Hampton v. Thompson
This text of 171 F.2d 535 (Hampton v. Thompson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellants, plaintiffs below, are brakemen on the Kingsville Division of the St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railroad Company, hereafter called St. L. B. & M., and members of the Colored Trainmen of America. Suing for themselves and all other brakemen members of their union, they brought this action to enjoin the enforcement of an award, No. 11566 1 of the First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board against San Antonio, Uvalde, and Gulf Railroad Company, hereafter called S. A. U. & G. and against Spangler Lodge 52 and Davy Crockett Lodge 369, subordinate lodges of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, hereafter called B. R. T. By amendment plaintiffs made Guy A. Thompson, Trustee of the S. A. U. & G. Railroad Company and of the St. L. B. & M. Railroad Company, defendant in lieu of S. A. U. & G. Railroad Company, which was dismissed out of the case.
Defendant contesting the jurisdiction and answering subject thereto, the district judge, on April 19, 1948, of the opinion that he was without jurisdiction, nevertheless stayed the proceedings in the cause “until plaintiffs had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their alleged grievances to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for its interpretation and decision.” Thereafter, on the 21st day of June, 1948, the court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law,2 the plaintiffs [537]*537in open court announced that they declined to, and would not, present their alleged grievances to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for its interpretation and decision, for the reasons set forth in the court’s findings of fact, and “it appearing to the court that the defendants would not present their grievances to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for its interpretation and decision even though afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so”, the cause was dismissed.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Texas & P. Railroad Co., 5 Cir., 159 F.2d [538]*538822, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 760, 68 S.Ct. 62, we llave had recent occasion to review the decisions of the Supreme Court on the nature and limits of the jurisdiction of the federal courts in controversies arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and the prerequisites to its exercise. No later decision of this or any other court, impeaching or casting doubt upon the conclusions we reached there, has been called to our attention. We have found none. That case and those of Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 156 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 329 U.S. 758, 67 S.Ct. 112, 91 L.Ed. 654 and Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Randolph, 8 Cir., 164 F.2d 4, certiorari denied 334 U.S. 818, 68 S.Ct. 1082, are precise authority in support of the trial court’s action, unless the fact, that the plaintiffs in this suit are Negroes and plaintiffs in those were not, requires a different rule.
What and all that is for decision here, then, is whether the fact, that appellants are Negroes and members of an all Negro railway labor union, entitles them, the Railway Labor Act notwithstanding, to by-pass the National Railroad Adjustment Board and sue direct in the federal courts upon grievances with their employer.
The district judge thought that it did not. We agree.
Constitutional amendments and federal statutes, dealing with race or color, were written, they have been interpreted and applied, not to discriminate in favor of Negroes, but to prevent discrimination against them, not to make, but to prevent, a different rule for Negroes than for whites. On page 2 of their reply brief, appellants say: “It is not necessary to prove that the individual members of the First Division have prejudice against Negroes or that the particular award was the produce of prejudice. All appellants have to prove is that the structure of the First Division is fatally tainted with race discrimination.” When this statement is read in the light of the undisputed facts, indeed the facts admitted and found on this record, it is at once apparent that appellants are using an ancient device, assuming a situation favorable to themselves, in order to get a favorable judgment. In short, begging the question, they put a' straw man up to knock him down. The dispute here involves no racial element whatever. The fact that the brakemen in one group are Negroes, in the other whites, has no bearing on the demands of the B. R. T. lodges that they be allowed to run off accumulated [539]*539mileage, none on the insistence of the colored railway trainmen that none of them should be displaced.
The doctrine, that in circumstances of this kind a person is entitled to a special tribunal or special treatment because of the color of his skin, has never prevailed in this country, in or out of the courts. If the position taken here should be sustained, the United States and every state must redraft all its laws, remake all its appointments. To say, as appellants in effect say here, that whenever a Negro, not as a Negro but as a person, is concerned in a controversy, he may call in question not the actual prejudice against him of those who are to hear it, but the fact that the hearers have been selected from white organizations which do not admit Negroes to' membership, is to introduce a new and strange doctrine. It would be impossible to conform to it. Contrary to the principle of democracy in America, the spirit of its laws, it would be as stupid as it would be wicked to conform to it if conformity were possible. The judgment is affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
171 F.2d 535, 23 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2151, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hampton-v-thompson-ca5-1948.