Hampton v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JANIECE HAMPTON, Case No.: 22-cv-01833-W-MSB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL Commissioner of Social Security 15 ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT [DOC. 21] Administration, 16 17 Defendant. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Janiece Hampton’s Application for Award of 20 Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (the “Motion” [Doc. 21]). 21 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See 22 Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Ms. 23 Hampton’s Motion [Doc. 21] in the amount of $7,467.41. 24 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff Janiece Hampton applied for social security benefits 27 under Title II and Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. (Report & Recommendation 28 1 (the “Report”) [Doc. 18] 2:14–16.) She alleged an inability to work since August 20, 2 2019. (Id.) 3 On December 16, 2020, Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the 4 “Commissioner” or “Government”) denied her application, and on July 30, 2021, denied 5 her request for reconsideration. (Report at 2:16–17.) Ms. Hampton then requested an 6 administrative hearing, and on February 2, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Kevin 7 Messer (“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing. (Id. at 2:18–21.) 8 On March 16, 2022, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Ms. Hampton 9 had not been under a disability from August 20, 2019, through the date of his decision. 10 (Report at 2:22–24.) Ms. Hampton then requested review of the ALJ’s decision, which 11 the Appeals Council denied on November 14, 2022. (Id. at 2:24–27.) 12 On November 21, 2022, Ms. Hampton filed this lawsuit seeking judicial review of 13 the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for social security benefits. 14 (See Comp. [Doc. 1].) The matter was assigned to the Magistrate Judge Michael S. Berg 15 for a report and recommendation. 16 On March 15, 2023, Ms. Hampton filed her brief on the merits, which raised four 17 grounds for reversal: (1) the ALJ failed to provide a residual functional capacity 18 statement including both severe and non-severe impairments; (2) the ALJ did not provide 19 clear and convincing reasons to discredit Ms. Hampton’s statements; (3) the ALJ’s past 20 relevant work findings conflict with Social Security Ruling 82-61; and (4) the ALJ failed 21 to address a medical opinion as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). (See Pl’s P&A 22 [Doc. 12-1] 9:5–15:28.) On May 30, 2023, the Government filed its opposition [Doc. 16] 23 and on June 5, 2023, Ms. Hampton filed her reply [Doc. 17]. 24 On February 21, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report, which 25 recommended finding partially in favor of Ms. Hampton on the first ground and in favor 26 of the Government on grounds two through four. (Report at 15:5–12, 20:4–9, 23:11–15, 27 26:19–21.) Regarding the first ground, the Report found that “although the ALJ’s RFC 28 properly accounted for Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the ALJ erred by not explicitly 1 considering Plaintiff’s anxiety and PTSD in the RFC assessment and merely 2 incorporating his step two analysis. [Citation omitted,]” (Id. at 15:5–12.) The Report 3 therefore recommended reversing the Commissioner’s decision and remanding this 4 matter for “further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 5 § 405(g).” (Id. at 27:17–20.) On March 18, 2024, this Court issued an order adopting the 6 Report, reversing the Commissioner’s decision and remanding the case for “further 7 proceedings consistent with the Report.” (Order [Doc. 19] 2:27–3:2.) 8 Thereafter, the parties attempted to reach an agreement regarding Ms. Hampton’s 9 request for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Motion at 2:4–6.) 10 Because no agreement was reached, Ms. Hampton filed the pending Motion. She seeks 11 $11,770.69 in fees (consisting of 48 hours of billable attorney time) and $405 in filing 12 costs. (Id. at 1:23–26.) The Government opposes the motion and argues Ms. Hampton’s 13 request should be denied because the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified. 14 (Opp’n [Doc. 22] 5:10–9:12.) In the alternative, the Government argues Ms. Hampton’s 15 request should be reduced based on her limited success in this case and counsel’s alleged 16 unreasonable and excessive time spent on preparing the opening brief. (Id. at 9:13–15:20) 17 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 The EAJA provides:

20 Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a 21 prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that 22 party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including 23 proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court 24 finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 25 special circumstances make an award unjust.

26 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 27

28 1 To be eligible for EAJA fees, several requirements must be met. First, the 2 individual claimant must be a “party,” meaning that their “net worth did not exceed 3 $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Second, 4 the claimant must be the “prevailing party.” Comm’r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. 5 Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). Third, the Commissioner’s position must not have been 6 “substantially justified.” Id. Fourth, there must be no “special circumstances” that make 7 an award unjust. Id. Finally, “any fee application must be submitted to the court within 30 8 days of final judgment in the action and be supported by an itemized statement.” Id. 9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)). 10 Whether the Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified” depends on if it 11 was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 12 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “Put differently, the government’s position must have a 13 ‘reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 14 The government does not need to show that “it was correct or ‘justified to a high 15 degree,’” and its loss on an issue does not “raise a presumption that its position was not 16 substantially justified.” Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1167– 17 1168 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). If the claimant establishes that it is a prevailing 18 party, “the burden is on the government to show that its litigation position was 19 substantially justified on the law and the facts.” Id. at 1167 (citation omitted). 20 The EAJA’s substantial justification standard only applies to issues that are 21 adjudicated. Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[The EAJA] 22 provides no indication that attorneys’ fees should be awarded with respect to positions of 23 the United States challenged by the claimant but unaddressed by the reviewing court.”). 24 The government therefore need only be substantially justified in its “litigation position 25 and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. 26 If a claimant is deemed entitled to EAJA fees, “a fee award presumptively 27 encompasses all aspects of the civil action.” Comm’r, 496 U.S. at 161. The Court should 28 generally defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to the amount of time 1 required for the case. See Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2 2008) (“[A]fter all, [the winning lawyer] won, and might not have, had [they] been more 3 of a slacker.”). However, the court still determines whether the attorney’s fees requested 4 are “reasonable,” and the “district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing 5 the amount of an EAJA award.” Id. at 163. 6 “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is 7 the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable 8 hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The claimant has the 9 burden to “submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed,” and if the 10 documentation is inadequate, the “district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Id. at 11 433, 437. If the government disputes the reasonableness of the fee, it “has a burden of 12 rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy 13 and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party.” 14 Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court also 15 should exclude hours not “reasonably expended” from the award. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 16 434. 17 “[T]he product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the 18 inquiry.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The “most critical factor” to consider is the “degree 19 of success obtained” by the claimant, particularly where the plaintiff only succeeded on 20 some of their claims for relief. Id. at 436 (“This factor is particularly crucial where a 21 plaintiff is deemed ‘prevailing’ even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for 22 relief.”). In such situations, the court first asks whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail 23 on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded.” Ibrahim, 912 F.3d 24 at 1172. “This inquiry rests on whether the ‘related claims involve a common core of 25 facts or are based on related legal theories . . . [with the focus on] whether the claims 26 arose out of a common course of conduct.’” Id. (citations omitted). If the claims are 27 unrelated, then the plaintiff cannot obtain fees for services on the unsuccessful claim. See 28 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–435 (holding that unrelated claims must “be treated as if they 1 had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on 2 the unsuccessful claim.”). If the claims are related, the court then considers whether “‘the 3 plaintiff achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a 4 satisfactory basis for making a fee award.’” Ibrahim, 912 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Hensley, 5 461 U.S. at 434). If the prevailing party obtained “excellent results,” the court may order 6 a “full fee award—that is, the entirety of those hours reasonably expended on both the 7 prevailing and unsuccessful but related claims.” Id. (citations omitted). 8 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. The Government’s Position was Not Substantially Justified 11 The Government does not dispute that Ms. Hampton timely filed this motion and 12 supported it with an itemized statement. It also does not dispute that Ms. Hampton is a 13 prevailing party, whose net worth was less than $2,000,000 at the time the civil action 14 was filed. Finally, the Government does not argue that any special circumstances make 15 an award unjust in this situation. (Id. at 3:8–9.) Thus, the only issue is whether the 16 Government’s position was substantially justified. With respect to the first ground for 17 relief, it was not. 18 As stated above, the Report found that the ALJ “erred by not explicitly considering 19 Plaintiff’s anxiety and PTSD in the RFC assessment and merely incorporating his step 20 two analysis.” (Report at 15:5–8.) The ALJ’s failure to explicitly consider Ms. 21 Hampton’s anxiety and PTSD in the RFC assessment was not substantially justified 22 because “[i]n assessing RFC, the [ALJ] must consider limitations and restrictions 23 imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’” Titles II 24 & XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 25 374184, at *14 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). As the Commissioner noted, non-severe limitations 26 do not ultimately need to be reflected in the RFC. (Opp’n 6:23–7:2.) However, SSR 96- 27 8P clearly states that the ALJ must still “consider” the non-severe impairments. 1996 WL 28 374184, at *14; see Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App’x 850 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 1 when adjudicating an application for social security benefits, the ALJ must consider all 2 the claimant’s mental limitations while determining their RFC). Such consideration may 3 have been shown by at least “explaining why [Ms. Hampton]’s mental impairments did 4 not warrant RFC restrictions.” (Report at 13:20–21.) The ALJ’s failure to do so does not 5 have a “reasonable basis in law and fact.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. 6 SSR 96-8P also explains that “[t]he mental RFC assessment used at steps 4 and 5 7 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing 8 various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraphs B and C.” 1996 9 WL 374184, at *13 (emphasis added). The ALJ did assess Ms. Hampton’s non-severe 10 impairments in his step two analysis, but he merely incorporated this analysis into his 11 RFC assessment. (Report at 13:10–16.) This incorporation does not satisfy the “more 12 detailed assessment” required by SSR 96-8P, so it does not have a reasonable basis in law 13 and fact. 1996 WL 374184, at *13. 14 Lastly, the Government cites several cases allegedly illustrating that the ALJ’s 15 decision was supported by circuit caselaw. (Opp’n at 7:9–8:25.) However, these cases 16 support a different rule than that urged by the Government. They only show that the ALJ 17 does not need to include mild mental limitations in the RFC; they do not state that the 18 ALJ need not consider mild mental limitations in the RFC at all. See, e.g. Woods v. 19 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2022) (rejecting the claimant’s argument that the 20 ALJ erred by not assessing mental limitations because “[t]he ALJ’s assessment of her 21 [RFC] expressly reflected these limitations”); Alexander v. O’Malley, No. 23-55213, 22 2024 WL 612877, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2024) (rejecting the claimant’s argument 23 because the claimant failed to “identify any evidence that the ALJ did not consider” in 24 the RFC); Hilda V. A. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:22-CV-01064, 2023 WL 1107867, at *4 (C.D. 25 Cal. Jan 30, 2023) (rejecting the claimant’s argument because the ALJ is not required to 26 “include any functional restrictions in a claimant’s RFC due to mild mental limitations’); 27 Ball v. Colvin, No. CV 14-2110, 2015 WL 2345652, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2015) 28 (rejecting the claimant’s argument because “the ALJ did consider [the plaintiff]’s mild 1 mental limitations in formulating her RFC”). The ALJ’s decision is therefore not 2 supported by circuit caselaw and does not have a reasonable basis in law and fact. 3 4 B. Ms. Hampton’s Requested Fees are Unreasonable 5 Ms. Hampton requests $11,770.69 for 48 hours of work performed by Ms. Gerrard 6 and $405 in filing fees. (Motion at 1:23–26.) The Government contends the amount of 7 time expended is “unreasonable and excessive,” particularly regarding the “41.4 hours” 8 that Ms. Gerrard spent on the opening brief. (Opp’n at 10:2–5.) The Government also 9 argues that Ms. Hampton’s requested fees should be reduced because of her “limited 10 success in this case.” (Id. at 13:22–23.) Both arguments are persuasive. 11 First, Ms. Hampton’s request for 48 hours of work is beyond the twenty-to-forty- 12 hour range “most often requested and granted in social security cases.” Costa v. Comm’r 13 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). While 14 district courts cannot “drastically reduce awards” simply because of this fact, they may 15 still consider it “in determining the reasonableness of a specific fee request.” Id. Ms. 16 Hampton cites cases where EAJA fees were granted for over forty hours of work, but 17 they are factually distinguishable. For example, she cited a case that was identified as 18 “complex and atypical,” with two hearings and ten pages of objections to the Magistrate 19 Judge’s report. Doan v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-00841, 2018 WL 2761733, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 20 June 7, 2018) (“[T]his case was complex and atypical, and despite counsel’s expertise in 21 social security law, required additional legal research and writing.”). In contrast, here, 22 there were no hearings after the administrative stage, and no objections were filed against 23 the Report. Nor is there any other indication that this case is atypical or complex, and 24 there is nothing explaining why the number of hours expended exceeds or falls in the 25 high end of the typical case. 26 Additionally, the Court agrees with the Government’s contention that Ms. 27 Hampton’s request appears excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Although the 28 opening brief was 17 pages, this was primarily due to the odd line and paragraph spacing 1 throughout the brief, as well as the four-and-a-half page-bloc quote of Ms. Hampton’s 2 hearing testimony. (See Pl’s P&A at 3:19–7:25.) In light of these issues, the “argument” 3 section likely takes up no more than 2 or 3 pages of a normal brief. But more importantly, 4 as noted in the Report, most of the issues Ms. Hampton raised in the opening brief were 5 not argued distinctly enough for the Court to seriously consider. For example, with 6 respect to whether the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Ms. 7 Hampton’s statements, the Report noted that “Plaintiff’s arguments consist of a single 8 paragraph and does not substantively address the ALJ’s discussion—she merely contends 9 the ALJ ‘ignored the VA record using the Disability Determination evaluations.’” 10 (Report at 15:17–20, citing Pl’s P&A at 17; see also id. at 18:5–7 (“Aside from this 11 generic reference to [Plaintiff’s] symptoms and treatment, Plaintiff fails to raise specific 12 arguments about why the ALJ’s assessment was erroneous.”).) Similarly, regarding 13 whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Hampton could perform 14 past relevant work, the Report noted that “[o]nce again, Plaintiff’s merits brief contains 15 sparse argument as to why the ALJ’s past relevant work finding is erroneous” and 16 concludes that because “Plaintiff once again fails to develop her arguments ‘specifically 17 and distinctly’” she has not satisfied her burden. (Id. at 22:22–23, 23:11–12.) Finally, 18 regarding whether the ALJ failed to address the medical opinion, the Report commented 19 that the opening brief failed to “identify what part of the administrative record she [was] 20 referring to, nor [did] she articulate specific arguments as to why the ALJ erred by 21 allegedly overlooking this evidence.” (Id. at 26:12–16.) 22 Second, the Government is correct that Ms. Hampton achieved limited success in 23 this case. Of the four grounds raised in the opening brief, Ms. Hampton only succeeded 24 partly on one of the issues, which warranted the remand in this case. (Report at 27:17– 25 24.) Her partly successful claim does not share a “common core of facts” or “related legal 26 theories” with her other arguments. Ibrahim, 912 F.3d at 1172. Ms. Hampton succeeded 27 solely because the ALJ failed to show that he considered her mild mental limitations in 28 the RFC. (Report at 27:17–24.) This failure is unrelated to the other issues regarding 1 || severe impairments, the discrediting of her statements, her ability to perform her past 2 ||relevant work, and the alleged failure to address a medical opinion. (/d. at 4:13—23.) Ms. 3 ||Hampton does not even dispute that “the sole challenge on which [she] prevailed was 4 || unrelated to her other arguments.” (Opp’n 14:23—24.) For these reasons, the Court finds 5 a 40% reduction in her fees is appropriate and thus will award Ms. Hampton 6 $7,062.41 in attorney’s fees. 7 8 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Janiece Hampton’s Application for Attorney’s 10 || Fees and costs is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $7,467.41, which includes her 11 || filing costs of $405. [Doc. 21.] Subject to offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset 12 || Program, payment is to be made directly to Ms. Hampton’s attorney. See Astrue v. 13 || Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592—93 (2010). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 ||Dated: December 16, 2024 \ '6 pe lnLor 17 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 18 Unted States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28