Hancock v. Miami Correctional Facility

• Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00995
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JASON HANCOCK,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-995 DRL-SJF

MIAMI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and CHRISTINA EMBERSON REAGLE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Jason Hancock, a prisoner represented by counsel, filed a seven-count complaint naming three defendants in the Miami Superior Court. ECF 5. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, the defendants removed the case. ECF 1. The defendants also filed a motion asking for the case to be screened. ECF 4. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Claims 3, 5, and 7 raise federal claims under the Eighth Amendment. Constitutional claims can be brought against a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but neither the Miami Correctional Facility nor the Indiana Department of Correction is a “person” under § 1983. See Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”)). The complaint alleges the third defendant, Christina Emberson Reagle “is the commissioner/Director of Indiana’s Department of Corrections.” ECF 5 at

¶ 11. “Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71. “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.” Id. There is no indication Commissioner Reagle is sued in her individual capacity. The complaint makes no mention of Commissioner Reagle having any involvement other than being sent a Notice of Tort

Claim. ECF 5 at ¶ 5. There is no general supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). Because claims 3, 5, and 7 do not state a claim, they must be dismissed. Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6 allege negligence, but negligence “does not state a valid claim

under the Eighth Amendment.” Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 688 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (ellipsis omitted). Because these claims do not state federal claims, only state law claims remain. “Ordinarily, when a district court dismisses the federal claim[s] conferring original jurisdiction before trial, it relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).” Doe-2 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2010). This case has barely begun. Without any remaining federal claims, it will be remanded to state court. For these reasons, the court: (1) GRANTS the motion to screen the complaint (ECF 4); (2) DISMISSES federal claims 3, 5 and 7; and

(3) DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); and (4) REMANDS state claims 1, 2, 4, and 6 to the Miami Superior Court. SO ORDERED. March 13, 2025 s/ Damon R. Leichty Judge, United States District Court