Hardin Sign Co. v. Industrial Commission

506 N.E.2d 1066, 154 Ill. App. 3d 386, 107 Ill. Dec. 175, 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 2310
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedApril 15, 1987
Docket3-86-0373WC
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 506 N.E.2d 1066 (Hardin Sign Co. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hardin Sign Co. v. Industrial Commission, 506 N.E.2d 1066, 154 Ill. App. 3d 386, 107 Ill. Dec. 175, 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 2310 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

JUSTICE KASSERMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant, James T. Hughes, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act) (111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) for an injury to his left arm which he alleges arose out of and in the course of his employment with Hardin Sign Company (Hardin). After a hearing before an arbitrator on December 11, 1978, claimant was awarded temporary total disability in the amount of $231.42 per week for 82 weeks (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.8(b)), reasonable and necessary medical expenses (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a)), and $231.42 per week for 2IIV2 weeks for a 90% permanent disability of the left arm, payable in installments (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.8(e)). On February 27, 1980, the Industrial Commission reduced the permanent disability award from 90% to 75% (i.e., $231.42 per week for 1761/4 weeks, payable in installments) but otherwise affirmed the arbitrator’s award. No judicial review of this original award was sought.

On August 5, 1980, claimant filed a petition for additional benefits pursuant to section 19(h) (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.19(h)). In a decision issued on May 24, 1982, the Industrial Commission awarded claimant an additional 96/y weeks of temporary total disability benefits and additional reasonable and necessary medical expenses. Additional permanent partial disability compensation was denied. No judicial review of this award was sought.

On January 18, 1983, claimant filed a second petition for additional benefits pursuant to section 19(h). Although this filing date was more than 30 months after the Industrial Commission’s original award on February 27, 1980, the Industrial Commission found the petition to have been timely filed in relation to the Industrial Commission’s decision entered on claimant’s first section 19(h) petition on May 24, 1982. The Industrial Commission found, however, that claimant’s second petition failed to establish any entitlement to additional compensation.

On November 30, 1984, the circuit court reviewed this decision and found it to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court ordered (1) that the Industrial Commission determine the amount of increase of disability the claimant had incurred since February 27, 1980, and (2) that the amount of the permanent disability award be increased accordingly. On remand, the Industrial Commission found claimant’s permanent disability to have increased from 75% to 90%. After the circuit court confirmed this award, Hardin perfected the instant appeal to this court. On appeal Hardin urges that: (1) claimant’s second section 19(h) petition was untimely, and (2) alternatively, the trial court erred in finding that the Industrial Commission’s denial of increased benefits pursuant to such petition was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 19(h) provides in pertinent part:

“(h) An agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments, may at any time within 18 months after such agreement or award be reviewed by the Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee, on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished or ended.
However, as to accidents occurring subsequent to July 1, 1955, which are covered by any agreement or award under this Act providing for compensation in installments made as a result of such accident, such agreement or award may at any time within 30 months after such agreement or award be reviewed by the Commission at the request of either the employer or the employee on the ground that the disability of the employee has subsequently recurred, increased, diminished, or ended.
On such review, compensation may be re-established, increased, diminished, or ended. ***
When compensation which is payable in accordance with an award or settlement contract approved by the Commission, is ordered paid in a lump sum by the Commission, no review shall be had as in this paragraph mentioned.” (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.19(h).)

Hardin contends that claimant’s January 18, 1983, petition for review of the permanent disability award was not timely filed because the award of temporary total disability entered on the first section 19(h) petition was not an “award” within the meaning of section 19(h). Hardin urges that as a consequence, the award was not subject to review under section 19(h). Moreover, Hardin asserts that the Industrial Commission’s previous finding of no increased permanent disability should preclude the filing of a second section 19(h) petition. Claimant contends, and the Industrial Commission determined, that the award of additional temporary total disability and medical expenses sought by claimant and awarded by the Industrial Commission on May 24, 1982, was a new “award” and, thus, created a new date from which the 30-month limitation period provided in section 19(h) would begin to run. In answer to Hardin’s assertion that claimant should be allowed to file only one section 19(h) petition, claimant contends that not allowing more than one section 19(h) petition in a 30-month period would violate the equal protection clause.

The Workers’ Compensation Act is a humane law of a remedial nature. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357.) The underlying purpose of the Act is to provide financial protection for workers whose earning power is interrupted or terminated as a consequence of injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment. Board of Education v. Industrial Com. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 290 N.E.2d 247, 249.

Remedial legislation should be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes. (S. N. Nielsen Co. v. Public Building Com. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 290, 298, 410 N.E.2d 40, 44.) Since section 19(h) seeks to redress changes in circumstances after the entry of a compensation award payable in installments, it is particularly remedial in nature and should be construed liberally so as to allow review of alleged changes in circumstances. In the first section 19(h) petition, claimant sought additional total temporary disability compensation as well as additional medical and incidental expenses because he was experiencing recurrent difficulty from his original injury. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission found a change in circumstances and increased the original award so as to include the additional benefits requested. In this regard, it is our conclusion that section 19(h) of the Act mandates that additional review of an award be encouraged so as to effectuate the purpose and spirit of the Act. Furthermore, such method of determination of a claimant’s disability eliminates the most difficult problem of attempting to anticipate the progress of a claimant’s disability and making a somewhat speculative award to him to cover anticipated increases or decreases in disability.

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Bluebook (online)
506 N.E.2d 1066, 154 Ill. App. 3d 386, 107 Ill. Dec. 175, 1987 Ill. App. LEXIS 2310, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hardin-sign-co-v-industrial-commission-illappct-1987.