Hamis Athoman Chande v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 18, 2013
Docket10-12-00417-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Hamis Athoman Chande v. State (Hamis Athoman Chande v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hamis Athoman Chande v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-12-00417-CR

HAMIS ATHOMAN CHANDE, Appellant v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

From the 19th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2012-338-C1

ABATEMENT ORDER

On March 11, 2013, this Court received appellant Hamis Athoman Chande’s

“Motion for Self-Representation.” In this motion, appellant seeks to waive his right to

counsel pursuant to article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f)-(g) (West Supp. 2012). In doing so, appellant

asserts that his appellate counsel has failed to file a motion for new trial at appellant’s

request, meet with appellant, and communicate with appellant. The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to

represent oneself on appeal. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate

District, 528 U.S. 152, 163, 120 S. Ct. 684, 692, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000); see Fewins v. State,

170 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, order) (clarifying that “article I, section 10 of

the Texas Constitution does not confer the right of self-representation afforded by the

Sixth Amendment under Faretta.” (emphasis in original)). However, a criminal

defendant does have a statutory right to self-representation on appeal. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(d)(1); see also Sickles v. State, 170 S.W.3d 298, 299 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2005, order). But the right to represent oneself on appeal cannot be used

as a tactic to delay the disposition of a proceeding or to create an issue when there is

none. See Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Webb v. State, 533

S.W.2d 780, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834

n.46, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (“The right of self-representation is not

a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply

with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus, whatever else may or may

not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot

thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of

‘effective assistance of counsel’”).

On the other hand, subsection f of article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure authorizes a criminal defendant to waive his right to appointed counsel, so

long as the waiver is made “voluntarily and intelligently” and “in writing.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(f). Once the right to self-representation is asserted, the trial

Chande v. State Page 2 judge must inform the defendant about “the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation,” so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his

choice is made with eyes open. Id. art. 1.051(g). If the court determines that the

criminal defendant has voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, the

court shall require him to execute a written waiver of counsel which substantially

complies with article 1.051(g). Id.

In the instant case, the trial court appointed Charles W. McDonald to represent

appellant on appeal. And as mentioned above, appellant has filed a motion in this

Court asserting his right to self-representation. Accordingly, we abate and remand this

cause for the trial court to administer the appropriate admonishments under subsection

g of article 1.051 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and to determine whether

appellant competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel.1 See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051(g).

The trial court shall conduct the hearing within twenty-eight (28) days after the

date of this order. The trial court clerk and court reporter shall file supplemental

records within forty-two (42) days after the date of this order.

PER CURIAM

1 Other than abating and remanding this cause for further consideration by the trial court, we do not explicitly rule on any of the filed motions in this case. Accordingly, these motions will be carried with the case at this time.

Chande v. State Page 3 Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Appeal abated Order issued and filed April 18, 2013 Do not publish [CR25]

Chande v. State Page 4

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Related

Faretta v. California
422 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Fewins v. State
170 S.W.3d 293 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Sickles v. State
170 S.W.3d 298 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Webb v. State
533 S.W.2d 780 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1976)
Hubbard v. State
739 S.W.2d 341 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1987)

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Hamis Athoman Chande v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamis-athoman-chande-v-state-texapp-2013.