Hammett v. Stern

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 24-5961
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURA LYNN HAMMETT, Nos. 24-3621, 24-5961

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-00605-LL-AHG v.

ELLIS ROY STERN, Esq., an individual; MEMORANDUM* ALAN N. GOLDBERG, Esq., an individual; STERN & GOLDBERG, a California Partnership,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

MARY E. SHERMAN, et. al.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 19, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: RAWLINSON, H.A. THOMAS, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Laura Lynn Hammett (Hammett) appeals the district court’s order granting

the renewed motion for attorneys’ fees filed by Ellis Roy Stern, Alan N. Goldberg,

and their law firm, Stern & Goldberg under California’s anti-strategic lawsuit

against public participation (SLAPP) law. Hammett also appeals the district

court’s order denying her motion for a stay pending appeal. We review a district

court’s decision to grant an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and its award of attorneys’

fees for abuse of discretion. See Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. Cnty.

of San Diego, 655 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). We also review for abuse of

discretion the decision to deny a stay. See Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088, 1093

(9th Cir. 2023). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the renewed

motion for attorneys’ fees. Under California’s anti-SLAPP provision, “a

prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that

defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1); see

also Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2001). We upheld the district

court’s initial fee award in a separately filed memorandum disposition. See

Hammett v. Sherman, No. 22-56003, 2026 WL 1365271, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15,

2026).

A prevailing party is entitled to “compensation for all hours reasonably

2 24-3621 spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim.” Serrano v.

Unruh, 652 P.2d 985, 997 (Cal. 1982) (in bank); see also Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 742

(applying Serrano to anti-SLAPP motions). Here, the district court applied the

lodestar method, and determined that the additional hours spent defeating

Hammett’s interlocutory appeal and motions challenging the initial fee award were

reasonable.

Hammett does not challenge the calculation of the amount of fees. Rather,

Hammett maintains that no fees should have been awarded, and that the award is

unconstitutionally oppressive under Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., 51 F.4th 1109 (9th

Cir. 2022).1 Wakefield held that an award of nearly one billion dollars in aggregate

statutory damages for sending robocalls was possibly “wholly disproportioned”

and “obviously unreasonable” in relation to the statute’s “compensatory or

deterrence goals.” See id. at 1120, 1122-23. Unlike in Wakefield, here the district

court ensured through its lodestar analysis that the fee award was reasonable.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Manufactured

Home Communities, 655 F.3d at 1181.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hammett’s

1 Hammett raised her Wakefield argument before the district court in her opposition to the renewed motion for attorneys’ fees. The district court rejected this argument in its fee order, finding Wakefield inapposite because it did not involve attorneys’ fees or anti-SLAPP assertions.

3 24-3621 motion to stay. “A district court abuses its discretion in granting or denying a stay

if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence.” Duke, 64 F.4th at 1093 (citation, alteration, and

internal quotation marks omitted). The district court applied the four-factor

standard described in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425-26 (2009), and

determined that Hammett was unlikely to succeed on the merits because she raised

the same arguments the district court had already rejected in deciding the fee

award, and a decrease in Hammett’s credit score did not establish irreparable harm.

See Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1006-07, 1014 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing

Nken and explaining that failure to satisfy the irreparable harm and likelihood of

success factors supports denial of a stay).

Neither did the district court abuse its discretion by setting a bond amount at

1.25 times the total attorneys’ fee amount because that bond amount is consistent

with amounts set by other courts in this circuit, and was calculated to cover the

judgment in addition to interest or other costs. See Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic

Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended; see also

Trautt v. Keystone RV Co., No. 2:19-CV-00342-RAJ, 2021 WL 4860810, at *2

(W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2021) (collecting cases).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-3621