felt a jolt." Hardlannert testified
that it was a common occurrence for a pin lifter to suddenly stop
when pulled, so he attempted to lift the pin lifter a second
time. However, on the second attempt the handle to the pin
lifter "snapped off" in his hand, and the rest of the pin lifter
fell to the ground. Hardlannert testified that during the second
attempt, he "felt a pain in [his] back that [he] hadn't felt
before." Hardlannert was never able to open the knuckle, but was
nonetheless able to couple railcar WC 84867 with the adjacent
railcar with the use of the locomotive by forcing the two
railcars together. Although Hardlannert continued working for
3 1-09-1291
approximately two hours, he was forced to report the injury when
the back pain started to radiate down his legs. Hardlannert
testified that at that point he "was in tears" from the severe
pain. He was unable to perform his duties as a conductor after
the incident and was dismissed 19 days later on October 29, 2005.
Anthony Schweitzer, Illinois Central's former senior
mechanical manager, indicated at his deposition that if a pin
lifter abruptly stops when pulled, it is not necessarily
defective. However, Schweitzer admitted that based on the
physical evidence, the lock lift of the pin lifter, which unlocks
the knuckle, was likely cracked prior to the incident,
constituting a defective piece of equipment.
Professor Ralph Barnett, a professor of mechanical and
aerospace engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology,
signed an affidavit as Illinois Central's expert. Professor
Barnett averred that the stance Hardlannert used in his effort to
open railcar WC 84867's connecting knuckle was a violation of
Illinois Central's safety regulations, which required employees
to "keep [their] feet clear of the area under the coupler in case
the knuckle should fall." Barnett believed that Hardlannert's
practice of opening train knuckles in this fashion "compromised
his back." Barnett noted that the two railcars could have been
coupled even with only one of the two knuckles open, as occurred
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here. He also noted that the "lock lift hook," which is attached
to the end of the pin lifter, was fractured, but concluded that
"the fracture of the [lock lift] hook was not a proximate cause
of [Hardlannert's] back injury."
Hardlannert filed a complaint on May 4, 2006, alleging a
violation of the FSAA (49 U.S.C. §20301 et seq. (2000)), for his
claim under the FELA (45 U.S.C. §51 through 60 (2000)). On March
3, 2009, Hardlannert filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on liability. On May 7, 2009, Judge Brewer entered an order
granting Hardlannert's motion and finding no just reason for
delay of this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with any
affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, reveal there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Midwest Trust Services, Inc. v. Catholic Health Partners
Services, 392 Ill. App. 3d 204, 209, 910 N.E.2d 638 (2009),
citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). Our review of a grant
of summary judgment is de novo. DeSaga v. West Bend Mutual
Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1066, 910 N.E.2d 159
(2009).
5 1-09-1291
Causation
Illinois Central first contends that the circuit court erred
in granting summary judgment on liability because whether
Hardlannert's own negligence was the sole cause of his injuries
remains an open question. Illinois Central contends a jury could
find Hardlannert's own negligence to be the sole cause of his
injuries, notwithstanding Illinois Central's concession in its
response to Hardlannert's motion for summary judgment that the
defective condition of the knuckle on railcar WC 84867 violated
the FSAA and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Transportation for the administration of the FSAA. 49 U.S.C.
§20302 (2000); 49 C.F.R. §215.123 (2009) (prohibiting railroad
carriers from equipping railcars with defective couplers or
inoperative lock lifts); see also Taluzek v. Illinois Central
Gulf R.R. Co., 255 Ill. App. 3d 72, 80, 626 N.E.2d 1367 (1993)
(describing the regulatory powers of the Secretary of
Transportation under the FSAA).
Employees alleging injuries resulting from violations of the
FSAA may maintain a private right of action under the FELA.
DeBiasio v. Illinois Central R.R., 52 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir.
1995), citing Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 395 U.S.
164, 166, 23 L. Ed. 2d 176, 179, 89 S. Ct. 1706, 1708 (1969). In
such an action, the defendant railroad "is deprived of the
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defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk."
Crane, 395 U.S. at 166, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 180, 89 S. Ct. at 1708.
However, the defendant is not liable if the plaintiff's
negligence was the sole cause of his injuries (Baker v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 221 Ill. App. 3d 121, 130, 581 N.E.2d 770
(1991)), because that "eliminates the possibility that the
regulatory violation contributed in whole or part to the injury"
(Walden v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 975 F.2d 361, 364 (7th
Cir. 1992)). Thus, to succeed on this theory the defendant
railroad would need to prove (1) that the plaintiff was
negligent, in that he acted "without the degree of care that a
reasonably prudent person would have used for his or her own
safety under like circumstances" (Coole v. Central Area
Recycling, 384 Ill. App. 3d 390, 396, 893 N.E.2d 303 (2008)), and
(2) that the plaintiff's negligence was, "by itself, the direct
and immediate cause of the injury, or *** a cause which so
entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's [FSAA
violation] that it alone, without the defendant's [violation]
contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the
injury" (Baker, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 130). "[The] defendant's
liability is still absolute in [FELA] cases if [the] plaintiff
establishes a violation of the [FSAA] and a causative
relationship between the violation and his injuries." Baker, 221
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Ill. App. 3d at 134.
Illinois Central argues that Hardlannert's "conduct in
deciding to open the [connecting] knuckle" on railcar WC 84867
was negligent and a jury could find it to be the sole cause of
his injury. Illinois Central does not explain how Hardlannert's
"conduct" in attempting to open the knuckle was negligent. We
can only surmise, without the benefit of an explanation, that
Hardlannert's very decision to use the pin lifter to open the
knuckle is deemed negligent conduct by Illinois Central. We fail
to see how Hardlannert's attempt to open the knuckle by way of
the pin lifter constituted negligence of any sort. The very
presence of a handle on the pin lifter suggests this is a
commonly accepted method of unlocking the knuckle on a railcar,
which is precisely what Hardlannert attempted in order to couple
the second railcar with railcar WC 84867. It is disingenuous for
Illinois Central to suggest that using the handle on the pin
lifter to open the knuckle on railcar WC 84867 made Hardlannert
completely responsible for his injury without also calling into
question Hardlannert's use of the handle to open the knuckle on
the adjacent railcar.
We reject Illinois Central's suggestion that once one
knuckle was open, Hardlannert was barred from attempting to open
the knuckle on railcar WC 84867 by the same method, even though
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the handle worked without a hitch in opening the knuckle of the
railcar to be coupled. That the railcars could have been (and in
fact were) coupled with a single knuckle being open does not mean
that Hardlannert had to believe there was danger in opening both
knuckles with the pin lifter; no trains were in motion at the
time, and the knuckle on railcar WC 84867 appeared to be in
working order. In fact, an attempt to open the knuckle with the
equivalent of a pin lifter after an attempt to force the coupling
of railcars with only one knuckle open does not preclude summary
judgment on liability against the railroad. See Romero v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., No. 06-1783, slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. December
9, 2008) (summary judgment on liability granted to railroad
employee injured when railcars failed to couple automatically
"upon impact," causing employee to attempt to open coupling
knuckle manually). That Hardlannert did not first attempt to
couple the railcars by impact cannot transform prudent conduct of
attempting to open the knuckle with the pin lifter into negligent
conduct, such that said conduct can be found to be the sole cause
of his injury.
Illinois Central also argues that the "negligent" stance
Hardlannert used in opening the knuckle was the sole cause of his
injury because the stance violated a safety regulation. Once
again, we disagree. See Romero, slip op. at 9 (railroad
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employee's alleged violation of safety rule did not preclude
summary judgment on liability against railroad because "[t]he
risk of an employee going between railcars when they fail to
couple upon impact is foreseeable"). It is not clear that
Hardlannert even violated the safety regulation that required he
"keep [his] feet clear of the area under the coupler in case the
knuckle should fall." Hardlannert testified that he was taught
to open knuckles in the fashion he used. His stance while
opening the knuckle, with his left foot outside the outer track
and his right foot between the tracks, was not a clear violation
of an Illinois Central safety regulation designed to protect
employees from injury should the knuckle fall. Nor is there any
suggestion by Illinois Central that the safety regulation that
prohibits having one foot inside the tracks contemplates
protecting employees against back injuries. Even if it did, the
violation of a safety regulation or statute itself does not
establish negligence until that violation is shown to be a cause
of the injury. Coole, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 397. It is undisputed
that Hardlannert was not injured until the pin lifter handle
broke in his left hand; the knuckle did not fall. Thus, Illinois
Central is unable to remove its own violation of the FSAA from
the causal chain that resulted in Hardlannert's back injury. No
reasonable fact finder could conclude that Illinois Central's
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faulty equipment was causally unrelated to the accident in order
to find Hardlannert solely responsible for his injury.
Illinois Central's reliance upon the Seventh Circuit's
Walden decision is misplaced. In that case, a jury found against
the plaintiff in his claim for injuries he sustained while
walking to his cabin seat when the train suddenly stopped during
a coupling procedure. Walden, 975 F.2d at 363. Radio
communications were interrupted during the coupling procedure;
because the coupling procedure continued for some time without
radio communications, the procedure violated the Federal Railroad
Administration Radio Standards. Walden, 975 F.2d at 363, citing
49 C.F.R. §220.49. However, the court held that the jury could
reasonably find the plaintiff was in an area where he knew he
could not appropriately brace himself during the coupling
procedure, which exposed him to possible injury should the train
suddenly stop. Critical to the determination that the jury could
find against the plaintiff on causation was the inescapable
conclusion that the plaintiff exposed himself to the same risk of
injury had the train stopped immediately when radio
communications were interrupted, as required by the radio
standards. In other words, the violation of the radio standards
had no causal relationship to the injury the plaintiff sustained,
given that the risk the plaintiff faced would have been the same.
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The plaintiff should never have been in a place where he knew he
could not brace himself if a sudden stop should occur. Walden,
975 F.2d at 364-65. Because a jury could find the plaintiff's
actions were the sole cause of his injury, the court upheld the
verdict in the defendant railroad's favor. Walden, 975 F.2d at
365.
The facts of this case bear no similarities to those in
Walden. In order for this case to be similar to Walden, Illinois
Central had to marshal evidence that Hardlannert would have
sustained the back injury even if the handle to the pin lifter
had not "snapped off" while he was attempting to open the knuckle
by use of the pin lifter. Similar to Walden, Illinois Central
could then argue that the defective piece of equipment, which
violated the FSAA, had no causal relationship to the injury
Hardlannert sustained. Of course, no such evidence was ever
adduced by Illinois Central.1
We conclude that the record evidence, at the conclusion of
1 We reject any suggestion by Illinois Central that
Professor Barnett, whose expertise is engineering, is qualified
to give an opinion that Hardlannert's physical actions, including
his stance, entitled it to go before a jury on the otherwise
unsupported claim that Hardlannert solely caused his back injury.
12 1-09-1291
discovery, established as a matter of law, even when viewed in
the light most favorable to Illinois Central, that Hardlannert's
injuries were at least in part caused by Illinois Central's
violation of the FSAA. The connecting knuckle of railcar WC
84867 was defective; Schweitzer testified that the lock lift
portion of the pin lifter, which actually unlocks the knuckle,
was likely cracked prior to the incident. Illinois Central does
not dispute this fact. That the lock lift was cracked is
consistent with Hardlannert's testimony that the pin lifter
handle broke while he attempted to pull the stuck pin lifter a
second time. Although Professor Barnett's affidavit sets out an
opinion that "the fracture of the [lock lift] hook was not a
proximate cause of [Hardlannert's] back injury," Hardlannert was
"not required to prove common-law proximate causation but only
that his injury resulted 'in whole or in part' from the
railroad's violation of the [FSAA] [citations]." Crane, 395 U.S.
at 166, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 180, 89 S. Ct. at 1708. Under the FELA,
liability of a railroad is established if its "negligence played
any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death
for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R.
Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493, 499, 77 S. Ct. 443, 448
(1957). We find it indisputable that a defect in Illinois
Central's equipment had at least some "causative relationship"
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with Hardlannert's back injury. Baker, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 134.
The record evidence foreclosed Illinois Central's defense
that Hardlannert was completely responsible for his injury. To
the contrary, we find as a matter of law that Hardlannert's
injury was at least partially, if not wholly, caused by Illinois
Central's violation of the FSAA. Hence, the circuit court
properly granted his motion for summary judgment on the liability
issue.
"In Use"
Illinois Central next contends that as a point of federal
law, the FSAA did not apply to railcar WC 84867 because it was
not "in use" under the statute when the incident occurred.
Illinois Central argues that a railcar is not in use when engaged
in switching operations such as those Hardlannert was performing.
This presents an issue of first impression in Illinois. We
conclude Illinois Central misreads the FSAA in its attempt to
apply the "switching operations exception" developed in federal
case law to circumstances involving a single railcar. To the
extent certain federal cases apply the exception pertaining to
the unit of equipment of a "train" to the unit of equipment of a
"vehicle," we decline to follow those cases.
By its terms, the FSAA only limits what "a railroad carrier
may use or allow to be used in any of its railroad lines" (49
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U.S.C. §20302(a) (2000)) and, thus, only applies when the
equipment it describes is "in use" (Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
303 U.S. 10, 13, 82 L. Ed. 614, 617, 58 S. Ct. 426, 428 (1938)).
To determine whether a unit of equipment is "in use," courts
consider a number of factors, including primarily its "locat[ion]
at the time of the accident and the activity of the injured
party." Deans v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 152 F.3d 326, 329
(4th Cir. 1998). However, different units of equipment are
regulated by different sections of the FSAA, and, for reasons
that become clear when considering the statute overall, whether
railroad equipment is "in use" depends on the unit of equipment
the section at issue regulates.
An outline of the units of equipment regulated by the FSAA
is helpful. Sections 20302(a)(1) to (a)(3) regulate the use of
"vehicles," defined as "a car, locomotive, tender, or similar
vehicle" (49 U.S.C. §20302(a) (2000)); an exemplary regulation is
section 20302(a)(1)(A), which requires that vehicles be equipped
with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of
being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going
between the ends of the vehicles" (49 U.S.C. §20302(a)(1)(A)
(2000)). Section 20302(a)(4) applies more specifically to one
type of vehicle, "locomotives." 49 U.S.C. §20302(a)(4) (2000).
However, section 20302(a)(5) applies more broadly to "trains";
15 1-09-1291
that section makes clear that a train is composed of multiple
"vehicles." It requires that certain proportions of "the
vehicles in the train [be] equipped with" specific types of
brakes. 49 U.S.C. §20302(a)(5) (2000).
Because the various units of equipment which the FSAA's
provisions regulate are "used" in different ways, the application
of a safety provision turns on the unit of equipment in use. For
instance, it is apparent that a train, which as the statute makes
clear is composed of multiple "vehicles," cannot be "in use"
until the vehicles in the train have been coupled together in
preparation for movement as a train. Prior to the completion of
the coupling procedure, no train exists. A train is not "in use"
while the various vehicles that constitute the unit of a "train"
are being coupled. Thus, an exception to the FSAA's provisions
regarding trains applies during switching operations, the very
procedure through which a train is assembled.
In contrast, and more germane to this case, an individual
"vehicle," be it "a car, locomotive, tender, or similar vehicle"
(49 U.S.C. §20301(a) (2000)), implicates different safety rules
pertaining to vehicles "in use." The regulations regarding the
coupling requirements of a vehicle would make little sense
otherwise; it is in the very process of coupling railcars during
switching operations that couplers perform an essential function.
16 1-09-1291
Thus, vehicles are "in use" during switching operations designed
to form a train, while a train is not formed until the coupling
procedure is completed. The differing sections pertaining to the
different units of equipment concern safety features that come
into play when the various units of equipment are "in use,"
trains versus vehicles.
A careful reading of federal case law highlights this
distinction. As early as its decision in United States v. Erie
R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 402, 59 L. Ed. 1019, 35 S. Ct. 621 (1915), the
Supreme Court recognized that the applicability of the FSAA
turned on the unit of equipment at issue:
"It will be perceived that the air-brake
provision deals with running a train, while
the other requirements relate to hauling or
using a car. In one a train is the unit and
in the other a car. As the context shows, a
train in the sense intended consists of an
engine and cars which have been assembled and
coupled together for a run or trip along the
road. When a train is thus made up and is
proceeding on its journey it is within the
operation of the air-brake provision. But it
is otherwise with the various movements in
17 1-09-1291
railroad yards whereby cars are assembled and
coupled into outgoing trains, and whereby
incoming trains which have completed their
run are broken up. These are not train
movements, but mere switching operations, and
so are not within the air-brake provision.
The other provisions calling for automatic
couplers and grab irons are of broader
application and embrace switching operations
as well as train movements, for both involve
a hauling or using of cars." Erie R.R. Co.,
237 U.S. at 407-08, 59 L. Ed. at 1023, 35 S.
Ct. at 624.
Thus, the Erie Court recognized that while a train is not in use
during switching operations because the purpose of the switching
operation is to assemble the unit of equipment termed a "train,"
individual railcars are in use during such operations. During
switching operations, the provisions applicable to a railcar and
another vehicle come into play because that unit of equipment is
"in use" during switching operations. See, e.g., O'Donnell v.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 394, 94 L. Ed.
187, 194, 70 S. Ct. 200, 206 (1949) ("the plaintiff was entitled
to a peremptory instruction that to equip a car with a coupler
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which broke in the switching operation was a violation of the
Act"); Robb v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 100 F.
Supp. 2d 867, 869-70 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that the "switching
exclusion" applies only to "a worker who was injured on a
'completed train,' " not a worker "injured on a car that was not
part of a completed train"); Williams v. Norfolk Southern Ry.
Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991-92 (W.D. Va. 2000).
Illinois Central's argument that railcar WC 84867 was not
"in use" under the FSAA is founded entirely on Phillips v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 190 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
We find the analysis employed in Phillips inapplicable by its
very language to this case.
In Phillips, the plaintiff injured his back while connecting
several railcars into a train when the handrail he was using to
climb into one of the railcars gave way. Phillips, 190 F.3d at
287. The plaintiff filed suit under the FSAA and the FELA,
alleging that the handrail failure amounted to a violation of the
FSAA. Phillips, 190 F.3d at 287. The district court granted the
plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion on liability, and the
defendant appealed. Phillips, 190 F.3d at 287. The Fourth
Circuit reversed, noting that the key issue in the case was
determining "the point at which switching operations end and a
train becomes 'in use.' " Phillips, 190 F.3d at 289. By its
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very language, it appears the Fourth Circuit's framework of its
analysis concerns a train as the unit of equipment. Ultimately,
the Phillips court concluded that "the train upon which [the
plaintiff] was injured was not 'in use' at the time of his
injury."2 Phillips, 190 F.3d at 290.
The issue in this case is whether a vehicle, a singular
railcar, was in use. As discussed above, railcars themselves are
not outside the realm of the FSAA during switching operations.
Williams, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 992. Holding otherwise would
nullify the FSAA during switching operations, contrary to
provisions in the FSAA enacted by Congress specifically to
promote "safety in the yard during switching operations" such as
those regarding train couplers. Robb, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
Although the Phillips court found the "train" upon which the
2 In Phillips, the plaintiff's claim was founded on a
violation of the handrail provision of the FSAA (49 U.S.C.
§20302(a)(2) (2000)). Although the handrail provision also
appears to regulate the use of "vehicles," we have no occasion to
consider that provision here. We reject any implicit suggestion
by Illinois Central that the Phillips decision should guide our
analysis of the coupler provision of the FSAA such that it is
only applicable when a "train" is in use.
20 1-09-1291
plaintiff was injured was not in use, the railcar that caused
Hardlannert's injury was in use during switching operations.
Thus, the FSAA applied to the defective condition on railcar WC
84867 as a matter of law; accordingly, Hardlannert was entitled
to judgment on liability.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court properly granted partial summary judgment
in favor of Hardlannert on Illinois Central's liability under the
FSAA. On the record evidence, no question of material fact is
raised that Hardlannert acted negligently while attempting to
open the connecting knuckle of railcar WC 84867, which the
physical evidence revealed to be in a defective condition. The
defective condition of the connecting knuckle constituted a
violation of the FSAA by Illinois Central; even if Hardlannert
could be found to have acted negligently in attempting to open
both knuckles of the railcars to be coupled, no reasonable jury
could find his negligence to be the sole cause of his back injury
because the defective condition of the pin lifter to the knuckle
of railcar WC 84867 is causally related to Hardlannert's injury.
Further, because the coupling provision of the FSAA applies to
the unit of equipment at issue in this case, an individual
railcar, railcar WC 84867 was "in use" at the time of the
incident.
21 1-09-1291
Affirmed.
HALL, P.J., and PATTI, J., concur.
22 1-09-1291
REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT _______________________________________________________________________ WILLIAM HARDLANNERT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appellate Court of Illinois First District, First Division
Filed: April 19, 2010 _________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County Honorable Eileen Mary Brewer, Judge Presiding _________________________________________________________________
For PLAINTIFF- Steven J. Scott APPELLEE MacCabe & McGuire 77 West Wacker Dr., Suite 3333 Chicago, Illinois 60601
For DEFENDANT- Ryan Brennan APPELLANT The Brennan Law Firm, P.C. 19 Bronze Pointe Belleville, Illinois 62226
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William B. Kohn 150 North Walker, Suite 1400 Chicago, Illinois 60606