Hanna v. Michigan Steel Castings Co.

170 N.W. 6, 204 Mich. 139, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 658
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 27, 1918
DocketDocket No. 78
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 170 N.W. 6 (Hanna v. Michigan Steel Castings Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanna v. Michigan Steel Castings Co., 170 N.W. 6, 204 Mich. 139, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 658 (Mich. 1918).

Opinion

Moore, J.

Certiorari to the industrial accident board to review its allowance of the plaintiff’s claim as the widow of Alexander Hanna who was in the employ of the Michigan Steel Castings Company, and who was injured September 14, 1917, and who died on September 18th. It was the claim of the widow, and the industrial accident board so found, that the death was the result of the injury.

In the brief of counsel for the appellants the discussion is under the following heads:

1. There can be no recovery if Hanna was injured by a board flying from an unknown source.

2. There can be no recovery if Hanna was injured by a board he was attempting to cut on the saw.

a. Because as a matter of law the accident did not occur in the course of the employment of Alexander Hanna by the Michigan Steel Castings Company.

[141]*141b. Because as a matter of law the accident did not arise out of the employment of Alexander Hanna by the Michigan Steel Castings Company.

c. Because as a matter of law Alexander Hanna was injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct.

d. Because the accident was not the proximate cause of the death of Alexander Hanna.

Each of these propositions is discussed at' great length by counsel and their conclusion is that this court should reverse the order of the industrial accident board, and hold that the defendants are not liable to plaintiff for the death of Alexander Hanna.

1. As to the first of these propositions there can be no possible doubt that Mr. Hanna was at work for the defendant company in some capacity, the company claims as a cleaner which did not call upon him to use any buzz saw. His widow claims he was at work as a carpenter. It was while he was engaged at work for the company, and because of that employment that he was injured and if as a result of the injury he died, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that liability followed.

2. We shall not attempt to follow the discussion of «ach subdivision under this head but will attempt tosíate the claims of the respective parties, what is shown by the record and our conclusions.

Mr. Hanna at the time of the accident had been employed by the defendant six months or more. He was 5S years of age. It is the claim of his widow that his work called upon him to push boards against a circular saw for the purpose of sawing them, and that one of them was thrown against him with great violence, hurting his hand and chest, and that as a result of his injuries his death followed.

It is the claim of the defendant that Mr. Hanna was employed as a cleaner and that no part of his duty required him to use the buzz saw, and that if he did [142]*142so that he was violating a positive order, and that he was guilty of intentional and wilful misconduct. It is the further claim that the only injury Mr. Hanna received was to his hand and that he died of pneumonia, to which the injury he received did not at all contribute, and that the court should say as a matter of law that the injury was not the proximate cause of his death. The claim that Mr. Hanna was guilty of intentional and wilful misconduct is based upon the testimony of the foreman; we quote some of it:

“Q. State whether or not you had ever said anything to Mr. Hanna about operating or not operating any of the saws in your department.
“Mr. Crowley: I object to that testimony.
“Mr. Zierleyn: I think it is very proper, Mr. Crowley.
“Mr. Crowley: I desire that my objections stand as a matter of record.
“Mr. Zierleyn: Answer the question.
“A. I took him off the carpenter work because I did not think his eyesight was good enough for it, he had. to put glasses on for it, and I told him if he would not keep off the saw I would have to fire him, and not only told him that but I told his son, too.”

Mr. Hanna knew what conversation he had with the foreman upon that subject. He is not here to give his version. Such a contingency has been guarded against in section 12553, 3 Comp. Laws 1915. The language of the statute is not ambiguous as a reference to it will show. It has often been construed by this court as is shown by the many cases cited in the notes to section 12553. See, also, the case of Horn v. Arnett, 91 N. J. Law, 110 (102 Atl. 366). The testimony of the foreman should not have been received. With it eliminated there is nothing to indicate that Mr. Hanna was warned not to use the saw.

It is said that the case presented by the plaintiff when the improper evidence is eliminated, must be determined as a question of law in favor of the de[143]*143fendant. This makes it necessary to give a résumé of the testimony most favorable to the plaintiff. After the accident the company made a first report to the accident board in which it was said: “Occupation of employee carpenter.” “Date of accident September 14, 1917.” “Nature and cause of injury bruised left hand.” A second report was made September 19, in which the following appears:

“Place of accident in detail, Carpenter shop. Cause and manner of accident, Was cutting wood for wedges. In taking pieces from the saw one piece caught and struck him on the joint of the first finger of left hand. This finger was off at joint. It jammed stump of finger and bruised it.”

Against the objection of defendant Mr. Hanna’s doctor was allowed to testify:

“Why he said that he had received it at a machine sawing wood. A piece of wood flew from the machine and struck him across the chest.”

In his testimony appears the following:

“Q. Do you at this time lay any stress upon the injury to the hand, or the injury to the chest or both?
“A. Yes I do on the injury to the chest. The hand was simply an abrasion of the hand that was ceptic, but I do not believe it had — did not have any factor towards causing his death.
“Q. It was the alleged injury to the chest which was the factor that finally resulted in his death in your opinion?
“A. Resulted in pneumonia, yes.
“Q. In other words the injury to the chest was the thing that caused the pneumonia in your opinion?
“A. Yes. * * *
“Q. The question is this, perhaps it would be more simple to say it in this way: In your opinion the cause of pneumonia was the blow on the chest?
‘‘A. Yes, sir. * * *
“Q. And the pneumonia caused the death?
“A. Yes, sir. * * * The man was at that time delirious and he was carrying a tremendously high [144]*144temperature and rapid pulse and I thought there was a septic condition going on at that time. The man at the first time I seen him, I would not have taken anything he said to me anyway, because he was not in his right mind, he was delirious.

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Bluebook (online)
170 N.W. 6, 204 Mich. 139, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 658, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanna-v-michigan-steel-castings-co-mich-1918.