Hanks v. Delaware & H. R. Corp.

63 F. Supp. 161, 17 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 541, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1664
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 25, 1945
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 63 F. Supp. 161 (Hanks v. Delaware & H. R. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanks v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 63 F. Supp. 161, 17 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 541, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1664 (N.D.N.Y. 1945).

Opinion

BRENNAN, District Judge.

This action is based upon the statutory provisions found in title 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 (p), which is part of the legislation generally referred to as the Railway Labor Act, and has for its purpose the enforcement of an award made to plaintiff by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, hereafter referred to as the Board.

The award is the culmination of a dispute arising between plaintiff and defendant out of the interpretation or application of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into on June 25, 1940, between the defendant and the American Train Dispatchers’ Association, which represented the craft or class of defendant’s employees known as Train Dispatchers.

Plaintiff’s claim arising out of such controversy was handled in the usual manner and submitted to the Board for decision as contemplated by the statute above referred to. The award to plaintiff followed the action of the Board and the required order directed to the defendant by the Board to make the award effective was issued in due course. The order was not obeyed and this litigation, as authorized by the above statute, followed.

The facts are not seriously disputed and they appear in the record based upon the stipulation of the parties, the comparatively brief testimony of witnesses and certain exhibits which were offered and received.

The plaintiff has been an employee of defendant since 1907. In the year 1913 he occupied the position known as Train Dispatcher or Trick Train Dispatcher. In 1918 he became Night Chief Dispatcher. He continued in that position until October 1, 1940, when the position was abolished by the action of defendant. Plaintiff’s service was performed during all of that period at the office of defendant at Plattsburg, New York, with the exception of approximately two months when he was located at Albany, New York. From 1918 until July 1, 1940, his hours of employment were from seven P. M. to seven A. M. and on that date his hours of duty were changed from 7 P. M. to 3 A. M. and he was given the additional duties of a Trick Train Dis[162]*162patcher on the northern end of the Platts-burg division of the railroad.

Prior to October 1, 1940, defendant gave notice that the position of Night Chief Dispatcher held by plaintiff was to be abolished as of October 1, 1940, and about the same time a new Trick Dispatcher’s position was created in the Plattsburg office. The new position was open to bid by eligible employees, among them the plaintiff. Plaintiff by virtue of his seniority rights was awarded the position and concededly has since that time performed the duties of Trick Train Dispatcher pursuant to his bid. At the same time the classification of Night Chief Dispatcher was abolished a new position of Trick Train Dispatcher was added to defendant’s payroll. •

The terms of the bargaining agreement need not be discussed in detail herein. There is no dispute but that its scope is broad enough to cover and apply to night chief and trick train dispatchers. These terms are not defined, neither are the duties of the positions outlined. The agreement further provides that payroll classification shall be fixed in accordance with the duties performed, and that notice of the intended abolishment of permanent positions shall be given.

Attached to the bargaining agreement was a “Schedule of Rates of Pay for Positions Covered by this Agreement.” Insofar as it is relevant to this case a portion is quoted below:

Rates of Pay

Division Location Positions Per Day Per Mo.

Champlain Plattsburg 1 Night Chief 11.69 30S.00

2 First Tries. 9.97 260.00

1 Second Trk. 9.97 260.00

1 Third Trk. 9.97 260.00

1 Relief 9.97 260.00

“It is understood that the above positions and rates continue only so long as the necessity for the positions exists.”

Evidence was received to show the commonly accepted meaning of the term “night chief dispatcher” in the railroad industry. This evidence substantially coincided with plaintiff’s description of his duties while he occupied that position. Briefly, they may be summarized as general supervision of the movements of traffic over the division under his jurisdiction, and the supervision of trick train dispatchers who direct the movement of traffic over different portions of the raiload trackage making up the traffic division. This includes the supervision and direction of trick dispatchers in the case of emergency, detour or the movement of special trains accorded privileges to secure their speedy passage. His duties also included the ascertainment of the number of cars to be moved over his division during his tour of duty, and the ascertaining and arranging for the necessary power and personnel to accomplish such movement according to schedule. The night chief also has the duty of making out certain reports related to the equipment and freight within his jurisdiction, and any unusual occurrence within his tour of duty.

The proceedings heretofore had herein were based upon a demand that the position of Night, Chief Dispatcher be reestablished and that plaintiff be paid the amount of his monetary loss computed as the difference in the pay schedule between the position of Night Chief and Trick Train Dispatcher since October 1, 1940. The award, the enforcement of which is sought in this action grants the requested relief.

Plaintiff contends that the duties of Night Chief Dispatcher still exist at the Platts-burg office; that in fact the plaintiff actually performs the greater portion of same during his tour of duty as Trick Train Dispatcher; that the change in payroll classification can not deprive the employee of his title and rate of pay to which his duties entitle him, nor can the classification be abolished as long as the duties are being performed.

Defendant contends that the abolishment of the position of Night Chief Dispatcher is a function of management; that the bargaining agreement contemplated that positions would continue only as long as necessity therefor existed; that in fact no necessity for the position of Night Chief [163]*163existed and that the duties thereof were abolished and discontinued.

The issue presented concisely stated involves a determination as to whether or not the abolishment of the position of Night Chief Dispatcher held by plaintiff constitutes a violation or breach of the collective bargaining agreement.

Neither party contends that the positions contained in the schedule, which is part of the bargaining agreement, are permanent in the sense that they can not be abolished. The language contained in the schedule itself indicates clearly that the position may be abolished by the defendant when the need or necessity therefor no longer exists.

The decision of this case then turns entirely upon the determination of the question of fact as to the necessity of continuing the position of Night Chief Dispatcher in the Plattsburg Office of 'defendant after October 1, 1940.

In approaching the question the Court has in mind the language of the statute, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153(p), to the effect that the findings and order of the Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This provision is of little help in this particular case. The Board in its findings found only that it had jurisdiction, and that the claim should be sustained. Detailed findings of fact were not made, and the sustaining of plaintiff’s award is more a conclusion than a finding.

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Related

Beeler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
169 F.2d 557 (Tenth Circuit, 1948)
Crowley v. Delaware & H. R. Corp.
63 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. New York, 1945)

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Bluebook (online)
63 F. Supp. 161, 17 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 541, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanks-v-delaware-h-r-corp-nynd-1945.