Harden v. American Airlines

178 F.R.D. 583, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4325, 1998 WL 260251
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedMarch 25, 1998
DocketCivil Action No. 97-A-1058-N
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 178 F.R.D. 583 (Harden v. American Airlines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harden v. American Airlines, 178 F.R.D. 583, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4325, 1998 WL 260251 (M.D. Ala. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on two motions: a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Alabama World Travel, Inc., and a motion to dismiss filed by American Hawaii Cruises, Inc. The suit arises from the purchase by Plaintiffs of a tour aboard an American Hawaii Cruise Ship, a tour which Plaintiffs thought would be a “thoroughbred race horse,” but which allegedly turned out to be a “mule.” Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, at p.S. Plaintiffs pirnchased the cruise through the defendant Alabama World Travel, a travel agency, in a complete travel package which included air fare aboard American Airlines. Plaintiffs were forced to miss two days of the cruise, however, when their flight aboard American was delayed, causing them to miss a connecting flight and suffer further delays. Because of these events, Plaintiffs have sued the travel agent who sold the trip, Alabama World Travel; the airline, American Airlines; and the cruise operator, American Hawaii Cruise Lines.

For the reasons discussed below, both motions are due to be GRANTED.

I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY TRAVEL AGENT.

The travel agent in this case, Alabama World Travel, Inc., has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it has no connection to the wrong which Plaintiffs alleged was done to them. Plaintiffs have largely agreed to this, although they have tried to sustain the claim with an additional legal argument. Plaintiffs’ argument, however, does not hold water.

The Summary Judgment Standard.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to the non-movant’s case exists. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A dispute of material fact “is ‘genuine’ ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the non-movant’s response consists of nothing more than conclusory allegations, the court must enter summary judgment for the movant. See Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1989).

Discussion.

At the summary judgment stage, the facts in a case, when in dispute, are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant Plaintiffs. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. In the present case, however, the Plaintiffs have chosen not to put facts in issue. Rather, they have largely agreed with Alabama World Travel that there are not material facts at issue.

Plaintiffs’ response is somewhat curious, however. In Plaintiffs’ brief filed in support of that statement: “Plaintiff agrees that Defendant “AWT” should be released in its individual capacity, but be retained in its capacity as agent for American Hawaii.”1 [585]*585The court is somewhat at sea as to the meaning of this statement. Since Plaintiff has submitted no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Alabama World Travel, the court takes the Plaintiffs’ statement regarding “individual eapacity”-along with the absence of any evidentiary submissions-to mean that Plaintiff cannot be shown to have done anything wrong. Alabama World Travel is, therefore, as Plaintiffs admit, due for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs attempt to retain Alabama World Travel as a defendant because it was acting as an agent for American Hawaii. Alabama World Travel did “admit” to being an agent of American Hawaii. However, that statement is of dubious accuracy. See Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544, 551-52 (5th Cir.1959) (holding that travel agent was not agent of shipping co.). Further, this ‘admission’ would not bind the court, being a legal conclusion which affects the alleged principal as well. In any event, even if the travel agency was an agent for American Hawaii, that would be of no legal consequence. A party who simply “acts in the capacity of an agent for a disclosed principal is not liable for claims arising out of a contract executed by the agent on behalf of his principal.” Lake City Stevedores, Inc. v. East-West Shipping Agencies, Inc., 474 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1973); see also Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 761 F.2d 855, 860 (2nd Cir.1985) (“When an agent makes a contract for a disclosed principal,” the agent “becomes neither a party to the contract nor liable for the performance of the contract.”). The agent “simply is not liable if the contract is breached.” Seguros Banvenez, 761 F.2d at 860. Further, if Alabama World Travel committed a tort, and it did so in its agency capacity, then the principal would be liable. See 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § (“It is a fundamental rule underlying the structure of agency law that the principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts which his agent does with or within the actual or apparent authority form the principal, and within the scope of the agent’s employment, or which the principal ratifies”). If Plaintiffs only seek to hold American Hawaii liable, there would be no need to retain Alabama World Travel as a defendant. And, as stated earlier, Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of wrongdoing by Alabama World Travel, itself, which would give rise to liability on its part.

Conclusion.

Plaintiffs in this case have not come forward with any evidence of a wrong committed by Alabama World Travel. Alabama World Travel cannot be held liable, or retained in this case, simply because they sold a trip with which the Plaintiffs were unsatisfied. Travel agents do not exist to warrant the safety or reliability of the trips that they sell. See Lavine v. General Mills, Inc., 519 F.Supp.

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Bluebook (online)
178 F.R.D. 583, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4325, 1998 WL 260251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harden-v-american-airlines-almd-1998.