NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
AUDREY L. HANCOCK, Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
BRANDON J. HANCOCK, Respondent/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0847 FC
FILED 08-28-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2021-094653
The Honorable Harla M. Davison, Judge, Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
COUNSEL
San Tan Family Law, P.L.C., Queen Creek By Spencer T. Hale, Matthew K. Palfreyman Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
Brandon J. Hancock, Gilbert Respondent/Appellee
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.
F U R U Y A, Judge:
¶1 Audrey L. Hancock (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order modifying legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Mother and Brandon J. Hancock (“Father”) married in October 2005 and have one adult child and three minor children—B.H., L.H., and K.H. The parties divorced in January 2022 and agreed to joint legal decision-making. The court also ordered Father to pay child support.
¶3 In January 2025, Mother filed a Motion for Post-Decree Temporary Order Without Notice and a Petition to Modify Legal Decision- Making, Parenting Time and Child Support. Mother sought sole legal decision-making and requested supervised parenting time for Father, alleging he psychologically abused the children. Mother also filed an Expedited Motion for Court to Interview Children of the Parties. The court denied Mother’s temporary order motion and motion to interview on an emergency basis. The next month, Father filed a Counter-Petition for Order to Appear Re: Contempt and Enforcement of Parenting Time and Legal Decision-Making Authority Orders.
¶4 The court set an evidentiary hearing to take place on August 11, 2025, to address Mother’s petition and Father’s counter-petition. Two weeks before that hearing, Mother filed a Motion to Continue Trial because she argued she needed time to find legal counsel and the court had not yet addressed her motion to interview. She also asserted in her motion to continue that “one hour is an insufficient amount of time” for the hearing. The court entered a minute entry on August 6 denying the motion to continue and the motion to interview. Later that day, Mother sent Father sixteen exhibits she sought to admit at the hearing. Father then filed a supplemental pre-trial statement, objecting to all of Mother’s exhibits as untimely disclosed.
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¶5 At the evidentiary hearing on August 11, the court excluded Mother’s exhibits as a sanction for her failure to comply with the rules of disclosure but allowed her to testify about the contents of the exhibits. After considering the evidence and the parties’ testimony, the court awarded Father sole legal decision-making, ordered Mother to pay $570 per month in child support, and found Mother in contempt for violating the court’s previous parenting-time order. The court also imposed a parenting plan for K.H. and L.H. but allowed B.H. to choose her own schedule.
¶6 One month later, Mother filed a Motion to Alter or Amend, requesting a new trial because the court “was not able to weigh all of the appropriate evidence” in its best-interests analysis. The court denied the motion and Mother timely appealed. Father filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing Mother’s opening brief was untimely and failed to comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13. We denied the motion to dismiss but permitted Father to re-raise his arguments in his answering brief.
¶7 In November 2025, while Mother’s appeal was pending, she filed a Petition to Modify Child Support. The court held a hearing in March 2026 and later ordered Father to pay $492 per month beginning on January 1, 2026.
¶8 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12- 2101(A)(2).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Mother contends the court erred by (1) excluding her evidence as a sanction; (2) untimely ruling on and denying her motion requesting that the court interview the minor children; (3) denying her request for an expanded hearing; (4) misapplying A.R.S. Section 25-320, the Arizona Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”); and (5) failing to consider all evidence related to the parties’ incomes.
¶10 Father argues Mother’s brief does not comply with ARCAP 13 because she fails to cite the applicable standard of review and include citations to the record. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B). Failure to comply with ARCAP 13 generally results in waiver. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022). But even if we assume Mother’s brief is deficient, we decline to apply waiver here because the children’s best interests are at issue. See Fadlon v. Cleverly, 262 Ariz. 127, 134 ¶ 17 n.2 (App. 2026) (citing
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cases), rev. denied (Aug. 7, 2026). We address each of Mother’s arguments in turn.
I. Violation of the Disclosure Rules
A. Timely Disclosure
¶11 Mother argues the court erred in summarily excluding her evidence as a sanction for her violation of disclosure rules because one exhibit was timely disclosed.
¶12 We review the court’s ruling to exclude evidence as a sanction for abuse of discretion. Fadlon, 262 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 41. “In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the question is not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without exceeding the bounds of reason.” Marquez v. Ortega, 231 Ariz. 437, 441 ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (citation modified). We will affirm unless the court made an error of law or its decision is unsupported by the record. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423 ¶ 9 (App. 2019).
¶13 Parties must serve their initial disclosures “not later than 40 days after the filing of the first responsive pleading to a petition.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. (“ARFLP”) 49(b)(1). Evidence discovered after this deadline must be disclosed no more than 30 days after discovery. ARFLP 49(b)(2)(B). But if new evidence is discovered less than 30 days before the hearing, it must be disclosed “reasonably in advance of the hearing.” Id.
¶14 Here, Mother first disclosed her list of exhibits in her pre-trial statement on July 28, 2025, approximately two weeks before the hearing. But she did not send Father the actual exhibits—which varied from those listed in her pre-trial statement—until August 6, five days before the hearing. Mother concedes that her disclosure of most exhibits was delinquent. She argues, however, that because one exhibit was not discoverable until July 22, and she disclosed that one exhibit within 30 days of discovery, her disclosure of at least that exhibit was timely.
¶15 But Mother’s argument is flawed because it fails to acknowledge the requirement that disclosure occur “reasonably in advance” when the evidence is discovered less than 30 days before the hearing. See id. July 22 was 20 days before the August 11 hearing. Mother does not cite supporting evidence in the record or argue why five days before trial is “reasonably in advance,” such that her disclosure was timely. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the court’s finding that
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Mother violated ARFLP 49 by untimely disclosing her evidence, including the one exhibit that was not discoverable until July 22.
B. Prejudice
¶16 Mother also argues the court erred because “Father was not unfairly prejudiced by the untimely disclosure.” A party who is prejudiced by the opposing party’s untimely disclosure may seek sanctions under ARFLP 65. ARFLP 49(b)(3). Mother contends Father was not prejudiced because he “knew the evidence existed since he either helped to create the evidence or was present during the creation of the evidence.” Mother also contends the court excluded her evidence “without regard to Father’s failure to show prejudice.”
¶17 Mother’s argument is unsupported by the record. In his supplemental pre-trial statement, Father alleged prejudice in that Mother’s exhibits were so voluminous he lacked sufficient time to review them or confirm their authenticity. He also noted there was “little to no context” provided and the exhibits “offer[ed] limited clarity or meaningful insight.” Further, at the hearing, the court acknowledged Father’s assertion of prejudice and found it to be sufficient. Thus, because the record supports the court’s finding of prejudice, we discern no abuse of discretion.
C. Best-Interests Analysis
¶18 Mother further argues the court’s sanction violated Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 (2003) and Kelly v. Kelly, 252 Ariz. 371 (App. 2021). Father argues these authorities are distinguishable and this case is more like Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239 (App. 2018), so the court’s sanction should be affirmed.
¶19 The superior court has broad discretion when imposing sanctions for disclosure violations. Fadlon, 262 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 45. But “[i]n family court cases, the court must nevertheless ensure it remains able to consider all factors relevant to the best interests of the children.” Id. In Hays and Kelly, the superior court reversed a court’s evidence-excluding sanctions because they “effectively preclude[d] potentially significant information from being considered in the custody determination.” Hays, 205 Ariz. at 103–04 ¶¶ 22–23; Kelly, 252 Ariz. at 375 ¶ 19 (“The superior court cannot sanction a parent in a way that prevents the court from considering admissible, potentially significant information about the child’s best interests.”) (citation modified). But in Johnson, we affirmed a sanction excluding evidence because other evidence “gave the court
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sufficient information” to conduct its best-interests analysis. 245 Ariz. at 244 ¶¶ 16–17.
¶20 Mother argues the court could not conduct a proper best- interests analysis without her excluded evidence. She argues that like Hays and Kelly, her evidence was significant and the court failed to review the exhibits and determine whether the information they contained “could realistically be obtained from additional sources.” More specifically, she contends the court lacked “information regarding Father’s abuse or the children’s desires to not return to their Father’s home.”
¶21 But we cannot examine Mother’s exhibits because she made no offer of proof to preserve their review and they are absent from the record. It is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure “the record on appeal contains all . . . documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised on appeal.” Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995). When such evidence is absent from the record, we assume it “would support the court’s findings and conclusions.” Id. Thus, we assume the information contained in the missing exhibits could realistically be obtained from other sources, supporting the court’s sanction.
¶22 Further, the relevant question is not whether the court weighed every piece of potentially relevant evidence in its best-interests analysis. Rather, the question on review is whether the court considered the best-interests factors under A.R.S. Section 25-403 and made findings supported by the record. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51 ¶ 11 (“In a contested custody case, the court must make specific findings on the record regarding all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the children.”) (citation modified).
¶23 Here, the court listed the best-interests factors in its order, made findings for each factor, and cited the parties’ testimony to support its findings. Also, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the court did receive evidence of Father’s alleged abuse and the children’s desires. Mother testified Father’s “emotional and psychological manipulation . . . transfer[ed] onto [the] kids” and the children “are afraid of [Father] in different ways.” She also testified that the children want “to be with [Father] but not . . . 50/50.” Thus, in light of the missing exhibits and the state of the record, we affirm the court’s sanction.
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II. Motion to Interview
A. Timely Ruling
¶24 Mother contends the court committed reversible error by untimely ruling on her motion to interview. Rule 91(e) of the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court states that the superior court must rule on matters within sixty days of submission, as required by Article 6, Section 21 of the Arizona Constitution. But this rule is “only directory and not mandatory.” In re Appleton’s Estate, 15 Ariz. App. 490, 493 (1971). As a result, the remedy for a pending matter that is more than 60 days old is a mandate for the court to enter a ruling. See Western Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Diamond Lazy K Guest Ranch, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 256, 261 (1972) (noting remedy is for parties to “make a record in the trial court . . . urging compliance with the rule”); see also Fish v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 1 CA-CV 16-0496, 2018 WL 2016495, at *4 ¶ 19 (Ariz. App. May 1, 2018) (concluding party’s failure to cite authority showing untimeliness “gives rise to a remedy that would assist her on the merits of the appeal” so the remedy is ordering court to rule on pending motion) (mem. decision). Here, the court denied Mother’s motion to interview on August 6, 2025, so no further remedy is warranted.
¶25 Mother also argues the court should have ruled within a reasonable amount of time, citing Zancanaro v. Cross, 85 Ariz. 394 (1959). But Zancanaro applied a reasonableness standard to the question of contract performance, 85 Ariz. at 398, and is thus irrelevant to the issue of timely judicial rulings. Mother further contends the court’s untimely ruling violated her substantial rights, but she fails to develop this argument, thus waiving it. See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64–65 ¶ 6 (2013) (considering arguments that lack adequate explanation as waived). Therefore, Mother’s argument regarding the timeliness of the court’s ruling is unavailing.
B. Denial of the Motion
¶26 Mother argues in the alternative that even if the court timely ruled on her motion, it nevertheless erred in denying the motion because it could not fully evaluate the children’s best interests without interviewing them.
¶27 We review the court’s decision on a motion to interview children for an abuse of discretion. See A.R.S. § 25-405(A) (“The court may interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child’s wishes as to the child’s custodian and as to parenting time”) (emphasis added); see also ARFLP 12(a) (“[T]he court may conduct an in camera interview with a minor
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child . . . .”) (emphasis added). We also review the court’s best-interests analysis for an abuse of discretion. DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 9.
¶28 When deciding legal-decision making and parenting time, the court must consider the children’s best interests using factors listed in A.R.S. Section 25-403. Id. at 423 ¶ 11. One such factor is “the wishes of the child as to legal decision-making and parenting time.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4).
¶29 Mother argues the court’s refusal to interview the children prevented the court from considering the children’s wishes. But the court received and considered evidence regarding the children’s wishes through the parties’ testimony. Mother testified the children “want to be with [Father] but not . . . 50/50.” Father testified that in January 2025, only L.H. was following the parenting-time schedule and the other two children had left his home. The court acknowledged both parties’ testimony in its order before establishing parenting time. Thus, the record supports the court’s best-interests analysis. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to interview.
III. Expanded Hearing
¶30 Mother further argues the court erred by denying her request for an expanded hearing because presenting evidence on her petition to modify and defending against Father’s counter-petition in one hour was “an unrealistic task.”
¶31 We review the court’s management of its docket for abuse of discretion. Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992); see also ARFLP 77(c)(1) (“The court may impose reasonable time limits appropriate to the proceedings.”). We will not “substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court in the day-to-day management of cases.” Findlay, 172 Ariz. at 346.
¶32 In April 2025, four months before the hearing, the court entered a minute entry that included instructions on how to request additional trial time. The instructions state the requesting party must file a motion “stating good cause to extend the time” and “an estimate of time and subject matter of the expected testimony for each witness.” Mother filed a motion to continue on July 28, 2025 and included a single line that read, “One hour is an insufficient amount of time for this trial.” Mother’s motion did not follow the court’s instructions, so the court was well within its discretion to deny Mother’s request for additional time.
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¶33 Mother also argues the court’s decision was error because she “did not have sufficient time to present her evidence which included ten video recordings.” But Mother’s exhibits were excluded at the beginning of the hearing, so this argument is unavailing. Thus, we affirm the court’s denial of Mother’s request for an expanded hearing.
IV. Child Support
¶34 Mother raises two issues regarding the court’s child support order. Father argues these issues are moot because the court modified the child support order in March 2026. While Mother no longer has a current child support obligation due to the modification, the court’s 2026 order was not retroactive and went into effect first on January 1, 2026. Thus, any error in the court’s August 2025 child support order would have impacted Mother’s liability for child support until December 31, 2025. So, the prior order is not moot.
A. Application of the Guidelines
¶35 Mother contends the court misapplied Section V(F) of the Guidelines and thus miscalculated child support. We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion “but review de novo the court’s conclusions of law and interpretation of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines[.]” Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112–113 ¶ 9 (App. 2016).
¶36 Section V(F) of the Guidelines addresses how to calculate child support in two separate scenarios involving multiple children with different parenting plans. The first scenario requires the court to use two child support worksheets and applies when “each parent exercises more than half of the parenting time with at least 1 child[.]” Guidelines § V.F. The court calculates “the child support owed based on which parent has the most parenting time with the child” and then finds the difference between the two parents to determine who has a remaining child support obligation. Id. (providing a calculation example). The second scenario requires only one child support worksheet and applies when “one parent does not have more than half of the parenting time with any of the children[.]” Id. To determine a parent’s total annual amount of parenting time under either scenario, the court should look to “a court order, a parenting plan, . . . the parents’ expectation, or . . . historical practice.” Id. § V.C.
¶37 Mother argues the court should have applied the two- worksheet scenario because Father exercises more than half of the parenting time with L.H. and K.H. and she exercises more than half of the parenting
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time with B.H. We agree and note the court did indeed use two child support worksheets, a decision the record supports.
¶38 The court’s parenting-time order shows Mother gets parenting time with L.H. and K.H. every other weekend and every Wednesday. This gives Father more than half of the parenting time with K.H. and L.H. But for B.H., the court did not impose a parenting-time schedule. As such, the Guidelines point the court to the parents’ expectations or historical practice to determine whether either parent exercises more than half of the parenting time. Id. Here, we rely on Father’s testimony and exhibits since the court found Mother’s testimony not credible. Father testified that B.H. began living exclusively with Mother on January 20, 2025 and was unsure “if [he] could convince her to come back.” Because this testimony shows Mother had been exercising more than half of the parenting time with B.H. since January 2025, the court appropriately applied the two-worksheet scenario. See id. § V.F.
¶39 But upon review of the two worksheets, we cannot determine how the court concluded that Mother owed $570 per month. In its first worksheet, the court calculated Mother’s presumptive child support obligation for L.H. and K.H. as $701.12 and Father’s presumptive obligation as $1,283.14. Then, in the second worksheet, the calculations show Mother’s presumptive obligation for B.H. was $628.71 and Father’s was $891.49. The court’s final calculation shows Mother’s child support obligation is $701 while Father’s is $131, leaving Mother with a child support obligation of $570. It is unclear how the court’s final calculations of $701 and $131 derive from the preceding calculations, and there are no supporting findings enabling us to adequately review the child support order. Thus, we vacate and remand the child support order to be recalculated using two worksheets with supporting findings. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 330 (1985) (concluding “we are not disposed to assume that the trial court exercised its discretion” when court fails to explain its decision and none are apparent from the record); see also Emeofa v. Emeofa, 1 CA-CV 24-0805, 2025 WL 3140192, at *3 ¶ 17 (Nov. 10, 2025) (remanding after discerning no reason for court’s inconsistent treatment of certain property allocations) (mem. decision).
B. Mother’s Income
¶40 Mother further argues the court erred by attributing a higher income to her, despite evidence to the contrary. Mother’s Affidavit of Financial Information, which was admitted at the hearing as one of Father’s exhibits, shows Mother makes $20 an hour with a $200 commission or
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bonus per paycheck. Father testified Mother makes $25 an hour after considering two certifications she received. In its order, the court attributed an income of $25 an hour to Mother after noting “a negative inference shall apply to Mother’s income due to her lack of participation in the discovery process.”
¶41 Mother contends the court ignored her Affidavit of Financial Information and relied on Father’s unsubstantiated testimony. But the court’s imputation of a higher income was based on Mother’s failure to follow the disclosure rules. As previously discussed, the record supports the court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with such rules, supra ¶¶ 13–15, and thus the court’s negative inference and its imputation of a higher income is supported by the record.
¶42 But because we vacate and remand the child support order, inasmuch as the court is required to recalculate the parties’ incomes, the court may exercise its discretion to reevaluate based on the evidence presented as of August 11, 2025, or it may consider further testimony and evidence to determine the parties’ incomes for the relevant period. See supra ¶ 34.
V. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal
¶43 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. Section 25-324. Because Father is a self-represented litigant, he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. and Const. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126 ¶ 5 (App. 2014). Further, having considered the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and their financial resources, we also deny Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees in exercise of our discretion.
¶44 But we cannot determine costs on appeal at this time. A.R.S. Section 12-342(A) lays out which party will recover costs on appeal if the appealing party is the one against whom judgment was entered by the superior court:
[I]f the judgment of the appellate court is against [appellant], but for a lesser amount, [the appellant] shall recover costs in the appellate court, but shall be adjudged to pay costs in the court below. If the judgment of the appellate court is against [the appellant] for the same or a greater amount than in the court below, the adverse party shall recover costs in both courts.
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¶45 Because we vacate and remand in part for the superior court to recalculate child support, we cannot conclude how the judgment against Mother will compare to the superior court’s judgment after remand. Thus, after recalculating child support, we defer to the superior court to determine costs of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶46 We affirm the legal decision-making and parenting-time orders but vacate and remand the child support order for recalculation and appropriate findings. We also defer to the superior court to award the costs of this appeal.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR