Hanifen v. Armitage

117 F. 845, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 5142
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 15, 1902
DocketNo. 38
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 117 F. 845 (Hanifen v. Armitage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hanifen v. Armitage, 117 F. 845, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 5142 (circtedpa 1902).

Opinion

ARCHBALD, District Judge.1

This patent has been the subject of marked vicissitude. It was at first sustained by Judge Dallas in’ this court in Hanifen v. E. H. Godshalk Co. (C. C.) 78 Fed. 811, but upon a rehearing, on account of certain expert evidence, by which he felt himself controlled, he decided against it. On appeal, however, he was reversed, and the patent upheld, although the court of appeals was not unanimous, Judge Butler dissenting from the views of Judge Shiras and Judge Acheson, who constituted the majority 28 C. C. A. 507, 84 Fed. 649. It came up again before Judge Gray in Hanifen v. Lupton (C. C.) 95 Fed. 465, where the validity of the patent was conceded, the suit being defended on other grounds. It next appeared in the Second circuit, and was sustained by Judge Townsend in a well-considered opinion (Hanifen v. Price [C. C.] 96 Fed. 435); but he in turn was reversed by the court of appeals [846]*846of that circuit in an opinion by Judge Shipman, and the patent declared invalid (42 C. C. A. 484, 102 Fed. 509). On account of these conflicting decisions in the two circuits, the supreme court allowed a certiorari in the latter case, and it was supposed that the matter would be thus put at rest. But again there was a serious difference of views, which resulted in an affirmance by an equally divided court. Such an affirmation establishes no precedent or principle (7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Prac. p. 44), and, so far as this court is concerned, the decision of the court of appeals of this circuit sustaining the patent therefore remains. With no new considerations advanced, the question of its validity cannot be regarded here as an open one. At the same time I have re-examined it as though it were, and, with the benefit of all that has occurred since it was rendered, I see no occasion to vary from the conclusion so reached.

The patent was issued in 1887 to Eevi Bywater, and, according to the second claim which is the one in controversy, the invention is declared to be “a knitted fabric, composed of face and back yarns of different materials, the face yarn being looped at regular intervals and on alternate stitches of adjacent rows of the back yarn, and being matted and curly, and having a smooth back, whereby the said fabric has the appearance of looped or Astrakhan cloth as described.”

In the specifications which precede, the invention is said to consist of “a new and improved textile fabric having the face yarn thereof looped on the stitches of the back yarn; * * * the said face, which is formed of mohair, worsted, or other yarn, being beat up so as to present a wavy or curly surface, and the back, which is formed of woolen or other yarn, brushed so as to present a smooth surface, the fabric having the appearance of looped or Astrakhan .cloth.” In carrying out his invention the patentee declares that he employs a circular knitting machine, a partial description of which he gives, and in the operation of knitting the fabric he says that the thread by which the rough face or Astrakhan effect is produced is so placed upon the needles by the backing wheels as to be alternately in front of and behind two needles, the backing wheels being so set in a four-feeder machine that for successive rows of the fabric they alternately press back different needles, thus forming the loops on alternate stitches of adjacent rows. It will be thus seen that the patent is distinctly for a textile fabric of specific character and designated structure. It is not for the process by which it is made, nor the machine for making it, each of which is referred to merely to aid in describing it. The question, therefore, on which the validity of the patent depends is whether the fabric is new, or has been previously, in whole or in part, anticipated. On this question it is brought into comparison with the prior British patent of James Booth in 1881. There are other references, but, without stopping to discuss them, the case seems to turn on this one. Unquestionably imitation Astrakhan existed before either of these inventors; but it was the woven, and not the knitted, article, which Bywater was the first to actually produce. As said by Judge Dallas in his first opinion: “Knitted Astrakhan was created by Bywater, and this he accomplished not by merely applying the skill of the knitter to effect a change in either [847]*847of their [i. e., prior] products, but by the exercise of his own inventive faculty.” That is the whole case in a nutshell, and it is abundantly sustained by a proper consideration of the matters involved. Booth did not aim to knit Astrakhan, and his patent, unaided, was not calculated to do so. What he claims to have invented was simply a novel description of looped fabric of ornamental appearance, whatever that might mean. Looking to the process by which if was made, we find that he employed for the back or body the ordinary wool yarn, capable of being afterwards felted, and for the face a worsted or long-fibered yarn that would not felt. This face yarn, which ultimately constitutes the loops, is laid in between the needles in any desired order, and tied to the body by the tie thread used in fleecy-backed hosiery, known as “stockinet.” The fabric so produced is then subjected to the process of fulling or felting, by which the back or knitted portion is shrunk or felted together, and the face yarn, “being laid in straight and tied,” is thereby caused to project from the body of the fabric in loops, producing, as he says, a very ornamental appearance. Did this disclose knitted Astrakhan? It is not so claimed by the inventor, by whom we must assume that the invention would be given its widest possible scope; and the suggestion of Judge Shipman in Hanifen v. Price, 42 C. C. A. 484, 102 Fed. 509-512, that he had in mind to make a knitted fabric which resembled the woven article ■ (unless there was something in that record of which I am not aware), would seem to be an entire misconception. The ornamental effect is all that he indicates, produced by the loops running in longitudinal or diagonal stripes, or with mixed irregularity in longer or shorter floats. Unless knitted Astrakhan is necessarily embraced by and involved in the fabric so described, it cannot be said to be disclosed by the patent. It is no answer that it has been produced by other knitters following the patent. We have no evidence of that kind in this case, however it may have been shown in others; Turtle merely testifying that he produced knitted Astrakhan in 1885 from a piece of the manufactured fabric which Booth had previously made. But even so, the additional skill by which this was able to be brought about, if it was, is an element of which we have no means of judging at this time. It is to be remembered also that, as a foreign patent it is not so much what could have been made out of it as what was inherent in it,—not its possibilities, but what it substantially diplayed,—that is to govern. Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 555, 20 L. Ed. 33; Hanifen v. E. H. Godshalk Co., 28 C. C. A. 507, 84 Fed. 649. Neither will it do to say, as in the case referred to in the Second circuit, that the loops of Booth, being made of long fibered worsted, would necessarily twist and curl. That is not claimed for them in the patent, and we cannot assume that it was desired or intended; and, even if it was, to meet the Bywater patent, as well as to imitate Astrakhan fur, the loops must both mat and curl so as to present the shaggy appearance of the animal. This is an imposed effect, due not only to the yarn used and the way it is laid in, but to the subsequent treatment of the fabric, and there is nothing suggested by Booth calculated to bring it about.

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117 F. 845, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 5142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hanifen-v-armitage-circtedpa-1902.