Hannonen v. McCloskey

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEENA HANNONEN, an individual; ) Case No.: 24-cv-2408-BEN-BLM AGNES BRADSHAW, an individual, ) 12 ) ORDER Plaintiff, 13 ) v. ) 14 ) MARK McCLOSKEY, an individual; 15 ) TIMOTHY M. RYAN, an individual; ) 16 ANDREW J. MASE, an individual; ) MATTHEW H. AGUIRRE, an individual; 17 ) THE RYAN LAW IRM, APC, a ) 18 California Professional Corporation; and ) DOES 5-25, 19 ) Defendant. ) 20 21 22 Before this Court is Plaintiffs Leena Hannonen and Agnes Bradshaw’s motion 23 requesting the Court appoint a “DOJ Whistleblower Coordinator” to investigate 24 allegations of fraud. This motion follows Plaintiffs’ dismissal of the FAC. (Doc. 22). 25 Plaintiffs previously moved to Alter or Amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 59(e).1 (Doc. 24). Plaintiffs subsequently moved for leave to file a late 27 28 1 reply in support (Doc. 29), which the Court granted. (Doc. 30). However, instead of 2 filing a later reply per the Court’s Order, Plaintiffs filed a motion to “Appoint a DOJ 3 Whistleblower Coordinator to investigate fraud, forgery, and obstruction of justice.” 4 (Doc. 31). 5 Plaintiffs’ cited authority in their motion lacks any legal basis for the relief 6 requested. Plaintiffs first rely on 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),2 which addresses concerns of 7 government supervisors against their employees. This statute has no applicability here 8 because Plaintiffs are not government employees. Plaintiffs next cite 28 U.S.C. § 509,3 9 which provides that “all functions of other officers of the [DOJ] and all functions of 10 agencies and employees of the [DOJ] are vested in the Attorney General.” This statute 11 does not authorize this Court to appoint a whistleblower coordinator. 12 Plaintiffs concede that their claims of fraud were insufficient to invoke an 13 investigation by the DOJ and the California Attorney General. (Doc. 31 at 9:5). While 14 Plaintiffs also rely on 18 U.S.C. § 1503,4 this statute addresses threats against the courts 15

16 17 2 Section 2302. Prohibited personnel practices “(b) [a]ny employee who has authority to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority. . .” “(8) take or 18 fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personal action with respect to anu employee or applicant for employment. . . .” 19 3 Section 509. “Functions of the Attorney General. All functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the [DOJ] are vested in the Attorney General 20 except the functions—(1) vested by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 [5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.] in 21 administrative law judges employed by the [DOJ]; (2) of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.; and (3) of the Board of Directors and officers of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.” 22 4 Section 1503. “Influencing or injuring officers or jurors generally. (a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede 23 any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing 24 magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property 25 on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or 26 property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 27 obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation 28 1 and provides no basis for the requested relief. 2 None of the cases Plaintiffs cite support a court-appointed whistleblower 3 coordinator. For example, Plaintiffs cite Hazel-Atlas Glass Co v. Hartford-Empire Co., 4 322 U.S. 238 (1944); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 5 U.S. 32 (1991); U.S. v. Lew, 875 F. 2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989); and Haines v. Kerner, 404 6 U.S. 519 (1972). None of these cases involves the appointment of a whistleblower by a 7 federal court. 8 The only relevant statute this Court has located dealing with the appointment of a 9 “Whistleblower Protection Coordinator” is 5 U.S.C § 403(d)(C). Section 403(d) provides 10 that each Inspector General for the relevant agency shall appoint an assistant inspector 11 general to designate a Whistleblower Protection Coordinator who shall: 12 (i) educate agency employees: (I) about prohibitions against retaliation for protected disclosures; and (II) who have made or are contemplating making a 13 protected disclosure about the rights and remedies against retaliation for protected 14 disclosures, including: (aa) the means by which employees may seek review of any allegation of reprisal, including the roles of the Office of the Inspector General, the 15 Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and any other 16 relevant entities; and (bb) general information about the timeliness of such cases, the availability of any alternative dispute mechanisms, and avenues for potential 17 relief; (ii) assist the [IG] in promoting the timely and appropriate handling and 18 consideration of protected disclosures and allegations of reprisal, to the extent practicable, by the [IG]; and (iii) assist the [IG] facilitating communication and 19 coordination with the Special Counsel, the Council of the Inspectors General on 20 Integrity and Efficiency, the establishment, Congress, and any other relevant entity regarding the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected 21 disclosures, allegations of reprisal and general matters regarding the 22 implementation and administration of whistleblower protection laws, rules, and regulations; (2) Whistleblower Protection Coordinator not to act as legal 23

24 25 imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.” 26

28 1 representative, agent, or advocate. The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall have direct access to the [IG] as needed to accomplish the requirements of this subsection; (3) Whistleblower Protection Coordinator access to [IG]. The 3 Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall have direct access to the [IG] as A needed to accomplish the requirements of this subsection. Jd. 5 This statute clearly vests the appointment authority with agency Inspectors 6 General, not federal courts. Plaintiffs ask this Court to exercise authority it does not

4 possess. See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 756 (9th Cir. 1993) g (“[U]nder Article HI, courts may not exercise ‘executive or administrative duties of a

9 nonjudicial nature.’”’). 10 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. ( DATED: September 2, 2025 HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _4-