Hammock v. Rizzuto

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 22, 2020
Docket7:20-cv-04175
StatusUnknown

This text of Hammock v. Rizzuto (Hammock v. Rizzuto) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hammock v. Rizzuto, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JESSE HAMMOCK, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-4175 (LLS) ANTHONY RIZZUTO, FOOD SERVICE ORDERTO AMEND ADMINISTRATOR; JOHN PAPAVASILIOU, HEAD COOK, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Sullivan Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Defendants unlawfully removed him from his job at the facility.By order datedJune 2, 2020,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss anIFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis.See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against Anthony Rizzuto, the Food Service Administratorat Sullivan; and John Papavasiliou, the Head Cook. He asserts that on December 14, 2019, at the

recommendation of Papavasiliou, Rizzuto removed him from the position of Special Housing Unit (SHU) cook and placed him in the tray room. Plaintiff claims that the stated reasons for the removal were: (1) he goes on visits; (2) he participates in the Family Reunion Program (FRP); (3) he attends religious services; and (4) he takes his days off from workinstead of working all seven days a week.He asserts that there were no complaints concerning his workperformance, he never had any negative evaluations, and the only time he missed cooking or delivering food was during his participation in the FRP.Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ actions constitute discriminationand “penaliz[e]” him for his religious belief. (ECF No. 2, at 14.) He seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION Prisoners have very limited rights when it comes to prison jobs. A prisoner has no

constitutional liberty interest in a particular job, and can be assigned orremoved from his jobfor almost any reason.Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1987).But a prisoner is protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from discrimination in prison job assignments because of race or religion. See LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1991); Bussey v. Phillips,419 F.Supp.2d 569, 582,588-89 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Plaintiff alleges that he was removed from his preferredposition as SHU cook for discriminatory reasons.But the Constitution does not prohibit the removal of Plaintiff from his job for visiting, participating in FRP,or taking his days off. However, his assertion that he was removed for religious reasons implicatesthe Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause essentially requires that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that he is a member of a suspect or quasi-

suspect class of persons, see Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995); such classes include, but are not limited to, classes identified by race, religion, gender, alienage, or national origin,see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Myers v. Cnty. of Orange, 157 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must also allege facts showing that the defendants have purposefully discriminated against the plaintiff because of hismembership in that class. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 252 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, rev’d and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom.,Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017));Giano, 54 F.3d at 1057. “[P]urposeful discrimination requires more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It instead involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action

because of, not merely in spite of, [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 252 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations in original).Aprisoner asserting anequal protection claim must further allege facts “demonstrat[ing]that his treatment was not ‘reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests.’” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124,129(2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225 (2001)). Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Defendantstreatedhimdifferently from similarly situatedprisoners or intentionally discriminated against him because of his religion.He only assertsthat one of the reasons given for his removal as SHU cook was because he attends religious services, which,coupled with the other reasons given,may suggest a scheduling issue rather than a religious one. He does not allege any facts suggesting any animus on Defendants’ part towardhis religion or that they acted with intent to discriminate against him in particular. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support his assertions that Defendants discriminated against him and penalized him because of his religious beliefs.He therefore failsto state an equal

protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116

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Related

City of New Orleans v. Dukes
427 U.S. 297 (Supreme Court, 1976)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
473 U.S. 432 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Gill v. Mooney
824 F.2d 192 (Second Circuit, 1987)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Bussey v. Phillips
419 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D. New York, 2006)
Shaw v. Murphy
532 U.S. 223 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Phillips v. Girdich
408 F.3d 124 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Turkmen v. Hasty
789 F.3d 218 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Hammock v. Rizzuto, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hammock-v-rizzuto-nysd-2020.