IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Hannah Janowiak, Jul 31 2026, 9:17 am
Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
Kenneth Sandage and The Trustees of Purdue University, Appellees-Defendants
July 31, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CT-2937 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D06-2310-CT-41286
Opinion by Judge Kenworthy Judges Bradford and Pyle concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 1 of 27 Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary [1] In 2022, Kenneth Sandhage 1 struck Hannah Janowiak with his car as she was
walking across the street on the then-named Indiana University Purdue
University Indianapolis (“IUPUI”) campus. Janowiak sustained injuries and
sued Sandhage for negligence. During litigation, Janowiak learned Sandhage
was a professor at Purdue University, and so she amended her complaint to add
The Trustees of Purdue University (“Purdue”) as a defendant and to allege
Sandhage was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision.
Sandhage admitted as much in his answer to the amended complaint. He and
Purdue (collectively, “Defendants”) then each moved to dismiss the suit under
provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”). 2 The trial court granted
Defendants’ motions.
[2] On appeal, Janowiak presents two restated issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err when it dismissed Janowiak’s case against Sandhage for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted?
1 Appellee’s name shows as both “Sandage” and “Sandhage” in the record, but it appears “Sandhage” is the correct spelling. 2 Ind. Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 2 of 27 2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for Purdue?
[3] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [4] At all relevant times, Sandhage lived in Lafayette and was a professor at Purdue
University in West Lafayette. On March 9, 2022, he drove his personal car to
Indianapolis and spent the day on the IUPUI campus. Just after 5:00 p.m., he
left to drive home. After stopping his car at the intersection of Blake and North
Streets, he turned left and struck Janowiak as she was walking in a pedestrian
crosswalk. Campus police responded and took the parties’ statements.
Sandhage provided the police with his driver’s license and information about
his personal automobile insurance policy through Erie Insurance (“Erie”). The
police incident report listed Sandhage as a “Vis[i]tor” and Janowiak as an “IU
employee.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 15. Janowiak sustained injuries and was
taken to the hospital.
[5] The next month, Janowiak retained counsel, who sent a letter of representation
to Erie and requested certain insurance documents and photographs related to
the claim. Because Janowiak believed Sandhage may have been using his cell
phone around the time of the collision, her counsel also requested information
about Sandhage’s cell phone provider and account. Erie acknowledged the
letter on April 14 and denied Sandhage was on his phone.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 3 of 27 [6] On October 23, 2023, nineteen months after the collision, Janowiak sued
Sandhage in his personal capacity for negligence. After receiving the
complaint, Sandhage talked to his department chair, and on November 3, he
notified Purdue’s legal counsel of the lawsuit and requested indemnification.
[7] Soon after, Janowiak served discovery requests on Sandhage. In January 2024,
Sandhage responded to interrogatories, including two questions about his
employment. In the first, Janowiak asked whether Sandhage was acting in the
scope of his employment at the time of the incident. Sandhage objected to the
extent the question called for a legal conclusion. But he responded that “in the
interest of full disclosure,” he was employed by Purdue, “had just finished
working in collaboration with a professor at IUPUI,” and was leaving IUPUI
and heading to Lafayette when the incident occurred. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at
39. When asked to describe his actions in the eight hours prior to the collision,
Sandhage responded that he had been conducting “business/work” on the
IUPUI campus during the day and was leaving when his car collided with
Janowiak. Id. at 43.
[8] In February 2024, Janowiak moved to amend her complaint and add Purdue as
a defendant. In the amended complaint, Janowiak alleged Sandhage was a
Purdue employee and, at the time of the incident, acting within the course and
scope of his employment. Accordingly, Janowiak alleged Purdue was
vicariously liable for losses caused by Sandhage’s negligence. The trial court
granted Janowiak’s motion to amend.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 4 of 27 [9] Sandhage answered the amended complaint, first asserting he lacked sufficient
information to admit or deny Janowiak’s scope-of-employment allegation. But
on April 10, Sandhage amended his answer to admit he was acting in the
course and scope of his employment. Sandhage and Purdue then each moved
to dismiss the claims under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) on the grounds the
ITCA barred Janowiak’s suit against them. To its motion, Purdue attached an
affidavit from its corporate executive, averring Janowiak had not provided
ITCA notice to Purdue.
[10] On April 23, 2024, over two years after the incident, Janowiak provided a
formal tort claim notice to Purdue, stating she first learned of the relationship
between Sandhage and Purdue on January 12, 2024, through Sandhage’s
interrogatory responses. Janowiak then filed her response to the motions to
dismiss, arguing she substantially complied with the tort claim notice
requirements and even if she did not, Purdue should be equitably estopped from
asserting an ITCA notice defense. She designated eleven exhibits in support of
her response, including an affidavit of the IUPUI campus police officer who
responded and completed the crash report. Janowiak also designated portions
of Sandhage’s deposition, in which he admitted that he never disclosed to
Janowiak or her representatives that he was acting in the scope of his
employment until the lawsuit against him was filed. 3
3 Janowiak designated excerpts of the deposition testimonies of Sandhage and Mark Kebert (a Purdue representative). See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 42–47. On appeal, Janowiak included the entire transcripts of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 5 of 27 [11] The trial court held a hearing on the motions, at which the parties argued the
motions to dismiss should be converted to summary judgment motions due to
the parties’ designated materials. The trial court took the motions under
advisement. After a brief second hearing, the trial court granted Defendants’
motions to dismiss solely under Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The court explained that it did so without
considering Purdue’s affidavit or Janowiak’s designated evidence, instead
considering only the complaint and Janowiak’s concession that the ITCA’s 180-
day notice period had passed when she provided Purdue with a formal tort
claim notice.
The trial court did not err in granting Sandhage’s motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). [12] Janowiak first argues the trial court erred in granting Sandhage’s motion to
dismiss. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the complaint’s legal
sufficiency, not the facts that support it. Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy
Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017). When ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the court views the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving
these depositions in her appendix. See id. at 89–211. Sandhage moved this Court to strike these portions of Janowiak’s appendix, and Defendants submitted only the designated portions of the depositions in their joint appendix. See Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 65–91. “It is well established that to make a determination in a summary judgment proceeding, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court.” Leo Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). By separate order issued today, we grant Sandhage’s motion to strike and consider only the select deposition testimony designated to the trial court in support of the parties’ motions and responses.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 6 of 27 party, drawing every reasonable inference in the non-movant’s favor. Robertson
v. State, 141 N.E.3d 1224, 1227 (Ind. 2020). A trial court’s decision on a Rule
12(B)(6) motion presents a legal question which we review de novo. Thornton v.
State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015). We will not affirm a trial court’s
dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) unless it is apparent the facts alleged in the
complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Id.
[13] The ITCA governs tort claims against political subdivisions and their
employees. Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind. 2020); I.C. ch. 34-13-3. 4
The ITCA provides substantial immunity for a government employee’s
negligent conduct when the employee’s acts or omissions giving rise to a claim
occurred within the scope of his employment. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 852.
Under the statute, a “lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope
of the employee’s employment bars an action by the claimant against the
employee personally.” I.C. § 34-13-3-5(b) (2003); see also Bushong v. Williamson,
790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003) (holding the same language under a prior
version of the statute is “fairly explicit” that “a plaintiff may not now sue a
governmental employee personally if the complaint, on its face, alleges that the
employee’s acts leading to the claim occurred within the scope of
employment”); Miner v. Sw. Sch. Corp., 755 N.E.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Ind. Ct.
4 The ITCA applies more broadly to governmental entities. See I.C. § 34-13-3-3 (2021). The term “governmental entity” includes a “political subdivision of the state.” I.C. § 34-6-2-49 (2013). The parties agree Purdue is a political subdivision for purposes of the ITCA. See I.C. § 34-6-2-110(7) (2007) (defining “political subdivision” to include a “state educational institution”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 7 of 27 App. 2001) (“In general, a plaintiff may not maintain an action against a
governmental employee personally if that employee was acting within the scope
of his employment.”). To maintain a lawsuit against a government employee
personally, the plaintiff must allege the employee’s act or omission that caused
a loss was “(1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee’s
employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit
the employee personally.” I.C. § 34-13-3-5(c).
[14] In her original complaint, Janowiak named only Sandhage as a defendant and
alleged his negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her injuries. After
some discovery, Janowiak amended her complaint and named Purdue as an
additional defendant. She again alleged Sandhage negligently caused her
injuries, but added that at the time of the collision, Sandhage “was operating his
vehicle while acting within the course and scope of his employment, agency
and/or contract with Defendant Purdue.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 26. 5 The
facts of the amended complaint, taken as true, bar Janowiak’s suit against
Sandhage personally. See Bushong, 790 N.E.2d at 471–72. Since Janowiak filed
her amended complaint, no party has argued Sandhage acted clearly outside the
scope of his employment, or that his acts were criminal, malicious, willful and
wanton, or calculated to benefit him. Because the facts alleged in the complaint
are incapable of supporting relief as to Janowiak’s claim against Sandhage, the
5 Sandhage admitted this allegation in his amended answer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 8 of 27 trial court did not err in granting Sandhage’s motion to dismiss Janowiak’s
claim against him.
Purdue is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. [15] Janowiak next argues the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint against
Purdue. Janowiak’s argument is two-fold. First, she argues she substantially
complied with the ITCA’s tort claim notice provision, so her suit against
Purdue should be allowed to proceed. Second, she argues that even if she
didn’t timely provide notice, Purdue should be equitably estopped from relying
on an ITCA notice defense.
Standard of Review
[16] Before addressing the merits of Janowiak’s arguments, we must address the
appropriate standard of review. In the case of a Rule 12(B)(6) motion, if
“matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56.” Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). A trial court converts a Rule 12
motion to a motion for summary judgment by its consideration of extraneous
matters, regardless of whether the court expressly converts the motion.
Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023).
[17] As discussed above, the trial court granted Purdue’s motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(B)(6) while explicitly excluding all evidence beyond the complaint and
Janowiak’s admission she filed the tort claim notice more than two years after
the incident. In the context of Rule 12 motions, materials of which a trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 9 of 27 may take judicial notice are not considered matters outside the pleading. Id.
State court filings, a public record request, and a tort-claim notice are items our
Supreme Court does not consider “extraneous materials” that, if considered by
a trial court, would require converting a Rule 12 to a Rule 56 motion. Id. In
this case, the resolution of Purdue’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6)
requires only consideration of the face of the complaint and the tort claim
notice made in April 2024. Therefore, it was not erroneous for the trial court to
decline to convert Purdue’s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, in
so much as the trial court entered judgment solely under Rule 12(B)(6).
[18] Yet in response to Purdue’s motion to dismiss, Janowiak raised an equitable
estoppel claim and designated materials in support. Resolution of Janowiak’s
estoppel argument requires consideration of the designated materials, including
the police officer’s crash report and Sandhage’s deposition testimony and
interrogatory responses. Accordingly, the issue requires conversion of Purdue’s
Rule 12(B)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp., 19 N.E.3d 254, 259 (Ind. 2014) (reviewing
compliance with the ITCA notice requirement, including substantial
compliance and equitable arguments, under a summary judgment standard of
review); Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 705–06 (Ind. 2013) (same).
[19] When a court treats a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the
court must grant the parties a reasonable opportunity to designate Rule 56
materials. Azhar v. Town of Fishers, 744 N.E.2d 947, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
A trial court’s failure to give the parties explicit notice of conversion is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 10 of 27 reversible error only if the court did not give a party a reasonable opportunity to
respond and the party is thereby prejudiced. Id. (citing Ayers v. Indian Heights
Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (Ind. 1986)). Here, because
both Purdue and Janowiak designated materials (and, in fact, argued the trial
court should convert the motion), our review under the summary judgment
standard presents no risk of prejudice to the parties.
[20] Our summary judgment standard is well settled:
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we will affirm a grant of summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A “genuine issue” is one upon which the parties proffer differing accounts of the truth, or as to which conflicting inferences may be drawn from the parties’ consistent accounts; a “material fact” is one that affects the outcome of the case. Like the trial court, we construe all evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party.
Lyons, 19 N.E.3d at 259 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 6
6 The trial court did not explicitly rule on Janowiak’s estoppel argument, as shown by the court verbally declining to consider any evidence beyond the complaint and by its written judgment. Generally, we consider only those issues which were briefed and argued by the parties before the trial court and which the trial court considered and ruled upon. Richardson v. Calderon, 713 N.E.2d 856, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. An intermediate court of appeals, for the most part, is not the forum for the initial decisions in a case. GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Invs., LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). This rule “in part protects the integrity of the trial court; it cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.” Id. And the rule reflects the allocation of trial and appellate functions in our justice system. Trial courts have the authority to hear and weigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, apply the law to the facts found, and decide questions raised by the parties. Id. Appellate courts,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 11 of 27 Janowiak’s complaint against Purdue is barred for failure to provide timely notice to Purdue under the ITCA.
[21] We turn now to Janowiak’s claim she substantially complied with the ITCA.
Under the ITCA, a tort claim against a governmental entity is barred unless the
claimant provides the entity with timely notice of the claim. 6232 Harrison Ave.
LLC v. City of Hammond, 181 N.E.3d 379, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). A claimant
must provide the prescribed notice to a political subdivision within 180 days
after the loss occurs. I.C. § 34-13-3-8(a) (1998). Notice “must describe in a
short and plain statement the facts on which the claim is based.” I.C. § 34-13-3-
10 (1998). The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure government
by contrast, have the authority to review questions of law and to judge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision. Id. Nevertheless, we believe it is a proper exercise of our authority in this case to decide whether Purdue is entitled to summary judgment, even if the trial court explicitly did not. First, the issue of estoppel was briefed and argued by both parties to the trial court, so this is not a case where the issues were raised for the first time on appeal. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 51 (Janowiak’s response to motions to dismiss); Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 96 (Defendants’ joint reply in support of their motions to dismiss); Tr. Vol. 2 at 18 (Janowiak presenting equitable estoppel argument during hearing on the motion to dismiss); Id. at 6 (Defendants’ argument at hearing). Second, the applicable standard of review does not require us to perform functions typically reserved for trial courts. On appeal from the entry of summary judgment, we exercise de novo review, applying the same standard as the trial court. U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 204 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. 2023). Summary judgment is “judgment entered when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved.” Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind. 1996). A trial court is not required to enter findings of fact and conclusions to support a summary judgment ruling, and when entered, they are not binding on appeal. Coulter v. Caviness, 128 N.E.3d 541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Therefore, the review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment does not require us to find facts or weigh witness credibility—acts typically within a trial court’s authority. If a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is simply not appropriate, and we would remand to the trial court. Third, the estoppel argument has been fully briefed on appeal, and the parties appear to agree it is properly before this Court. So again, there is no prejudice to the parties by deciding the issue. For these reasons, we proceed to decide whether Purdue was entitled to summary judgment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 12 of 27 entities can investigate the incident giving rise to the claim and prepare a
defense. Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 706.
[22] Not all technical violations of the ITCA are fatal to a claim. Brown v. Alexander,
876 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Notice is sufficient if it
“substantially complies with the content requirements of the statute,” Collier v.
Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1989), such that “the purpose of the notice
requirement is satisfied,” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 707 (citation omitted). A
notice satisfies the statutory purpose and is substantially compliant if it is filed
within the 180-day period, informs the political subdivision of the claimant’s
intent to make a claim, and contains sufficient information which reasonably
affords the entity an opportunity to promptly investigate the claim. Collier, 544
N.E.2d at 499. “As a general rule, an evaluation of substantial compliance
looks not to the information held by the governmental entity but instead to the
efforts made by the claimant to notify the governmental entity of the claim.”
Brown, 876 N.E.2d at 382. What constitutes substantial compliance is a
question of law, albeit a fact-sensitive determination. Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at
707.
[23] In this case, the collision occurred in March 2022, and Janowiak gave formal,
statutorily required notice in April 2024—well beyond the 180-day deadline.
Still, Janowiak argues she substantially complied with the ITCA requirements
because she gave formal notice to Purdue within 180 days of January 12, 2024.
That was the date Sandhage responded to an interrogatory by stating he was on
the IUPUI campus to collaborate with another professor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 13 of 27 [24] Although Janowiak claims she could not have discovered Purdue’s involvement
until January 2024, the operative question for determining the notice period is
when Janowiak discovered she sustained a loss. See I.C. § 34-13-3-8(a)
(providing a tort claim notice is due within 180 days “after the loss occurs”). A
loss occurs “‘when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence,
could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the
tortious act of another.’” Reed v. City of Evansville, 956 N.E.2d 684, 691 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011) (quoting Wehling v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind.
1992)), trans. denied. Here, Janowiak knew she sustained a loss in 2022 when
the collision occurred, not when Sandhage answered interrogatories. Notice
was due in fall 2022, and the untimely notice Janowiak gave Purdue in spring
2024 was not substantially compliant. Lyons, 19 N.E.3d at 260 (holding there
was no substantial compliance where the plaintiffs filed a notice of claim more
than one year after a known loss).
[25] Janowiak next argues she substantially complied with the ITCA notice
requirements when she sent a letter of representation and initiated negotiations
with Sandhage’s personal liability insurer, Erie, within a month of the accident.
Because Erie knew the facts of the claim and had opportunity to promptly
investigate it, Janowiak contends the statutory purpose of notice was satisfied.
[26] Janowiak directs us to no case in which a claimant’s communication with an
employee’s personal automobile insurance carrier constitutes substantial
compliance with the ITCA notice requirements. Different panels of this Court
have reached varying conclusions as to whether a plaintiff’s notice to a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 14 of 27 governmental entity’s insurer constitutes substantial compliance with the ITCA.
See Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 707 (comparing cases). But even there, courts
have declined to find substantial compliance where the claimant communicated
only with the entity’s insurer and “took no steps whatsoever to comply with the
notice statute.” Id. at 708. Further, our Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that a governmental entity’s insurer is the entity’s agent for the
purpose of receiving tort claim notices. Id. (holding no section of the ITCA
creates such an agency relationship and discerning no intent on the legislature’s
part to create one). Janowiak directs us to no statute which would impose an
agency relationship between a governmental entity and a third-party insurer.
Because there is no such relationship between Purdue and Erie, and Janowiak
took no steps to give Purdue the statutorily required notice, the trial court did
not err in dismissing Janowiak’s claim against Purdue for failure to give timely
notice under the ITCA.
Purdue is not equitably estopped from asserting its ITCA notice defense.
[27] As shown above, Janowiak essentially pled herself out of court by amending
her complaint—after the tort claim notice period had run—to allege Sandhage
was acting in the scope of his employment and Purdue should be held
vicariously liable for her losses. To revive her claims, Janowiak argues the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 15 of 27 doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar Purdue 7 from asserting its ITCA
notice defense.
[28] There are various types of estoppels, but all “are based on the same underlying
principle: one who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a
particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position,
attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other.” Brown v.
Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. 2001). Under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, “if a party’s actions prevent another party from obtaining the requisite
knowledge to pursue a claim, then equity will toll the statute of limitations until
the equitable grounds cease to operate as a reason for delay.” Kenworth of
Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370, 383 (Ind. 2019) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). 8
7 Technically, Janowiak argues “the defendants”—that is, both Sandhage and Purdue—should be equitably estopped from relying on the “ITCA notice defense.” See Appellant’s Br. at 11–17. As discussed above, Janowiak’s claim against Sandhage is barred because Sandhage cannot be sued personally under the ITCA. Even if equity excused Janowiak from giving Purdue timely notice, the ITCA would still bar her claim against Sandhage. (The trial court requested supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Janowiak could proceed against Sandhage in his personal capacity even if Purdue were dismissed. But on appeal, Janowiak does not explicitly argue Sandhage should be estopped from claiming he was acting in the scope of his employment. In any case, Janowiak alleged it, and Sandhage has admitted he was.) Moreover, the cases on which Janowiak relies concern only estoppel of a governmental entity due to lack of notice. We construe Janowiak’s appellate issue as asking us to review whether Purdue should be estopped from asserting its ITCA notice defense. 8 Compliance with the notice provisions of the ITCA is a procedural precedent which the plaintiff must prove and the trial court must determine before trial. 6232 Harrison Ave., 181 N.E.3d at 384. “While the 180-day notice requirement is a procedural precedent, it is similar in its operation and effect to a statute of limitations.” Town of Cicero v. Sethi, 189 N.E.3d 194, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 16 of 27 [29] Equitable estoppel is typically “linked to claims of fraudulent concealment,”
Kenworth, 134 N.E.3d at 383, that is, “circumstances involving an actual false
representation or concealment of existing material fact,” Paramo v. Edwards, 563
N.E.2d 595, 598–99 (Ind. 1990). The doctrine also applies to other conduct
that lulls a party into inaction. Kenworth, 134 N.E.3d at 383. For the doctrine
to be invoked, the conduct of the party to be estopped or its agent “must be of a
sufficient affirmative character to prevent inquiry or to elude investigation or to
mislead and hinder” the other party. Paramo, 563 N.E.2d at 599. “These
factors have often been significant in the reluctance of our courts to apply
equitable estoppel to benefit persons represented by counsel.” Id.
[30] “To make out a claim of estoppel, one must show: (1) a representation or
concealment of material fact; (2) made by a person with knowledge of the fact
and with the intention that the other party should act upon it; (3) to a party
ignorant of the matter; and (4) which induced the other party to act upon it to
his detriment.” Ind. Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt. v. Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ind.
1993). More recently, our Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff
claiming estoppel in response to an ITCA notice defense “must show its (1) lack
of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in question, (2)
reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action based thereon of
such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Schoettmer, 992
N.E.2d at 709 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Equitable
estoppel will not be applied against a governmental entity absent “clear
evidence that its agents made representations upon which the party asserting
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 17 of 27 estoppel relied.” Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n,
819 N.E.2d 55, 67 (Ind. 2004). The party asserting estoppel bears the burden of
providing clear evidence to support it. Id.
[31] The thrust of Janowiak’s estoppel argument is that Sandhage, as Purdue’s
employee and agent, fraudulently concealed that he was acting in the course
and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. In support, she points
to the crash report describing him as a visitor, rather than a Purdue employee.
Based on the facts of the collision, she claims she had “no reasonable way to
know that the ITCA could have applied to her claim.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.
She also alleges that through this “concealment of his employment” status,
Sandhage induced her “to negotiate only with [his] personal insurance carrier
until after the ITCA notice deadline had passed.” Id. at 14.
[32] Drawing all reasonable inferences in Janowiak’s favor, the designated evidence
shows Janowiak lacked knowledge Sandhage was acting as a government
employee at the time of the collision until he responded to Janowiak’s
interrogatories in January 2024. But Janowiak has not shown she lacked the
means of knowledge as to the pertinent facts. Nor does the evidence establish
Sandhage made false representations, concealed his employer or employment-
related activities, or engaged in conduct that prevented inquiry, eluded
investigation, or was designed to mislead or hinder Janowiak from knowing the
truth.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 18 of 27 [33] Regarding his conduct at the time of the collision, there is no evidence
Sandhage lied about his government employment or business activities to
Janowiak or police. According to Sandhage’s interrogatory response and
deposition, the only communication he had with Janowiak at the scene was to
ask “if she was okay.” Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 at 41. According to the crash
report, Sandhage told the IUPUI police officer “he was not familiar with the
area[.]” Id. at 52. In the report, the officer described Janowiak as an IU
employee and listed Sandhage as a visitor. According to the officer’s affidavit,
that information “would have come from me speaking with the parties” and it
was his “typical practice to note in a report that someone with no affiliation
with IUPUI was a ‘Visitor’.” Id. at 57. At most, the police officer’s report and
affidavit support a reasonable inference that Sandhage told the officer he was
unaffiliated with IUPUI and/or visiting the IUPUI campus. As a Purdue
professor from West Lafayette on the IUPUI campus for the day, this was not
patently false. The record is silent as to anything further Sandhage said to
Janowiak or the officer at the time of the incident or what, if any, questions
were asked of him. The evidence does not support an inference that Sandhage
made false or misleading statements designed to hinder Janowiak from
discovering the truth of his employment or business activities.
[34] Further, there is no evidence Sandhage or Purdue made false statements or
acted in the ensuing months to conceal the facts or prevent Janowiak’s counsel
from investigating the circumstances surrounding the accident. Janowiak
quickly retained counsel, who asked Erie for documentation and information
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 19 of 27 regarding Sandhage’s cell phone use during the incident. Yet Janowiak
apparently waited over a year to ask questions about Sandhage’s employment
and activities that day. 9 At no point has Janowiak alleged she asked such
questions of Sandhage but he was deceptive, evasive, or silent. Once asked,
Sandhage provided the information. Estoppel is not appropriate where the
party claiming estoppel had the means of knowledge but failed to investigate
the underlying facts. See Sethi, 189 N.E.3d at 206 (holding unrepresented
plaintiffs who failed to independently verify statements made by a
governmental entity’s attorney could not be said to lack knowledge or the
means of knowledge of the facts underlying their claims in time to file tort claim
notice).
[35] Moreover, the critical question in deciding whether estoppel is appropriate in
this context is whether the governmental entity had actual knowledge of and
investigated the claim yet induced the plaintiff to believe filing a tort claim
notice was not required. City of Columbus v. Londeree, 145 N.E.3d 827, 833–34
(Ind. Ct. App. 2020); Coghill v. Badger, 418 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 n.6 (Ind. Ct.
9 Erie allegedly engaged in prelitigation negotiations with Janowiak over several months without raising the issue that Sandhage might have been acting in the scope of his employment. See Appellant’s Br. at 13–14 (arguing Erie “engaged in negotiations with Janowiak as if Sandhage had, in fact, been operating his vehicle only in a personal capacity”). In the trial court, Janowiak designated no evidence concerning her counsel’s negotiations with Erie beyond the initial letter of representation and response. We have no reason to doubt that negotiations continued, but neither does designated evidence support the assertion. Regarding Erie’s knowledge of Sandhage’s employment activities, Janowiak attempted to depose Erie’s claims adjuster to learn if or when Sandhage told Erie he was acting as a government employee at the time of the incident. But Sandhage filed a motion to quash the subpoena, and the trial granted Sandhage’s motion. Janowiak does not appeal that decision.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 20 of 27 App. 1981) (“[T]he crucial question is whether the governmental unit had
actual knowledge of and investigated the accident and surrounding
circumstances. In addition, acts of the governmental unit must have induced
the plaintiff to believe that formal notice was unnecessary.”). 10
[36] This Court’s opinion in Londeree, 145 N.E.3d 827, is instructive, as it pertains to
a plaintiff who communicated with the wrong party’s insurer until after the
ITCA notice deadline passed. There, the plaintiff slipped on ice in the parking
lot of an organization called FFY and suffered injuries. The city of Columbus
provided snow removal services in FFY’s lot. The plaintiff filed an incident
report with FFY. She also called the city about the incident, and a city
employee told her the city’s insurance company would contact her. However,
FFY’s insurer, not the city’s, called the plaintiff. The plaintiff and FFY’s
insurance agent spoke many times, during which the agent started to believe the
city might have liability. The agent told the plaintiff about the two-year statute
of limitations to sue but not the ITCA notice deadline. FFY’s insurer
eventually denied liability—four months after the deadline to file a tort claim
notice with the city.
[37] When the plaintiff sued the city, the city asserted an ITCA notice defense and
moved for summary judgment. In response, the plaintiff argued the city should
be estopped from doing so because the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the
10 The Londeree Court misattributes this quote to Madison Consolidated Schools v. Thurston, 135 N.E.3d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 21 of 27 statements, conduct, and representations of the city employee and FFY’s agent.
On appeal, the Londeree Court focused its review on the actions of the
governmental entity. In so doing, it concluded that even assuming the city
employee intended to mislead the plaintiff during that initial call, the
undisputed facts showed the city did nothing thereafter to induce the plaintiff to
believe formal compliance with the notice requirement was unnecessary. Id. at
836–37. As a result, the city was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law because there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of estoppel.
Id. at 837.
[38] Similarly, even if we assume Sandhage intended to mislead or confuse
Janowiak by stating he was visiting and/or unaffiliated with IUPUI and by
providing his personal insurance on the day of the accident, this minimal
communication makes it inappropriate to estop Purdue from using the notice
defense. See id. at 836 (holding “the complete absence of communication”
between the city and the plaintiff after the city employee’s initial call made it
“inappropriate to estop the City from using the notice defense”); see also Story
Bed & Breakfast, 819 N.E.2d at 67 (“The State will not be estopped in the
absence of clear evidence that its agents made representations upon which the
party asserting estoppel relied.”).
[39] Nevertheless, Janowiak likens her situation to that of the plaintiffs in Schoettmer,
992 N.E.2d 702, and Madison Consolidated Schools v. Thurston, 135 N.E.3d 926
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In Schoettmer, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident
with an employee of an entity which, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, was a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 22 of 27 political subdivision subject to the ITCA. 992 N.E.2d at 705. The
unrepresented plaintiff negotiated directly with the entity’s insurance agent,
who told the plaintiff the claim could not be settled until after his medical
treatment was completed and did not advise the plaintiff of the ITCA notice
deadline. The plaintiff relied on the agent’s advice and waited to hire counsel
and sue the entity until after the ITCA deadline passed. Under these facts, our
Supreme Court held there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
entity should be estopped from asserting an ITCA notice defense. Id. at 709–
10.
[40] In Thurston, the plaintiff was a student injured in an accident while riding a
school bus. 135 N.E.3d at 928. There, too, the school’s insurance agent
encouraged the plaintiff to finish medical treatment before discussing a
settlement. Although the school’s agent warned the plaintiff of the statute of
limitations, the agent never disclosed the ITCA notice requirement. This Court
held genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on whether
the school should be equitably estopped from asserting an ITCA notice defense.
Id. at 930.
[41] In both cases, there was evidence the governmental entities’ agents engaged in
settlement discussions with the plaintiffs, suggested or required the plaintiffs to
wait to settle until their medical treatments were complete, and induced
plaintiffs to reasonably believe formal ITCA notice was unnecessary. See
Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 709–10; Thurston, 135 N.E.3d at 930. This case is
distinguishable, though, because there is no indication in the record Purdue or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 23 of 27 Sandhage made statements or undertook actions during negotiations to induce
Janowiak to believe compliance with the ITCA notice requirement was
unnecessary. Accordingly, there are no material issues of fact as to whether
Purdue should be estopped from raising its ITCA notice defense.
[42] In a closely related argument, Janowiak contends Purdue should be estopped
from asserting its notice defense under the equitable doctrine of fraudulent
concealment. Fraudulent concealment operates to estop a defendant from
asserting the statute of limitations whenever the defendant has—either by
deception or by a violation of duty—concealed from the plaintiff material facts
thereby preventing the plaintiff from discovering a potential cause of action.
Lyons, 19 N.E.3d at 260. “In such cases, equity will toll the commencement of
the applicable time limitation until such time as the plaintiff discovers, or in the
exercise of ordinary diligence should discover, the existence of the cause of
action.” Id. Active fraudulent concealment requires a showing that the
defendant (1) had actual knowledge of the alleged wrongful act, (2)
intentionally concealed it from the plaintiff, (3) by making some statement or
taking some action calculated to prevent inquiry or to mislead, (4) upon which
the plaintiff reasonably relied. Id. at 260–61. Passive fraudulent concealment
requires (1) a relationship between the parties such that the defendant has a
duty to disclose the alleged wrongful act to the plaintiff and (2) a breach of that
duty. Id. at 261. As to a duty owed, “Indiana law does not impose an
affirmative duty on [a governmental entity] to advise [plaintiffs] that they were
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 24 of 27 required to file notice under the ITCA within 180 days.” Sethi, 189 N.E.3d at
208.
[43] Janowiak cites Lyons, 19 N.E.3d 254, in support of her argument. There, the
parents of a child who choked to death at school sued the school and
administrators for negligence, wrongful death, and federal civil rights
violations, but failed to file a tort claim notice within 180 days of the incident.
On summary judgment, the plaintiffs designated evidence the school concealed
the existence of the wrongful acts forming the basis of their claims, such as by
misrepresenting facts about the time the child was without oxygen, failing to
preserve video evidence, and threatening to fire school employees who
witnessed the incident. In light of the designated evidence, our Supreme Court
held there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the doctrine of
active fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations and barred the
school from asserting an ITCA notice defense. Id. at 261.
[44] Unlike in Lyons, there is no evidence Purdue or Sandhage concealed wrongful
acts to prevent Janowiak from discovering a cause of action. Rather, Janowiak
failed to investigate the facts surrounding a known claim and, after discovery,
amended her claim to pursue Purdue after the notice period had run.
[45] Finally, Janowiak argues that if Purdue is entitled to rely on the ITCA notice
defense, it will put “future claimants in a dilemma of choosing between
tendering frivolous ITCA notices or hastily filing suit, both of which are
contrary to public policy.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. As to the latter, our Supreme
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 25 of 27 Court has recognized “that it may be desirable to encourage potential claimants
to work with insurers to settle claims rather than proceed directly to litigation,”
and a court’s failure to find substantial compliance with the ITCA notice
requirement “may tend to encourage the opposite.” Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at
708. Nevertheless, “such policy considerations [are to] be addressed in the
proper forum: the General Assembly.” Id.
[46] In sum, Janowiak failed to provide timely notice to Purdue of her tort claim,
and there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Purdue should be
estopped from raising its ITCA notice defense. Accordingly, Purdue is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Conclusion [47] The trial court did not err in dismissing Janowiak’s complaint under Rule
12(B)(6), and Purdue was entitled to summary judgment on Janowiak’s claim.
[48] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Sarah Graziano Hensley Legal Group, PC Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE KENNETH SANDAGE John W. Mervilde Kevin D. Lichtenberger
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 26 of 27 Schultz & Pogue, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THE TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY Barry L. Loftus Danielle K. Fortin Stuart & Branigin LLP Lafayette, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2937 | July 31, 2026 Page 27 of 27