Harckham v. Burns

33 Misc. 3d 317
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 11, 2011
StatusPublished

This text of 33 Misc. 3d 317 (Harckham v. Burns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harckham v. Burns, 33 Misc. 3d 317 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

John R. LaCava, J.

Petitioner brings this Election Law article 16 proceeding and declaratory judgment action (collectively referred to as the proceeding) seeking, inter alia, an order invalidating the Qpportunity-to-Ballot (O-T-B) petitions for write-in designation for the Independence Party (Party), by respondent Committee to Receive Notices (Committee), and restraining respondents Westchester County Board of Elections (Board) from designating a write-in candidate for access to the September 13, 2011 ballot as the candidate for the Independence Party primary dated September 13, 2011, for the position of Westchester County Legislator, 2nd Legislative District. The proceeding was commenced by an order to show cause, dated August 3, 2011, contesting the filed O-T-B petitions.

Petitioner alleges, inter alia, that pursuant to Election Law § 6-132 (3), where the petition is circulated by a non-Party member, a notary must be present and attest that the petition signer came before him; the notary must also attest that he administered an oath to the signer and that the petition signer swore to the truth of his statements in signing the petition; that these formalities were not followed with regard to many of the O-T-B petitions circulated herein; and that, therefore, the O-T-B petitions were invalid. Respondent Committee argues that one notary, being disabled, nevertheless was present a short distance away when petition signers were advised by the petition carrier that they were being asked to sign a candidate’s O-T-B petition, and when they were asked if their answers were truthful; it also asserts that signatures gathered by a petition carrier and an attorney-notary were also properly sworn to by the petition gatherers.

The Hearing

On August 9, 2011, a hearing was conducted to determine the validity of the signatures and other information contained on sheets No. 9 (5 signatures), No. 10 (5 signatures), No. 11 (13 signatures), No. 14 (5 signatures), No. 15 (6 signatures), and No. 16 (5 signatures), and more particularly whether those signatures were properly notarized by Dean Steven Travalino. The hearing also encompassed a determination as to the valid[319]*319ity of the notarization by John Anthony Pappalardo with regard to Sheets No. 1 (5 signatures) and No. 12 (2 signatures).

Based upon the credible evidence adduced at the hearing, the court makes the following findings of fact:

Mr. Travalino and Mr. Pappalardo both testified that they had not formally placed any one of the combined 49 signers of the petition sheets that they had notarized under oath. Nor did either of the notaries ask any of the signers to swear that the information provided was true. Both notaries had read and were familiar with the statement, immediately preceding their signature line, contained in the “2. Notary Public or Commissioner of Deeds” section of the petition sheet, to wit,

“On the dates above indicated before me personally came each of the voters whose signatures appear on this petition sheet containing (fill in number)— signatures, who signed in my presence and who, being by me duly sworn, each for himself or herself, said that the foregoing statement made and subscribed by him or her, was true.”

With regard to Mr. Travalino’s sheets, the combined testimony by Charles Duffy and Mr. Travalino revealed a methodology employed by them which, it was argued, amounted to, or equated to, a proper “notarization” of the signatures contained on each of the sheets. Mr. Travalino testified that he is a “C 6/7 quadriplegic” who is basically paralyzed from the neck down, who has limited use of his arms, but no use of his fingers. Despite the latter affliction, he testified that he was able to sign each of his petition pages. He has excellent hearing and speaks and communicates without any problem. He is an attorney who formerly was involved in real estate law, but no longer practices.

Mr. Duffy is the Supervisor of the Town of Lewisboro and was assisting with the collection of signatures for another candidate, Peter Michaelis. Since Duffy was not an enrolled member of the Independence Party, he needed a notary for the petition sheets, and Mr Travalino assisted in this capacity for a period of approximately three days. The men got into one of Mr. Travalino’s cars and variously proceeded to the homes of registered Independence Party members. The car was parked near each of the homes, “between 8-25 feet” from the front doors, porches, carports, etc. of the homes. Mr. Travalino would remain in the car, with a window(s) open and a good sight line to where Mr. Duffy would meet with and talk to the voters. Mr. Duffy would [320]*320explain why he was asking for the voter’s signature on the petition. After the voters agreed to sign one of the pages, he would tell most, if not all of them, that Mr. Travalino was in the car, that he was disabled, but nevertheless was a notary public, and that he was there to witness them sign. Mr. Travalino could hear all of this, and felt that each signatory was “sworn” by Mr. Duffy in his presence since each person was either personally known, or properly identified as the voter living at that residence, the purpose of the petition was fully explained to the voter, and the voter affirmatively indicated his or her understanding of the reason for signing the petition, and that he was a notary, was close by, and was there to witness their signature on the petition sheet. Some people actually came up to the car to say hello to Mr. Travalino, but, in each case, this occurred after they had been “sworn” by Mr. Duffy. As previously indicated, Mr. Travalino, although he was fully able to do so despite his disability, did not have any of the signers who came to the car show identification, raise his or her hand and swear to their identity or to the truth of the information contained on the signature line.

Mr. Pappalardo, who is an attorney, with the exception of the first signer on sheet No. 1 who is his wife, carried the two previously indicated petition sheets to the homes of the other six registered members of the Independence Party. He thoroughly explained the reason for the petition process and why he was asking them to sign each sheet. He was satisfied that each person was properly identified and that he or she understood the petition process, who they were signing for, and the office for which that person was running for. As previously indicated, he did not swear them in, or ask them to swear that the information provided was true.

Were the Signatures Properly Taken under Oath by a Notary?

Petitioner argues, and respondent Committee does not contest, that pursuant to Election Law § 6-132 (3), where a designating petition is circulated by a person who is not a duly enrolled member of the party for which the petition is being carried, a notary public or commissioner of deeds must be present to attest that the petition signer came before him, that the signer was sworn, and that the signer swore specifically to the truth of the statements made in signing the petition. Election Law § 6-132 (3) provides:

[321]*321“In lieu of the signed statement of a witness who is a duly qualified voter of the state qualified to sign the petition, the following statement signed by a notary public or commissioner of deeds shall be accepted:
“On the dates above indicated before me personally came each of the voters whose signatures appear on this petition sheet containing .............

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Bluebook (online)
33 Misc. 3d 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harckham-v-burns-nysupct-2011.