Handojo v. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 28, 2024
Docket23-823
StatusUnpublished

This text of Handojo v. Garland (Handojo v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Handojo v. Garland, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INDRAJANTI HANDOJO, No. 23-823 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-482-443 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 10, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Indrajanti Handojo, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal

from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) and deny the petition.

We review de novo the agency’s legal determinations and review its factual

findings for substantial evidence. Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955, 958

(9th Cir. 2018). When the BIA reviews “the IJ’s factual findings for clear error,

and review[s] de novo all other issues, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision,

except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914

F.3d 654, 658 (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzalez, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Handojo did not

suffer past persecution. Handojo testified about harassment and the general

discrimination that she experienced in Indonesia, but the record does not compel

the conclusion that she suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. See

Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “physical

discomfort or loss of liberty,” do not necessarily constitute past persecution,

“despite the fact that such conditions have caused the petitioners some harm”).

Because Handojo did not suffer past persecution, she was not entitled to the

rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Sharma v.

Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021).

2. Handojo contends that she is a member of two disfavored groups,

Indonesians of Chinese descent, see Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir.

2 23-823 2004), and Christian Indonesians, see Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056, 1062

(9th Cir. 2010), and faces persecution if removed on account of her membership in

those groups. Although Handojo demonstrated membership in both groups,

nothing in the record compels the conclusion that she would be targeted for

persecution if she returned to Indonesia on account of her membership in those

groups. See, e.g. Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that

petitioner “failed to offer any evidence that distinguishes his exposure [to harm]

from those of all other ethnic Chinese Indonesians”).

3. To qualify for relief under the CAT, Handojo must establish that it is

more likely than not—a “greater than fifty percent chance”—that she would be

tortured if returned to Indonesia. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Cole v. Holder, 659

F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2011). Handojo argues that the BIA erred in drawing this

conclusion that she had not met this burden because it failed to properly consider

country conditions evidence in conjunction with her testimony. But the country

conditions evidence did not establish that it is more likely than not that Handojo

herself would be tortured in Indonesia. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32

F.4th 696, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2022) (denying CAT relief where the petitioner

provided country conditions evidence of crime and police corruption in Mexico,

but could not demonstrate a “particularized, ongoing risk of future torture”).

Although the record contains evidence of anti-Chinese and anti-Christian violence

3 23-823 in Indonesia, the record does not demonstrate that Handojo herself is more likely

than not to be targeted.

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-823

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Related

Tampubolon v. Holder
610 F.3d 1056 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Cole v. Holder
659 F.3d 762 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Halim v. Holder
590 F.3d 971 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
David Diaz-Jimenez v. Jefferson Sessions, III
902 F.3d 955 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Narinder Singh v. Matthew Whitaker
914 F.3d 654 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Jose Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Merrick Garland
32 F.4th 696 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)

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Handojo v. Garland, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/handojo-v-garland-ca9-2024.