Hampton v. Tuskegee Alabama Sheriff Department (INMATE 2)

• Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
• Decided: March 5, 2021
• Docket: 3:21-cv-00071
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

WARREN LEWIS HAMPTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 3:21-CV-71-WHA-CSC ) [WO] TUSKEGEE AL. SHERIFF ) DEPARTMENT, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Warren Hampton [“Hampton”], an inmate incarcerated at the Lee County Detention Center in Opelika, Alabama, files this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Tuskegee Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff Andre Brunson. He seeks to challenge a use of force incident which occurred on September 26, 2018. According to the Complaint, a Macon County sheriff’s deputy shot Hampton in the back of the head while he was running. Hampton states he was not armed and did not constitute a threat to the deputy sheriff. Upon review, the Court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1

1 The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 5. A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). I. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Because Hampton is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court reviews his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss a complaint proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that an action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. A claim is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of success,” that is, when it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal theories are indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist, id., or an affirmative defense would defeat the claim such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Courts are accorded “not only the authority

to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding,

2 The predecessor to this section is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Even though Congress made many substantive changes to § 1915(d) when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2)(B), the frivolity and the failure to state a claim analysis contained in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), was unaltered. Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000). However, dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is now mandatory. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1348-49. 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A review on this ground is governed by the same standards as dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim to relief that is plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations should present a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a successful affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, appears on the face of a complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215. Pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys”

and are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). However, they “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And a court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). While, the court treats factual allegations as true, it does not treat as true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action’s elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681. Finally, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). B. Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations Hampton seeks to challenge the conduct of an unnamed deputy sheriff for an incident which occurred on September 26, 2018. Hampton’s Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to actions filed by an inmate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946- 47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). [Plaintiff’s] claim was brought in Alabama where the governing limitations period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to have his claim heard, [Plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date the limitations period began to run.

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). The action about which Hampton complains occurred on September 26, 2018. By its express terms, the tolling provision of Alabama Code § 6-2-8(a) provides no basis for relief to Hampton from application of the time bar.3 Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on the claims arising from the challenged conduct on September 26, 2018. The limitations period for this event ran uninterrupted until it expired on September 26, 2020. Hampton filed the Complaint on January 11, 2021, after expiration of the applicable limitation periods. 4 The statute of limitations is usually raised as an affirmative defense. In an action proceeding in forma pauperis under section 1983, the Court may consider affirmative defenses

3 This section allows tolling of the limitations period for an individual who “is, at the time the right accrues ... insane....” Alabama Code § 6-2-8(a). The Complaint demonstrates Hampton was not legally insane at the time of the challenged events so as to warrant tolling under Alabama Code § 6-2-8(a).

4 The Court considers January 11, 2021, to be the filing date of the Complaint. Although the Clerk stamped the Complaint “filed” on January 26, 2021, Plaintiff signed his Complaint on January 11, 2021, and a pro se inmate’s complaint is deemed by law to have been filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir.1993). apparent from the face of the complaint. Clark v. Georgia Pardons and Parole Board, 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990); Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990). “[I]f the district court sees that an affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section 1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)] dismissal is allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the existence of which warrants dismissal as frivolous.” Id. at 640 n.2 (citing Franklin v.

State of Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1330-1332 (D.C. Oregon 1983)). In analyzing § 1983 cases, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the answer.” Ali, 892 F.2d at 440. “It necessarily follows that in the absence of the defendant or defendants, the district court must evaluate the merit of the claim sua sponte.” Id. An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners (because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985)].

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). Based on the facts apparent from the face of the Complaint, Hampton has no legal basis on which to proceed regarding his claim because he filed this action over two years after the challenged conduct occurred. As noted, the statutory tolling provision is unavailing. Consequently, the two-year period of limitations applicable to Hampton’s claim expired prior to his filing this action. In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes Hampton’s excessive force claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Hampton’s Complaint is, therefore, subject to dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Clark, 915 F.2d 636; Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). C. Sheriff Brunson Even if Hampton could demonstrate his claims are not time-barred, the Court finds he has alleged no facts against Defendant Brunson regarding the matters about which he complains nor do his allegations reflect any involvement by Defendant Brunson. In a § 1983 action supervisory officers “are not liable . . . for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates [or fellow officers]

on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotes and citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Thus, “[t]he standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360–61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Hampton fails to make even a conclusory allegation that Defendant Brunson was aware of or was personally involved in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, the Complaint against this defendant is due to be summarily dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2(B)(ii). D. The Tuskegee Sheriff’s Department In order to allege a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must name as a defendant an entity that is subject to being sued. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992). The capacity of a party to be sued is “determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held.” Id. Both federal and state law are well settled that a county sheriff’s department is not a legal entity subject to suit or liability. Id.; White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Ala. 1991). Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Tuskegee Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit. Thus, Hampton’s Complaint against this defendant is due to be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). II. CONCLUSION Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). Plaintiff may file an objection to the Recommendation on or before March 19, 2021. Any objection filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. This Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable. Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). Done, this 5th day of March 2021.

/s/ Charles S. Coody CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE