Hanson v. Theranest, LLC

District Court, S.D. California·Decided September 25, 2024·No. 3:24-cv-00086·Unknown

Opinion

LAURA HANSON, Case No.: 24-cv-00086-AGS-JLB Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE THERANEST, LLC, et al., ORDER

Defendants. [ECF No. 42]

Before the Court is a Motion for Protective Order filed by Defendants TheraNest, LLC (“TheraNest”), Therapy Brands Holdings, LLC (“Therapy Brands”), and Jennifer Wolfe (collectively “Defendants”) (ECF No. 42), which Plaintiff Laura Hanson (“Plaintiff”) opposes (ECF No. 43). On September 19, 2024, Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 48), and on September 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a surreply (ECF No. 49). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. A. Underlying Case The instant case arises out of Plaintiff’s employment as a Director of Compliance by and subsequent termination from TheraNest. (See generally ECF No. 24, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).) Plaintiff alleges she suffered serious, disabling injuries from a motor vehicle accident on March 1, 2020, that necessitated her taking intermittent leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and California Family Rights Act between March 2020 and February 2021. (SAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff’s SAC raises claims of discrimination, hostile work environment, harassment, and retaliation based on Plaintiff’s disability, along with failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to accommodate her disability. (See generally SAC.) B. Instant Discovery Dispute On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff served an initial 30(b)(6) deposition notice on Therapy Brands that listed 25 topics, and then served an amended 30(b)(6) deposition notice (“Amended Notice”) listing 28 topics on June 3, 2024. (ECF Nos. 42-1 at 2.) After Therapy Brands served objections to the Amended Notice, the parties met and conferred to narrow the disputed issues from all 28 topics to 14 topics. (ECF Nos. 42-1 at 2.) On July 12, 2024, the parties lodged a Joint Discovery Statement, and the Court set a Discovery Conference for July 19, 2024. (ECF Nos. 42-1 at 2; 30.) On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff served a second amended 30(b)(6) deposition notice (“Second Amended Notice”) listing 46 topics (ECF Nos. 42-1 at 2–3; 42-6), so the Court reset the July 19, 2024 Discovery Conference for August 2, 2024, to provide counsel time to meet and confer regarding the Second Amended Notice (ECF No. 32). The Court held Discovery Conferences on August 2, August 23, and August 30, 2024, after which the Court issued a briefing schedule for the instant motion. (ECF Nos. 33; 37; 40.) A party is entitled to seek discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Rule 30 further provides that a party may notice the deposition of “a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Such notice “must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” Id. Although “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes,” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), discovery of relevant information is not limitless. The Court must—either on motion or sua sponte—“limit the frequency or extent” of otherwise permissible discovery if the Court finds the request “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” or the discovery sought is obtainable from a “more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive” source. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Rule 26(c) further provides that, “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “The burden is on the person seeking the protective order to demonstrate good cause.” Grano v. Sodexo Mgt., Inc., 335 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (citing U.S. v. $160,066.98 from Bank of America, 202 F.R.D. 624, 626 (S.D. Cal. 2001). “The court has wide discretion to determine what constitutes a showing of good cause and to fashion a protective order that provides the appropriate degree of protection.” Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)); see also Alvarado-Herrera v. Acuity, 344 F.R.D. 103, 107, n.3 (D. Nev. 2023), aff’d sub nom. Alvarado-Herrera v. Acuity A Mut. Ins. Co., No. 222CV00438CDSNJK, 2023 WL 5035323 (D. Nev. Aug. 4, 2023) (“While [Rule] 26(b)(1) permits a party to obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense, courts have limited discovery where the breadth of subjects and number of topics identified in a [Rule] 30(b)(6) deposition notice renders a responding party’s efforts to designate a knowledgeable person unworkable.”); U.S. v. HVI Cat Canyon, Inc., No. CV 11-5097 FMO (SSX), 2016 WL 11683593, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (“While a corporation must make a good faith effort to prepare a 30(b)(6) witness to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter that task becomes less realistic and increasingly impossible as the number and breadth of noticed subject areas expand.”) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). At issue are topic numbers 4, 14, 16, 17, 21–23, 25–27, 33–36, and 39–46.1 Defendants generally argue that the disputed topics are overbroad and lack necessary specificity.2 (See generally ECF No. 42-1.) Defendants’ motion itself does not dive into particular detail about every disputed topic, instead relying on general conclusions that certain topics are “objectionable,” “overbroad,” “vague,” and “not specific.”3 (See, e.g., 1 Although Defendants’ motion includes topic number 15, Plaintiff’s opposition states that it was withdrawn and “turned into an interrogatory per the demand of Defendants. . . .” (ECF No. 43 at 5, n.1.) Accordingly, based on Plaintiff’s representation, the Court does not address topic number 15. 2 The objections Defendants served in response to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Notice were largely identical and improperly boilerplate, listing objections based on the definition of terms, lack of specificity, relevance, proportionality, attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, overbreadth, vagueness, and ambiguity. (See generally ECF No. 42-4.) “Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all.” Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Regardless, Defendants do not reraise all these objections in the instant motion. The Court declines to address any objections raised in Defendants’ discovery responses that they did not reassert within the instant motion. See Hall v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 19-cv-01715-JLS-AHG, 2021 WL 1906464, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2021) (quoting SolarCity Corp. v. Doria, No. 16-cv-3085-JAH-RBB, 2018 WL 467898, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

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