Hampton v. State

106 S.W.3d 846, 2003 WL 21197061
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 18, 2003
Docket08-00-00045-CR
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 106 S.W.3d 846 (Hampton v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hampton v. State, 106 S.W.3d 846, 2003 WL 21197061 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice.

This case is on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Leon Hampton, Jr. who at the time of his arrest was a juvenile, appeals his murder conviction. Upon our first consideration of this appeal, we reversed, holding that in fading to notify his parent that Hampton was being questioned on suspicion of murder, the police had violated Tex. Fam.Cobe Ann. § 52.02(b)(1), and therefore his videotaped statement should have been excluded. Hampton v. State, 36 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on that issue. In addition, on that issue, we found that by failing to notify the office or official designated by the juvenile court, the police had violated Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.02(b)(2). Hampton, 36 S.W.3d at 924. That ground for reversal was not challenged by the State nor addressed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The high court remanded for further consideration of Hampton’s second issue on appeal, concerning the prosecutor’s failure to timely disclose Brady evidence. Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 613. Applying the standard for assaying Brady violations, we find that there was not a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. We therefore affirm.

Status of videotaped statement upon remand

We begin by facing a conundrum. The Court of Criminal Appeals has remanded this case to us with the instruction that, in examining the Brady violation, “[t]he reviewing court’s analysis upon remand should consider this properly admitted evi- *848 denee [the videotaped statement] as well as the remainder of the evidence.... ” Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 613. In reviewing our earlier opinions and the briefs in this case, however, we perceive a problem with considering the videotaped statement as properly admitted evidence, even in light of that court’s finding that the police complied with the Family Code in giving Hampton’s mother a reason for detaining him.

Hampton raised an independent argument for suppressing the videotaped statement, and we sustained that ground in our first opinion. The State did not raise that issue in its petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals, nor did that court discuss the ground in its opinion finding the videotaped statement admissible. We find ourselves, then, in a situation where we have sustained two independent reasons for excluding a defendant’s statement, and although one has been overturned by the higher court, the second was neither challenged by the State nor discussed by the court. This requires us to examine our jurisdiction on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The courts of appeals generally enjoy broad jurisdiction following remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals. Carroll v. State, 101 S.W.3d 454 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), overruling Williams v. State, 829 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, pet. ref'd). After a case has been remanded by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the jurisdiction originally granted to the court of appeals by constitutional and statutory mandate is fully restored. Adkins, 764 S.W.2d at 784. “[T]he courts of appeals are not limited on remand to deciding the pertinent point of error based solely on the explicit basis set out by [the Court of Criminal Appeals].... ” Carroll, 101 S.W.3d at 459. Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals instructed us to reconsider the Brady issue in the following language:

In the present case, the court of appeals did not analyze the prosecutor’s failure to timely disclose the existence of the supplementary report in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial. In particular, the court did not discuss the report’s materiality in light of appellant’s own videotaped statement admitting that he alone had shot Mr. Nance. ... The reviewing court’s analysis upon remand should consider this properly admitted evidence as well as the remainder of the evidence.... Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 612-13.

We do not question the high court’s ability and duty to correct our errors, and we certainly bow to its determination that the officer properly notified appellant’s mother of the reason for taking the child into custody, and therefore Hampton’s videotaped interview could not have been excluded on that theory. This does not assist us, however, in deciding how to treat the failure of the State and the high court to address the second challenge Hampton raised on this issue: that the police did not give notice and the reason for taking the child into custody to the office or official designated by the juvenile court. Hampton, 36 S.W.3d at 924. We sustained Hampton’s first point of error on both independent grounds. Id.

We therefore cannot agree that the videotaped statement was properly admitted evidence, as the State waived its opportunity to challenge our determination that the videotape should have been excluded because it was the result of a custodial interrogation that did not comply with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.02(b)(2). For this reason, we respectfully decline to consider the videotape in complying with the *849 Court of Criminal Appeals instruction that we reconsider the Brady violation for materiality.

Reversible error for Brady violation

In remanding, the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us to analyze the prosecutor’s failure to timely disclose Brady evidence in light of all the evidence adduced at trial, including Hampton’s statement that he shot the victim, as well as the testimony of various witnesses. We will endeavor to do so. Under the three-pronged test for reversible error for a Brady violation, Hampton must show that:

(1) the State failed to disclose evidence, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith;
(2) the withheld evidence is favorable to him;
(3) the evidence is material, that is, there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 612. Neither the first or second prongs are disputed; the evidence was withheld, and it was favorable.

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106 S.W.3d 846, 2003 WL 21197061, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hampton-v-state-texapp-2003.