Hann v. Hann

211 N.W. 495, 202 Iowa 807
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 14, 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 211 N.W. 495 (Hann v. Hann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hann v. Hann, 211 N.W. 495, 202 Iowa 807 (iowa 1926).

Opinion

Albert, J.

Ida L. Hann and Frank W. Hann, appellee herein, were wife and husband, and Vern II. Hann, appellant, was their son. Ida L. Hann died on the 31st day of January, 1924, and the will in controversy was duly probated * on March 4, 1924. This action was commenced on ^ ^ <jay 0f; February, 1925, to set aside probate and declare the will void on the ground of mental incapacity of the said Ida L. Hann, and undue influence exercised over her by her husband, Frank W. Hann. Two motions were made at the close of plaintiff’s testimony: The first, to withdraw from the consideration of the jury the question of undue influence, on the ground that there was no evidence to warrant submission of such issue to the jury; the second, to direct a verdict for defendant, the substance of which was that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of mental incapacity of the said Ida L. Hann. Both motions were sustained by the court, and judgment entered accordingly. It is the rulings on these motions that are assigned as errors. Other assignments of error go to the question of admission or rejection of testimony.

*809 The first question discussed is the sustaining of the motion withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the question of undue influence.

The quantity of evidence necessary to take this issue to the jury has been a question of extended discussion in our former cases. We have definitely fixed these rules, however, in the case of In re Will of Richardson, 199 Iowa 1320, at page 1327, where we said:

“Influence, to be undue, within the meaning of the law, must be such as subjects the will of the testator to that of the person exercising the influence, and makes the written will express the purpose of such person, rather than that of the testator. It is frequently said that it must be equivalent to moral coercion, and directly connected with the execution of the will, operating at the time it is made. Perkins v. Perkins, supra [116 Iowa 253] ; Parker v. Lambertz, 128 Iowa 496; Henderson v. Jackson, 138 Iowa 326. The person charged with exercising undue influence need not have been personally present when the will was made, but his influence must have been actively operative [citing cases]. Undue influence is not established by proof of opportunity to exercise it and a disposition to do so [citing cases]. Importunity, requests, and persuasion that do not go to the point of overthrowing the will of the testator, are not sufficient to constitute undue influence [citing cases].”.

We turn now to the evidence in this case. It is impossible to set the record out in full, because it would make too lengthy an opinion. Among others, the following facts are established by appellant’s testimony: Until 1922, the testator was a strong, active woman, and took an active interest in the affairs of life, blit in that year she became afflicted with cancer of the uterus. Prognosis of her trouble was bad, and the disease was progressive to the time of her death. In December, 1922, she executed a will, which, in substance, gave to her son, appellant herein, a 240-aere tract of land during the natural life of the son and his wife, and at the death of the survivor, to the children of appellant. The husband owned certain lands in which the testator had an interest, and by will she released to her husband her interest in the lands thus owned by the husband. On January 4, 1923, a codicil was added to this will, by which she confirmed the will and provisions therein, and also devised and bequeathed to *810 the sou, Vern, “all her right, title and interest in and to the estate of Mary A. Goddard, deceased, whether this property consist of real or personal property, or whether it be moneys and credits. ”

■ On January 4, 1924, she executed the will in controversy, the material part of which is that she gave to the husband, for a period of five years from her death, the use of -an 80-acre tract of land, subject to which use by the husband she' devised said tract to appellant herein. All the .rest, residue, and remainder of her property, of every kind and description, she devised and bequeathed to her husband, Frank W. Ilann. ■ She further-explains this devise and bequest by saying:

“Feeling that he will make such provision for my son as future conditions warrant, but I want it expressly understood that the provision herein made for my husband is absolute and not in trust. ”

The relations- between mother and son seem to have been .friendly and affectionate at all times. We glean from the record the following prominent points that might be considered on this question of undue influence: The will was drawn by the late Judge Cullison on the 4th day of January, 1924, 27 days before the death of the testator. The husband, Frank W. Ilann, called Judge Cullison to the home to draw the will, and was present in the room when the same was executed by the testator. There is no evidence whatever that Frank Ilann had anything to do with the preparation of the will,. or in any way dictated the terms or provisions thereof. .

Dr. Bocken was testator’s attending physician. He began treating her- December 6, 1922, and continued so to do until the time of her demise. He testifies to- the progressiveness of the disease, wearing of the disease on the system ;■ that the disease carried with it a toxic effect which affected the blood and would affect the organs of the body. He said that toxin in the blood would injure the brain and be detrimental to it; that at times he observed testator in a stupor, and she suffered pain, and morphine was administered to her whenever she needed it, to.quiet her. As the disease progressed, he noticed a yellowish .color, and thex-e was loss of flesh and loss of weight. He testifies fuxffher that disease of the female organs would be likely t'o, or \orobably woixld, indirectly affect, to some extent, the mind or brain. He *811 was present on the 4th of January when the wrill was made, and signed the will as a witness, although he said he did not know it was a will. No other witness testifies who was present at the time the will was made, Judge Cnllisop. haying died in .the interim.

These are the high points in the testimony on the question of undue influence. Measured by the rale we have heretofore cited in In re Will of Richardson, 199 Iowa 1320, this was not enough to take this question to the jury. While it is true that, under some circumstances, undue influence may be proven circumstantially, as well as by direct testimony, yet we do not think that this is a case for an application of the rule permitting proof by circumstantial evidence. It will be noticed that the principal point here was that the husband was present in the room at the time the will was drawn. This fact cannot weigh very heavily, because, as husband of the testator, his presence in the room at the time the will was drawn does not bear very much significance.. The fact also that she had previously made a will, giving the larger part of her property to her son, .and by the last will materially reduced the bequest to the son, cannot be said .to be very persuasive on the proposition of undue influence. It is, of course, a circumstance to be considered, with the other circumstances in the case, on the question of undue influence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Thompson's Estate
44 N.W.2d 814 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1950)
Glider v. Melinski
25 N.W.2d 379 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1946)
Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co.
5 N.W.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1942)
In Re Estate of Ensminger
296 N.W. 814 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1941)
In Re Estate of Brooks
294 N.W. 735 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1940)
Walters v. Heaton
271 N.W. 310 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1937)
Wolfe v. Shroyer
221 N.W. 546 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1928)
Walkington v. Ide
220 N.W. 5 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1928)
In Re Estate of Paczoch
211 N.W. 500 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1926)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
211 N.W. 495, 202 Iowa 807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hann-v-hann-iowa-1926.