Hammond v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 18, 2019
Docket5:19-cv-00245
StatusUnknown

This text of Hammond v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company (Hammond v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hammond v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company, (W.D. Okla. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

KYLI HAMMOND, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-19-245-D ) LYNDON SOUTHERN INSURANCE ) COMPANY and JUPITER MANAGING ) GENERAL AGENCY, INC., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

Three discovery motions are fully briefed and pending before the Court; they were the subjects of an in-chambers conference of counsel and a hearing held September 24, 2019. The parties were successful in resolving some issues by mutual agreement, as stated on the record at the hearing. The remaining issues were argued and submitted for decision. After careful consideration, the Court rules as follows: 1. Defendants’ Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum [Doc. No. 16], filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(iii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

Defendants assert claims of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection to prohibit the disclosure of records by one of their attorneys, Gary D. Hammond. “The party seeking to assert a privilege has the burden of establishing its applicability.” Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995); accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010). In this diversity case, the claim of attorney-client privilege is governed by Oklahoma law. See Seneca Ins. Co. v. W. Claims, Inc., 774 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2014); Fed. R. Evid. 501. Oklahoma has codified its rules regarding this privilege, which protects “confidential communications made for the

purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2502(B). Defendants’ claim to protect their attorney’s work product is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).1 Upon consideration of the issues presented by the Motion and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to discover the requested documents. Mr. Hammond was engaged to advise Defendants regarding a bankruptcy case that

Plaintiff filed while this lawsuit was pending in state court. Plaintiff seeks to obtain records of communications between Mr. Hammond and his clients or co-counsel regarding this litigation or Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case; any notes he made about the cases; and his time records, billing statements, or records of compensation received for the representation.2 Oklahoma law plainly protects Mr. Hammond’s communications with his clients and co-

counsel regarding the representation. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(1), (5). Federal law protects his case-related notes and materials unless Plaintiff can show a substantial need for them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); see also Frontier, 136 F.3d at 703

1 Defendants also cite state law authorities, but in all federal cases, work product is governed by Rule 26(b)(3). See Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 702 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Unlike the attorney client privilege, the work product privilege is governed, even in diversity cases, by a uniform federal standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).”) (internal quotation omitted).

2 Plaintiff also requests correspondence with the bankruptcy trustee, Douglas Gould. See Pl.’s Notice of Subpoena Duces Tecum, Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 13-1] at 6, topic 3 (ECF page numbering). Although these documents would not be protected, Mr. Hammond testified during his deposition that he only communicated with Mr. Gould by telephone. See Hammond Dep. 100:8-18. Thus, there are no responsive documents to be produced. (Rule 26(b)(3) “protects materials prepared for any litigation . . . as long as they were prepared by or for a party to the subsequent litigation”) (internal quotation omitted,

emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s quest for disclosure focuses on Mr. Hammond’s conduct of contacting the bankruptcy trustee to inquire “about the status of the bankruptcy case and to see if there was a path towards a resolution of the lawsuit,” meaning this case. See Hammond Dep. 62:12-18, 82:1-5. Plaintiff contends this conduct should be considered post-litigation bad faith conduct by Defendant Lyndon Southern Insurance Company, acting through

Mr. Hamond, that was part of a continued investigation of Plaintiff’s insurance claim during the litigation and part of the insurer’s bad faith conduct with respect to the claim. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4, 7, 9-12, 15-16. At bottom, Plaintiff’s position is: “Mr. Hammond was not performing legal work” but was “performing a business act in an attempt to save Defendants money.” Id. at 17.3

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s position regarding Mr. Hammond’s work, which lacks pertinent factual and legal support and is inconsistent with bankruptcy practice. Mr. Gould, as the trustee of Plaintiff’s no-asset, Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, was responsible for evaluating and deciding how to resolve contingent claims against third parties, like the ones

3 Plaintiff has also accused Mr. Hammond of unethical conduct as Defendants’ attorney, allegedly having direct communications with Mr. Gould, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate and a party to this lawsuit, while the estate was represented by Plaintiff’s attorney as special counsel for this case. Notably, Mr. Gould was authorized to act as the estate’s attorney as well. See In re Hammond, Case No. BK-18-12615-SAH, Order Employing Attorney (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2018). However, because Plaintiff does not rely on any alleged ethical violation as a basis for authorizing discovery of privileged materials (see Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 7, 12), the Court need not consider this issue. in this lawsuit. See In re Hammond, BK-18-12615, Pet. (Bankr. W.D. Okla. June 22, 2018) (listing assets of only exempt personal property and the claims in this case); see also In re

Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 636-37 (3d Cir. 2010) (debtor’s disclosure of “contingent assets such as causes of action pursued against another party . . . allows the trustee and the creditors to determine whether to pursue these assets on the creditors’ behalf”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Cadle Co. v. Mims (In re Moore), 608 F.3d 253, 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In a “no-asset” case such as this, litigation claims represent the last prospect of recovery for the estate.”). Mr. Gould was the logical person for Mr. Hammond to call to obtain

information that would assist him in advising Defendants about how to proceed with the defense of this case. Plaintiff points to no facts or evidence suggesting that, when Mr. Hammond called Mr. Gould in November 2018, Mr.

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Related

Cadle Co. v. Mims (In Re Moore)
608 F.3d 253 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Frontier Refining Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co.
136 F.3d 695 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
In Re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
616 F.3d 1172 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
In Re Kane
628 F.3d 631 (Third Circuit, 2010)
In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas. United States
906 F.2d 1485 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Seneca Insurance v. Western Claims, Inc.
774 F.3d 1272 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)
Lindley v. Life Investors Insurance
267 F.R.D. 382 (N.D. Oklahoma, 2010)

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