Hammond v. Gastelo

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: May 20, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00261
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD GIDEON HAMMOND, Case No.: 20cv261-BAS(MSB)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 13 v. FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [ECF NO. 10.] 14 JOSIE GASTELO, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17

18 On May 18, 2020, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion asking the Court to 19 appoint counsel. (See Mot. Appointment Counsel, ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”); see also ECF No. 20 9.) Petitioner claims that he cannot afford an attorney in light of “poverty and the 21 disruption in everyday life from the COVID-19 Pandemic.” (Mot. at 1, 3). Petitioner 22 further alleges that he contacted several attorneys, but was not able to “find a lawyer 23 capable of working with [him].” (Id. at 2-3.) Additionally, Petitioner contends that he 24 lacks legal training, and this case involves complex legal issues. (Id.) 25 I. LEGAL STANDARD 26 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus 27 actions by state prisoners. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.3d 2 in state or federal court). Courts may, however, appoint counsel for financially eligible 3 habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when “the interests of 4 justice so require.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 642 5 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B)); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 6 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (“Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus 7 relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case 8 indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations.”). 9 Courts have discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel, unless an evidentiary 10 hearing is necessary. See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1990); 11 Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728-30 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), courts may exercise their discretion to appoint 13 counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corr. 14 Corp. Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). When assessing 15 whether exceptional circumstances exist, courts must evaluate “the likelihood of the 16 plaintiff’s success on the merits” and “the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in 17 light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 18 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Both of these factors must be reviewed before 19 deciding whether to appoint counsel, and neither factor is individually dispositive. 20 Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 The Court finds that Petitioner has not established the required exceptional 23 circumstances for appointment of counsel. Despite his claimed lack of legal training, 24 Petitioner has sufficiently represented himself to date, and has drafted and submitted 25 numerous documents without the assistance of legal counsel. In addition to the instant 26 motion, Petitioner has submitted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1], a 27 “Notice of Change of Address” [ECF No. 6], and a motion for enlargement of time to file 2 Petition. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming district 3 court’s denial of request for appointment of counsel, where pleadings demonstrated 4 petitioner had “a good understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully 5 and coherently his contentions.”); see also Taa v. Chase Home Fin., No. 5:11–CV–00554 6 EJD, 2012 WL 507430, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (noting a pro se litigant’s lack of 7 legal training and poverty do not constitute exceptional circumstances, because many 8 other litigants face similar difficulties when proceeding pro se). Further, to the extent 9 the current health crisis caused by COVID-19 impacted Plaintiff’s ability to litigate this 10 case, the Court notes that Petitioner is out of custody [see ECF No. 6], and the Court has 11 granted Petitioner’s recent motion for extension of time to file his traverse [see ECF No. 12 8]. The Court also concludes that at this stage in the proceedings, Petitioner has not 13 demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. See Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103; 14 Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. 15 Additionally, the interests of justice do not warrant the appointment of counsel in 16 this case. Courts are required to construe a petition filed by a pro se litigant more 17 liberally than a petition drafted by counsel. See Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 729. “The district 18 court must scrutinize the state court record independently to determine whether the 19 state court procedures and findings were sufficient.” Id. (citations omitted). The 20 Petition contains claims that the Court will be able to properly resolve by reviewing the 21 state court record independently, and the “additional assistance provided by attorneys, 22 while significant, is not compelling.” See id. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 23 appointment of counsel is not warranted. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s 26 motion for appointment of counsel. See LaMere, 827 F.2d at 626 (finding that district 27 court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel, where the pleadings 1 || established that petitioner understood the issues and was able to present his 2 || contentions). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: May 20, 2020

6 Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28