Hani Hafiz Ibrahim Qutiefan v. Lubna Aziz Safi

Opinion

Opinion issued March 8, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

We are authorized by statute to consider an appeal from a “final order”

rendered under Title 5 of the Family Code, unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West 2014) (“An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”); see, e.g., Brejon v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). To be a “final order” under Title 5 of the Family Code, other than in a termination case under Chapter 161 or an adoption case under Chapter 162, the order must contain the several items listed under Section 105.006. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e) (West 2014) (listing contents of final order under Title 5 of Family Code not involving Chapters 161 or 162). Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments or final orders. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001). To be final, a judgment or order must “actually dispose[] of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or [] state[] with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.” Id. at 204.

Here, after reviewing the clerk’s record, appellant’s notice of appeal lists the order on appeal as the “Order on Motion to Invoke the Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right & Request an Appellate Lawyer,” signed on November 2, 2017. This order states, in pertinent part, that, “[a]fter reviewing the pleadings and the arguments of [appellant] and any responses thereto, this Court is of the opinion

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that the MOTION TO INVOKE the SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT & REQUEST AN APPELLATE LAWYER IS [not] well taken and should in all things, be DENIED.” However, this is not a “final order” under Title 5 of the Family Code because it does not contain the several items required under Section 105.006 and it does not state that it disposes of all parties and claims. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e); see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because this order is not an appealable final order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b).

The Clerk of this Court’s February 8, 2018 notice warned appellant that this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless he timely responded within ten days of that notice to show how this Court had jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Appellant failed to timely file any response.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.3(a), (c); 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.

Footnotes

1. NO. 01-17-00925-CV ——————————— HANI HAFIZ IBRAHIM QUTIEFAN, Appellant V. LUBNA AZIZ SAFI, Appellee On Appeal from the 505th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 13-DCV-206211 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Hani Hafiz Ibrahim Qutiefan, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s order, signed on November 2, 2017, in this divorce case. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.