Hamilton Township v. Estate of Lyons

8 N.J. Tax 112
CourtNew Jersey Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 14, 1986
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 8 N.J. Tax 112 (Hamilton Township v. Estate of Lyons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hamilton Township v. Estate of Lyons, 8 N.J. Tax 112 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986).

Opinion

LARIO, J.T.C.

The question raised in this case is whether the interruption of an agricultural use by reason of excavation and sale of mineral materials, with the intent to resume the agricultural activity at a future date after the excavation ceases, is sufficient to trigger the farmland roll-back assessment provisions of N.J. S.A. 54:4-23.8.

The taxing district’s assessor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.9 and N.J.S.A. 54:4-63.12, et seq. filed an application with the Mercer County Board of Taxation for farmland roll-back assessments against the subject property in the sum of $35,900 for the tax year 1984 and each of the two prior years. After hearing, the county board issued its judgment denying the roll-back assessments whereupon the taxing district filed this appeal. In these proceedings, the quantum of assessment is not disputed; the sole question being whether the taxing district is entitled to application of roll-back tax assessments.

[115]*115The parties have stipulated the following facts: The property in question is owned by the Estate of Margaret C. Lyons and consists of 71.8 acres of unimproved land situated on the Yardville-Allentown Road in Hamilton Township, Mercer County, and is identified on the tax map as Block 625, Lot 10Q.

For the tax years 1982, 1983 and 1984, which are the tax years at issue in this litigation, 70 of the 71.8 acres were qualified and assessed as farmland under the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964. On July 27, 1983, pursuant to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1, el seq., the taxpayer filed an application for valuation, assessment and taxation of land under the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964 with the assessor of Hamilton Township which application was approved on October 1, 1983. The approved application alleged that 70 acres were devoted to agricultural or horticultural use, with 1.8 acres of the total parcel not being devoted to such use. Of the 1.8 acres which were not qualified, 1.3 of those acres consisted of lands which had for years been devoted to a mining operation, from which certain gravels and other mineral materials were excavated.

During the calendar year 1984, the excavation operation on the subject property expanded, and an additional 14.12 acres of previously-qualified farmland was placed under excavation for the purpose of extracting mineral materials. The taxpayer does not question the right of the taxing authority to remove the 14.12 acres being excavated for mineral materials from farmland qualification for as long as the excavation continues on that portion of the property. Taxpayer does contend, however, and the municipality cannot dispute, that the taxpayer intends to return the property under excavation to agricultural use as soon as the excavation for mineral materials ceases.

Plaintiff presented no additional evidence, relying upon the facts stipulated. Other particulars not stipulated between the parties but alleged by defendants to merit consideration and which were presented at the trial are as follows: The son of Margaret C. Lyons, deceased, testified that he is the co-executor and co-trustee of his mother’s estate; that he was born and [116]*116raised on the farm in question; and, that it had been utilized as a farm for all of his 65 years. There are 22 heirs, of which five are recipients of the income, and the remaining 17 will receive the corpus. He stated that the land, which had many high and low elevations, consisted of much clay. The low land accumulated water which interfered with its use for farming. In order to get the proper drainage for the low spots, thereby improving the land for the raising of better crops, for many years the soil from the high places was removed and transferred to the low portions.

In 1976 defendants filed a plan with the Mercer County Soil Erosion Control District, which was approved, showing elevation of the ground before and after, with the intent that upon completion the land would be basically level and the altered portion would be temporarily seeded and returned to farmland.

Over the years defendants did not actually perform the major leveling but instead it was done by general highway contractors and others to whom the road materials were sold. The extent of the mineral extraction that took place during those years depended upon the need in the area for the kind of fill that existed on this land. The only time the removal of a large amount of material occurred (or can be expected to occur) was when a highway was being constructed nearby.

For a period of 15 to 20 years prior to 1983 approximately one and one-third acres at a time was open. In 1983 and continuing into 1984, because of the construction of nearby highways 1-95 and 1-295, defendants entered into a contract with Hess Brothers, a highway contractor.1 The contract resulted in the expansion of the mineral excavation operation to approximately 14.12 acres. Physical excavation and removal of the minerals from the property were done completely by the contractor who thereafter also leveled the ground. During 1984 Hess Brothers was the sole contractor, but in some previous years there were [117]*117as many as 10 to 15 different contractors who removed smaller loads of material.

In 1984 the total land area, upon which there was no agricultural growth, was that excavated area, which approximated 16 acres. When the mineral extraction process on these 16 acres is completed, it is defendants’ intention that all of the property will be farmed.

The operative statute controlling the issue addressed in this matter is N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.8, referred to as the roll-back statute which directs:

When land which is in agricultural or horticultural use and is being valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act, is applied to a use other than agricultural or horticultural, it shall be subject to additional taxes, hereinafter referred to as roll-back taxes.

It is the municipality’s position that excavation of any portion of the subject property for the purposes contracted by the estate sufficiently changes the use of the land so excavated to subject that portion to the provisions of the roll-back statute.

Contrary thereto, taxpayers contend that a temporary interruption of an agricultural use with the intention of resuming agricultural purposes is not sufficient to trigger the roll-back provisions of the statute, since the primary use of the subject parcel remains agricultural and the excavation of mineral materials represents only a temporary deviation from that use rather than a change in use as contemplated by the statute. Defendants claim this interpretation is especially true when the change, besides being temporary, will also have the ultimate effect of providing the State with lands more valuable for agricultural purposes, one of the primary purposes of the act.

To bolster their position defendants point to a lack of conversion for residential or commercial development or of pure speculation and it emphasizes the present intention of the owners to return the property to agricultural use. In support of its contention that the Legislature has incorporated the roll-back tax provisions into the act in order to protect municipalities from land speculation, they rely upon Gardiner v. State, 196 N.J.Super. 529, 532, 483 A.2d 442 (Law.Div.1984),

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Township of Wantage v. Rivlin Corp.
23 N.J. Tax 441 (New Jersey Tax Court, 2007)
Wilson v. Hopewell Township
23 N.J. Tax 240 (New Jersey Tax Court, 2006)
Alpha-Bella VI, Inc. v. Clinton Township
14 N.J. Tax 597 (New Jersey Tax Court, 1995)
Rossi v. Upper Pittsgrove Township
12 N.J. Tax 235 (New Jersey Tax Court, 1992)
Angelini v. Township of Upper Freehold
8 N.J. Tax 644 (New Jersey Tax Court, 1987)
South Brunswick Township v. Bellemead Development Corp.
8 N.J. Tax 616 (New Jersey Tax Court, 1987)
Burlington Township v. Messer
8 N.J. Tax 274 (New Jersey Tax Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 N.J. Tax 112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hamilton-township-v-estate-of-lyons-njtaxct-1986.