Handschu v. Police Department of New York

241 F. Supp. 3d 433, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54049, 2017 WL 1293005
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 13, 2017
DocketNo. 71 Civ. 2203 (CSH)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 241 F. Supp. 3d 433 (Handschu v. Police Department of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Handschu v. Police Department of New York, 241 F. Supp. 3d 433, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54049, 2017 WL 1293005 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

Opinion

RULING AND ORDER ON PROPOSED REVISED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

In this civil rights class action, the Court is required for the second time to approve or disapprove a proposed settlement between the plaintiff Class and the City of New York regarding important issues affecting the City’s Muslim community.

The settlement agreement now before the Court is a revision of the initial settlement proposal that the Court declined to approve for the reasons stated in a Ruling reported at 2016 WL 7048839, signed on October 28, 2016 (the “October Ruling”), familiarity with which is assumed. The October Ruling declined to approve what I will refer to herein as the “Initial Settlement Agreement.” Thereafter, counsel for the parties conducted further negotiations. The parties eventually agreed upon a revised proposal (the “Revised Settlement Agreement”). The parties submitted the Revised Settlement Agreement to the Clerk for filing on March 6, 2017, and jointly request that the Court approve it.1

For the reasons that follow, the Court approves the Revised Settlement Agreement.

I

Understanding a district judge’s duties and responsibilities in evaluating the proposed settlement of a class action begins with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which creates and governs class actions in the federal courts. Rule 23(e) provides: “The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” The court must give notice “to all class members who would be bound by the proposal,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), and “[i]f the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate,” id. 23(e)(2).

The Rule does not undertake to define the adjectives “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and given the infinite complexities of the human spirit and the disputes it is capable of generating, that is understandable: the application of so broadly stated desiderata to a particular settlement in a particular case is necessarily fact specific. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s series of decisions, reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s approval or disapproval of a class action settlement, furnish[435]*435es guidance on the practical meaning of these salutary objectives.

One of those decisions was rendered at an earlier stage of this case. In Handschu v. Special Services Division, 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit affirmed this Court’s approval of a settlement jointly proposed by the Class and the City that included the initial Handschu Guidelines. I conducted a lengthy fairness hearing at which a number of individuals and entities, represented by counsel or appearing pro se, objected to the proposal on one ground or another, and pressed their objections to the settlement on appeal following this Court’s approval of it. Judge Van Graafei-land’s opinion for the court of appeals focused upon the necessity of showing that “the settlement agreement was fair and reasonable,” 787 F.2d at 833, and expressed the view that the trial judge “knows the litigants and the strengths and weaknesses of their contentions and is in the best position to evaluate whether the settlement constitutes a reasonable compromise,” id. (emphasis added), phrasing that suggests the reasonableness of a settlement may depend upon the parties’ demonstrated ability to compromise their contentions on important contested issues. Additional responsibilities of the district judge are articulated by the Second Circuit in Handschu: “The district court must, of course, ensure that the settlement is fair arid not a product of collusion, and that class members’ interests were represented adequately.” Id. A trial judge who heeds this appellate guidance may look forward, in sure and certain hope, to the benediction the Second Circuit bestowed in Handschu: “If the court then approves a settlement based upon well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, the settlement should be upheld on review.” Id. (citations omitted).

The Second Circuit adheres to these principles in its more recent cases, exemplified by McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790 (2d Cir. 2009). McReynolds affirmed the settlement of a class action relating to the removal of abused and neglected children from their homes. Judge Miner’s opinion quoted the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2), and then said:

We have recognized a presumption of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy as to the settlement where a class settlement-[is] reached in arm’s-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery. Such a presumption is consistent with the strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class action context. This Court will disturb a judicially-approved [class action] settlement only when there is a clear showing that the District Court abused its discretion.
In determining whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the District Court examines the negotiating process leading up to the settlement^ ie., procedural fairness,] as well as the settlement’s substantive terms[, i.e., substantive fairness].

588 F.3d at 803-04 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

As for procedural fairness in McRey-nolds, the Second Circuit cautioned that the trial court “must pay close attention to the negotiating process, to ensure that the settlement resulted from arm’s length negotiations and that plaintiffs counsel possessed the necessary experience and ability, and have engaged in the discovery, necessary to effective representation of the class’s interests.” Id. at 804 (citation, internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). Agreeing with the trial judge, the Second Circuit held that “there was no question that the Settlement is the product of arm’s length, good faith negotiation,” [436]*436there was “no indication that the Settlement was- the product of bad faith or collusion,” and “[t]he extended and transparent negotiations involved in this case were sufficient evidence' for the District Court to conclude that the settlement process was procedurally fair.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As for substantive fairness, the Second Circuit held that the District Court paid sufficient attention to potential factors listed in lead cases like Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974). McReynolds, 588 F.3d at 804.

These principles will inform this Court’s evaluation of the Revised Settlement Agreement.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
241 F. Supp. 3d 433, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54049, 2017 WL 1293005, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/handschu-v-police-department-of-new-york-nysd-2017.