Harden v. State

59 S.E.2d 563, 81 Ga. App. 638, 1950 Ga. App. LEXIS 965
Court of Appeals of Georgia·Decided May 23, 1950·No. 32962·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

MacIntyre, P. J.

1. In special ground 2 of the amended motion for a new trial the defendant contends that the court erroneously admitted in evidence the following testimony of the witness Dow Padgett: “I hardly believe I would know Mr. Harden, the defendant in this case. I have seen him one time in my life before, and that was about three weeks ago. I seen him around the place there. As to what section of the county it was, it was down there at what we call the Oscar Weitman place. As to what he was doing, he was feeding a hog. He made a statement to me about the hog. He said C. N. Boone asked him to shut up his hogs. I saw him there about to get the hog. He made a statement as to whose hog it was. I told him that wasn’t Mr. Boone’s hog, it was my boy’s hog and he said he, well he wouldn’t bother it. That was about two or three weeks ago. He did not do anything to bother him except to feed him, that is all. He was shelling some corn to the hog. He told me he thought it was Mr. Boone’s hog and I told him it was my son’s hog and he said he wouldn’t bother it. As to whether he had done anything other than shell a little corn out to her, there was a little more than that now, there was a pig, she had three pigs and there was one just off a little piece and he seemed to be interested in the other pig and he said there was four of the pigs. He said he thought they were Mr. Boone’s hogs, Lum Boone’s hogs, Mr. Boone has a lot of hogs down there. Mr. Harden lives down there and as to whether or not he was feeding his neighbor, Mr. Boone’s hog, that’s whafc he thought he was doing. And I told him he was mistaken and I told him it was my son’s hog; he didn’t take the hog that I know of. As to what he told me about getting the hog from Mr. Boone, I told about all he said about the hog, he stated that he thought it was Mr. Boone’s hog and he was going to shut him, up and let him know about it. He said he thought that was his neighbor Boone’s hog and he was going to shut him up and let him know about it.” The objection of the defendant to the admission of this evidence was: “We object to the testimony because he is not charged with stealing hogs, and in a conversation with Mr. Padgett some three or four weeks prior to the [640] alleged commission of this alleged crime is wholly immaterial and illustrates nothing in the world in this case.” It appears from the record that Boone, the gentleman referred to in the evidence objected to, testified: “I slightly know Mr. Ansel Harden; I’ve seen him a half dozen times I guess. I own some hogs down in the community where I live. I have never instructed Ansel Harden to shut up any of my hogs down there. I have never had any conversation with him about catching up any of my hogs.” This is a case of simple larceny and one in which the guilt of the defendant depends upon the intent with which the act was done. In the words of Justice Storey the principle of the admissibility of collateral facts is stated thus: “In all cases where the guilt of the party depends upon the intent, purpose or design with which an act is done, or upon his guilty knowledge, I understand it to be a general rule that collateral facts may be examined into in which he bore a part, for the purpose of establishing a guilty intent. In short, whenever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in the issue of a case, these collateral facts, that is, other acts and declarations of a similar character tending to establish such intent or knowledge, are proper evidence.” Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story’s Rep. 135, cited with approval in Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 41, 44 (28 S. E. 26). In the instant case it must be shown that the defendant’s intent was to steal the cows in question. Such intent is not a presumption of law, but a matter of fact for the jury. Being a secret operation of the mind, it can only be ascertained by acts and representations of the defendant; a single act or representation in many cases would not be decisive, especially where the accused has sustained a previous good character. But when it is shown that he made similar representations or had done similar acts about the same time to other persons and by means of such acts or representations he had obtained livestock of another, it would tend to establish his intent to steal the cows as alleged in the indictment. We think that the evidence was admissible as tending to illustrate the intent of the accused in his actings in the transaction for which he was then on trial. Farmer v. State, supra. This is especially true in view of the testimony of Mr. Boone that he had never instructed the defendant at any time to pen his hogs. [641] The relevancy of these “other transactions” does not arise from the fact that they were criminal but from the fact of their having happened. Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413, 418 (69 S. E. 310); Scott v. State, 46 Ga. App. 213 (167 S. E. 210); Martin v. State, 10 Ga. App. 795 (74 S. E. 304); Goldberg v. State, 20 Ga. App. 162 (92 S. E. 957). This ground of the motion for a new trial is without merit.

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Harden v. State, 59 S.E.2d 563, 81 Ga. App. 638, 1950 Ga. App. LEXIS 965 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950).

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