Hanson v. S.D. Warren Co.

2010 ME 51, 997 A.2d 730, 2010 Me. LEXIS 51, 2010 WL 2267396
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJune 8, 2010
DocketDocket: WCB-09-465
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 2010 ME 51 (Hanson v. S.D. Warren Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanson v. S.D. Warren Co., 2010 ME 51, 997 A.2d 730, 2010 Me. LEXIS 51, 2010 WL 2267396 (Me. 2010).

Opinion

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] Gregory R. Hanson appeals from a decision of a Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer (Elwin, HO), granting his petition for award and awarding him partial incapacity benefits subject to an offset for Hanson’s pension. Hanson contends that the hearing officer erred by reducing the partial benefit, paid pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 213 (2009), to the statutory maximum, pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 211 (2009), before coordinating the workers’ compensation benefit with his pension, pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 221 (2009). Hanson contends that workers’ compensation benefits should be reduced to the statutory maximum only after permissible offsets are taken. We affirm.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 2] Gregory Hanson worked for S.D. Warren for thirty years, most recently as control room operator. In January 2006, he suffered two acute episodes of shortness of breath, and was diagnosed with occupational asthma as a result of exposure to fumes. He was restricted to working in environments where he would not be exposed to gases, dust, or fumes. Although he attempted to return to work in April 2006, he was unable to do so. S.D. Warren terminated his employment in February 2008.

[¶ 3] In May 2008, Hanson began receiving pension benefits of $2050 per month. Based on benefit payment elections that Hanson has made, that amount will be reduced to $750 per month when he reaches the age of sixty-two and begins receiving Social Security benefits. 1

[¶ 4] Hanson filed a petition for award of workers’ compensation benefits. The hearing officer granted the petition, awarding Hanson ongoing partial benefits based on his average weekly wage of $1679, less a $400 per week imputed earning capacity. The hearing officer reduced this amount to the statutory maximum benefit pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 211, and then applied the pension offset to further reduce the benefit by the after-tax amount of the pension pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 221. 2 Hanson contended that the statutory maximum should have been applied to calculate his weekly benefit only after the pension offset was taken.

[¶ 5] Hanson filed a petition for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and proposed findings, pursuant to which the hearing officer corrected some figures and explained her reasoning, but did not alter the decision. Hanson filed a petition for appellate review, which we granted pursuant to M.RApp. P. 23(c) and 39-A M.R.S. § 322 (2009).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶ 6] The issue for us to determine is whether 39-A M.R.S. §§ 211, 213 *732 and 221 require that an employee’s workers’ compensation benefit be reduced to the statutory maximum before the pension offset is taken, or whether the statutory maximum should be applied after the pension offset is taken.

[¶ 7] The statutory maximum weekly benefit is established pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 211, which states:

Effective January 1, 1993, the maximum weekly benefit payable under section 212, 213 or 215 is $441 or 90% of [the] state average weekly wage, whichever is higher. Beginning on July 1, 1994, the maximum benefit level is the higher of $441 or 90% of the state average weekly wage as adjusted annually utilizing the state average weekly wage as determined by the Department of Labor.

[¶ 8] For the year July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010, the statutory maximum weekly benefit calculated pursuant to section 211 is $616.74.

[¶ 9] Partial incapacity benefits calculated pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1) must “not [be] more than the maximum benefit under section 211.” 3 When partial incapacity benefits are paid and a pension offset is required, the offset is calculated pursuant to the coordination of benefits provisions of 39-A M.R.S. § 221. The portions of the coordination of benefits statute applicable to this case state:

§ 221. Coordination of benefits
1. Application. This section applies when either weekly or lump sum payments are made to an employee as a result of liability pursuant to section 212 or 213 with respect to the same time period for which the employee is also receiving or has received payments for:
C. Pension or retirement payments pursuant to a plan or program established or maintained by the employer.
3. Coordination of benefits. Benefit payments subject to this section must be reduced in accordance with the following provisions.
D. Except as provided in subsections 6 and 7, a credit or reduction of benefits otherwise payable for any week may not be taken under this section until there has been a determination of the benefit amount otherwise payable to the employee under section 212 or 213 and the employee has begun receiving the benefit payments.

[¶ 10] Subsection (3)(D) of section 221 states in plain language that the pension offset must not be taken until there has first been a calculation of the benefits that would be payable to the employee under section 213, including any necessary reduction of benefits to the statutory maximum.

[¶ 11] The differing positions of the employee and the employer regarding payment calculations are outlined below.

Employee’s position
Compensation rate: $889.47 4
Post injury comp, rate: $626.24 5
Pension offset: ($185.91)
Weekly benefit $440.33
Employer’s position
*733 Compensation rate: $889.47
Post injury comp, rate: $626.24
Reduce to stat. max. $616.74 6
Pension offset: ($185.91)
Weekly benefit $430.83

[¶ 12] When construing provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, our purpose is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1994). In so doing, we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and construe that language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results. Id. When a statute is not ambiguous, we will interpret the statute directly, without applying rules of construction or examining legislative history or agency interpretation. See McGee v. Sec’y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 18, 896 A.2d 933, 939-40. We will look to rules of construction and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous. Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co.,

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Bluebook (online)
2010 ME 51, 997 A.2d 730, 2010 Me. LEXIS 51, 2010 WL 2267396, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanson-v-sd-warren-co-me-2010.