J-S10006-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
UNIVERSITY OF THE SCIENCES IN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PHILADELPHIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : ALYNNE HANSON : : No. 1233 MDA 2025 Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No(s): CI-22-07720
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 14, 2026
Appellant, Alynne Hanson, appeals from the August 12, 2025 order
entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas denying, inter alia,
Appellant’s petition to strike and stay execution of a judgment entered against
her in student loan litigation brought by Appellee, University of the Sciences
in Philadelphia.1 After careful consideration, we affirm the order.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. In 2001,
Appellant entered into a Health Professions Student Loan Program Promissory
Note for $2,315.00 (“Note”) with Appellee. The Note provides that it “shall be
construed according to the Federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 294m-294q) and
regulations (42 CFR section 57.201 et seq.) governing the administration of
the Health Professions Student Loan program[.]” Note at ¶ 14. ____________________________________________
1 As she has throughout this litigation, Appellant appeals pro se in this Court. J-S10006-26
On December 13, 2022, Appellee filed a complaint seeking to collect the
outstanding balance on the 2001 Note plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.
In her Answer, Appellant did not address the merits of the complaint but
instead asserted that the complaint was untimely based upon the four-year
statute of limitations on contracts set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a).
On March 30, 2023, Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, emphasizing that Appellant should be deemed to have admitted all
factual averments as she had not responded to the merits. Appellee also
rejected Appellant’s statute of limitations argument, asserting that the Note
was subject to the federal General Provisions Relating to Student Assistance
Programs, which Appellee asserted exempted actions to collect federal student
loan obligations from statutes of limitations, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a).
Appellant did not respond.
On June 14, 2023, the court granted Appellee’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings and awarded Appellee $4,879.25. The court found that, by not
denying the factual allegations in the complaint, Appellant had “admitted to
executing a promissory note for a $2,315.00 loan in 2001 and failing to make
scheduled repayments.” Trial Ct. Order, 6/14/23, at 1 n.1. The court further
found that “[t]he four-year statute of limitations for contract actions does not
apply to loans within the Health Professions Student Loans Program.” Id.
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091a). Appellant did not appeal this order.
While Appellee praeciped to enter judgment on September 12, 2023, it
did not praecipe for a writ of execution until April 2, 2025.
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On July 17, 2025, over 100 days after entry of the writ of execution,
Appellant filed a “petition to strike judgment and for stay of execution,”
reiterating her claim based upon the statute of limitations without addressing
the federal provision relied upon by the trial court.
On July 18, 2025, the court entered an order denying Appellant’s
petition to strike judgment and stay execution finding it “procedurally untimely
and substantively unmeritorious.” Trial Ct. Order, 7/18/25, at 1 n.1. The
court concluded that Appellant’s petition was untimely, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.
2959(a)(3), which requires the petitioner, in certain cases, to file the petition
to strike off or open a judgment “within thirty days” after service of the writ
of execution.2 Id. The Rule provides that “[u]nless the defendant can
demonstrate that there were compelling reasons for the delay, a petition not
timely filed shall be denied.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(a)(3). The court additionally
opined that Appellant’s underlying statute of limitations argument was “devoid
of merit[,]” for the reasons set forth in its June 14, 2023 order.
On August 6, 2025, Appellant filed a second petition, titled “petition to
strike and/or open judgment and for stay of execution.” Without development
of any argument or citation to relevant authority other than the four-year
statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(8), Appellant proffered the
following four grounds for relief. First, she reiterated her statute of limitation ____________________________________________
2 Specifically, Rule 2959 instructs that “[i]f written notice is served upon the
petitioner pursuant to Rule 2956.1(c)(2) or Rule 2973.1(c), the petition shall be filed within thirty days after such service.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(a)(3). At no point has Appellant addressed the applicability of this rule.
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argument. Second, she baldly asserted that “[t]he judgment is void due to
improper service of process and/or lack of jurisdiction[.]” Petition, 8/6/24 at
¶ (3)(b). Third, she stated “[i]n the alternative, [Appellant] seeks to open the
judgment, as there is a meritorious defense to the underlying claim, and the
failure to appear was due to excusable neglect or lack of notice.” Id. at
¶ (3)(c). Finally, she averred that she had “acted promptly and in good faith
upon learning of the judgment and resulting execution proceedings.” Id. at
¶ (3)(d). In so doing, she did not address the court’s reasoning in the July
18, 2025 order denying Appellant’s first petition to strike.
In a one sentence order entered on August 12, 2025, the court denied
Appellant’s second petition “for the reasons stated in the court’s July 18, 2025
order.” Order, 8/12/25. The court did not expressly address the attempted
addition of a petition to open judgment.
On September 8, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, with the trial court relying upon
the reasoning of its July 18, 2025 order.
Appellant raises pro se the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the four-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525 to Appellant’s private loan[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred in classifying the loan as federal when it was privately issued[?]
3. Whether judgment was entered without proper notice in violation of Pa.R.C[iv].P. 236[?]
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Appellant’s Br. at 1-2.3
Notably, Appellant does not address the threshold issue: whether the
trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying her petition to strike the
judgment and stay execution and her subsequent petition, which sought also
to open the judgment. “Our standard of review from the denial of a petition
to strike a judgment is limited to whether the trial court manifestly abused its
discretion or committed an error of law.” Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
900 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. Super.
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J-S10006-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
UNIVERSITY OF THE SCIENCES IN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PHILADELPHIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : ALYNNE HANSON : : No. 1233 MDA 2025 Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at No(s): CI-22-07720
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: MAY 14, 2026
Appellant, Alynne Hanson, appeals from the August 12, 2025 order
entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas denying, inter alia,
Appellant’s petition to strike and stay execution of a judgment entered against
her in student loan litigation brought by Appellee, University of the Sciences
in Philadelphia.1 After careful consideration, we affirm the order.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. In 2001,
Appellant entered into a Health Professions Student Loan Program Promissory
Note for $2,315.00 (“Note”) with Appellee. The Note provides that it “shall be
construed according to the Federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 294m-294q) and
regulations (42 CFR section 57.201 et seq.) governing the administration of
the Health Professions Student Loan program[.]” Note at ¶ 14. ____________________________________________
1 As she has throughout this litigation, Appellant appeals pro se in this Court. J-S10006-26
On December 13, 2022, Appellee filed a complaint seeking to collect the
outstanding balance on the 2001 Note plus interest, costs, and attorney fees.
In her Answer, Appellant did not address the merits of the complaint but
instead asserted that the complaint was untimely based upon the four-year
statute of limitations on contracts set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a).
On March 30, 2023, Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, emphasizing that Appellant should be deemed to have admitted all
factual averments as she had not responded to the merits. Appellee also
rejected Appellant’s statute of limitations argument, asserting that the Note
was subject to the federal General Provisions Relating to Student Assistance
Programs, which Appellee asserted exempted actions to collect federal student
loan obligations from statutes of limitations, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a).
Appellant did not respond.
On June 14, 2023, the court granted Appellee’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings and awarded Appellee $4,879.25. The court found that, by not
denying the factual allegations in the complaint, Appellant had “admitted to
executing a promissory note for a $2,315.00 loan in 2001 and failing to make
scheduled repayments.” Trial Ct. Order, 6/14/23, at 1 n.1. The court further
found that “[t]he four-year statute of limitations for contract actions does not
apply to loans within the Health Professions Student Loans Program.” Id.
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091a). Appellant did not appeal this order.
While Appellee praeciped to enter judgment on September 12, 2023, it
did not praecipe for a writ of execution until April 2, 2025.
-2- J-S10006-26
On July 17, 2025, over 100 days after entry of the writ of execution,
Appellant filed a “petition to strike judgment and for stay of execution,”
reiterating her claim based upon the statute of limitations without addressing
the federal provision relied upon by the trial court.
On July 18, 2025, the court entered an order denying Appellant’s
petition to strike judgment and stay execution finding it “procedurally untimely
and substantively unmeritorious.” Trial Ct. Order, 7/18/25, at 1 n.1. The
court concluded that Appellant’s petition was untimely, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.
2959(a)(3), which requires the petitioner, in certain cases, to file the petition
to strike off or open a judgment “within thirty days” after service of the writ
of execution.2 Id. The Rule provides that “[u]nless the defendant can
demonstrate that there were compelling reasons for the delay, a petition not
timely filed shall be denied.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(a)(3). The court additionally
opined that Appellant’s underlying statute of limitations argument was “devoid
of merit[,]” for the reasons set forth in its June 14, 2023 order.
On August 6, 2025, Appellant filed a second petition, titled “petition to
strike and/or open judgment and for stay of execution.” Without development
of any argument or citation to relevant authority other than the four-year
statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a)(8), Appellant proffered the
following four grounds for relief. First, she reiterated her statute of limitation ____________________________________________
2 Specifically, Rule 2959 instructs that “[i]f written notice is served upon the
petitioner pursuant to Rule 2956.1(c)(2) or Rule 2973.1(c), the petition shall be filed within thirty days after such service.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(a)(3). At no point has Appellant addressed the applicability of this rule.
-3- J-S10006-26
argument. Second, she baldly asserted that “[t]he judgment is void due to
improper service of process and/or lack of jurisdiction[.]” Petition, 8/6/24 at
¶ (3)(b). Third, she stated “[i]n the alternative, [Appellant] seeks to open the
judgment, as there is a meritorious defense to the underlying claim, and the
failure to appear was due to excusable neglect or lack of notice.” Id. at
¶ (3)(c). Finally, she averred that she had “acted promptly and in good faith
upon learning of the judgment and resulting execution proceedings.” Id. at
¶ (3)(d). In so doing, she did not address the court’s reasoning in the July
18, 2025 order denying Appellant’s first petition to strike.
In a one sentence order entered on August 12, 2025, the court denied
Appellant’s second petition “for the reasons stated in the court’s July 18, 2025
order.” Order, 8/12/25. The court did not expressly address the attempted
addition of a petition to open judgment.
On September 8, 2025, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, with the trial court relying upon
the reasoning of its July 18, 2025 order.
Appellant raises pro se the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the four-year statute of limitations under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525 to Appellant’s private loan[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred in classifying the loan as federal when it was privately issued[?]
3. Whether judgment was entered without proper notice in violation of Pa.R.C[iv].P. 236[?]
-4- J-S10006-26
Appellant’s Br. at 1-2.3
Notably, Appellant does not address the threshold issue: whether the
trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying her petition to strike the
judgment and stay execution and her subsequent petition, which sought also
to open the judgment. “Our standard of review from the denial of a petition
to strike a judgment is limited to whether the trial court manifestly abused its
discretion or committed an error of law.” Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
900 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “[I]f in reaching a
conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,
as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” Smith v.
Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 25 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted).
As noted, in denying relief, the trial court concluded that Appellant
untimely filed her petitions to strike and failed to provide a compelling reason
for her delay pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(a)(3). Appellant does not respond
to, or even acknowledge, the trial court’s basis for denying her petitions.
Indeed, she does not recognize that her appeal is from the order denying her
petition to strike and/or open; rather, she characterizes the August 12, 2025
____________________________________________
3 Appellee claims that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the denial of
a motion to strike judgment and stay execution, claiming that it is not a final order. Appellee’s Br. at 3. We reject this argument as an appeal may be taken as of right from “[a]n order refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).
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decision as one which “entered judgment in favor” of Appellee. Appellant’s
Br. at 2. As Appellant fails to address the trial court’s reasoning or allege how
the court abused its discretion in denying her petitions, she has not presented
a claim warranting relief.4
We reiterate that while “this Court is willing to liberally construe
materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit
upon the appellant.” S.S. v. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citation omitted). “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080,
1088 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 05/14/2026 ____________________________________________
4 Moreover, addressing Appellant’s third issue, alleging lack of notice of the
“April 30th ruling” pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 236, we conclude that Appellant fails to present a viable claim. Appellant’s Br. at 12. The record does not contain an “April 30th ruling.” If we presume that Appellant intended to reference the June 14, 2023 order granting judgment on the pleadings, we reject Appellant’s claim given that the docket indicates that the court provided a Rule 236 notice. Moreover, the docket and record state that the Prothonotary entered judgment on September 12, 2023, and mailed notice of the entry of judgment, pursuant to Rule 236, to Appellant. Appellant fails to refute these entries. Accordingly, this issue warrants no relief.
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