IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Jul 03 2025, 9:27 am Hamilton National Title LLC, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Defendant Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
Linda Rothrock Jurus, Appellee-Plaintiff
July 3, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PL-2872 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D03-2202-PL-40
Opinion by Judge Bailey Judges Brown and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 1 of 16 Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary [1] In 2015, Linda Rothrock Jurus entered into a land contract to sell her property,
but she reserved a life estate. Jurus hired Hamilton National Title LLC
(“Hamilton”) to prepare the closing documents, including a warranty deed.
After the purchaser of Jurus’ property died, his beneficiary transferred the
property to herself without mention of the life estate. Jurus discovered that the
2015 warranty deed did not contain the life estate. In a separate lawsuit, Jurus
filed a complaint against the beneficiary and asked the trial court to reform the
warranty deed to include the life estate. The court ruled in favor of Jurus. The
beneficiary appealed, and this Court affirmed.
[2] Thereafter, in 2022, Jurus filed a complaint for breach of contract against
Hamilton in the instant case, and she sought to recover almost $27,000 that she
had spent in the lawsuit against the beneficiary and the related appeal.
Hamilton filed a motion to dismiss and alleged that Jurus’ complaint was one
for legal malpractice and was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The
court found that the claim was one for breach of a written contract subject to a
ten-year statute of limitations and denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, Jurus filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted. Hamilton now appeals. We affirm.
Issues [3] Hamilton raises the following three issues for our review: Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 2 of 16 1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss.
2. Whether the court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of Jurus.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Jurus prejudgment interest.
Facts and Procedural History [4] Jurus owned approximately ten acres of land in Goshen. In July 2014, Jurus
entered into a land contract with Joe Bailey. Pursuant to that contract, Bailey
agreed to purchase the real estate for $155,000, to be paid in monthly
installments beginning on August 1, 2014, and ending on July 31, 2019.
However, the parties agreed that Jurus would “retain[] a life estate in the real
estate upon which is erected the main residence[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at
33 (emphasis removed). The contract also included a clause that, upon
successful completion of the conditions of the contract by Bailey, Jurus would
convey a warranty deed, subject to her “life estate[.]” Id.
[5] In early 2015, Bailey informed Jurus that he wished to pay the balance due on
the contract. Jurus hired Hamilton to prepare the closing documents. On April
9, 2015, Jurus and Bailey closed on the sale of the land. At closing, the parties
signed a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
Settlement Statement that listed a fee of $60.00 for “Deed and Affidavit
Preparation.” Id. at 39. Hamilton also presented an American Land Title
Association (“ALTA”) commitment form that identified the parties and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 3 of 16 described the land and included a section on “Special Exceptions” that
specifically noted the “[r]ights, terms, provisions, conditions, and limitations
contained in the contract of sale (or memorandum of sale) entered into” by
Jurus and Bailey. Id. at 45. Hamilton also presented Jurus with a warranty
deed. The deed included a statement that it was “in full and final satisfaction of
the Memorandum of Land Contract entered into by” Jurus and Bailey, but it
did not include the life estate. Id. at 52. Jurus signed that warranty deed.
Following the sale, Jurus and Bailey continued to act pursuant to the terms of
the land contract, with Jurus living on the property and paying certain bills.
[6] In May 2018, Bailey died. Becky Cutter, Bailey’s personal representative,
opened Bailey’s estate. Sometime between October 31 and November 25, 2018,
Jurus obtained a copy of the 2015 warranty deed and discovered that the life
estate had not been included. Then, on April 10, 2019, Cutter executed a
personal representative’s deed and conveyed the real estate to herself, without
reference to Jurus’ life interest. When Jurus learned of the execution of Cutter’s
deed, she asked Cutter to execute a quitclaim deed that contained the life estate,
but Cutter refused.
[7] On January 15, 2020, Jurus filed a complaint for reformation of instruments
against Cutter and alleged that the warranty deed prepared by Hamilton had
“erroneously omitted an explicit reservation of a life estate” for Jurus.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 88. And Jurus asked the court to reform both her
2015 warranty deed to Bailey and Cutter’s deed to herself. Jurus and Cutter
then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its order, the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 4 of 16 found that the evidence demonstrated that Bailey “intended for [Jurus] to retain
a life estate in the real estate[.]” Id. at 116. The court further found that the
“A.L.T.A. Commitment, Schedule B Part II (Exceptions) at paragraph 15,
specifically provides that the policy or policies of insurance to be issued will
contain” as an exception the conditions contained in the contract of sale. Id.
Accordingly, the court concluded that “the person who drafted the Warranty
Deed erred by omitting from the Warranty Deed a reservation by [Jurus] of her
life estate which was emphatically included in the referenced contract.” Id. The
court then entered summary judgment in favor of Jurus and ordered that the
deeds be reformed to include the life estate.
[8] Cutter appealed and argued that the trial court should have entered summary
judgment in her favor because the intentions of Jurus and Bailey ought to have
been understood from the 2015 warranty deed alone and not any prior contract.
See Cutter v. Jurus, 177 N.E.3d 492, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). This Court
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the parties’
intentions and affirmed the trial court. In total, Jurus spent $26,979.51 in costs
and attorney’s fees in order to get the deeds reformed and to defend the appeal.
[9] On February 24, 2022, Jurus filed a complaint against Hamilton in the instant
cause and alleged that Hamilton “had a contractual duty . . . to prepare a deed
that would convey the real estate to Bailey but reserve to her a life estate as
provided in” the contract for the sale of the land. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 29.
She further alleged that Hamilton had “breached its contract with Jurus when it
omitted a reservation for her of a life estate from the deed it prepared for the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 5 of 16 closing[.]” Id. And Jurus maintained that, “[o]n account of Hamilton’s breach
of contract,” she “had been damaged in the amount of the legal expenses she
had incurred in order to correct” the erroneous deed. Id. at 30. Jurus attached to
her complaint a copy of the sales agreement between her and Bailey, the HUD
settlement statement, the ALTA commitment form, and the sales disclosure
form.
[10] Hamilton filed a motion to dismiss and asserted that Jurus’ claim, while framed
as one for breach of contract, “sound[ed] in legal malpractice because it
involve[d] allegations that Hamilton negligently drafted the warranty deed.” Id.
at 70. And Hamilton asserted that legal malpractice claims are subject to a two-
year statute of limitations, such that Jurus’ claim, which she filed seven years
after she signed the warranty deed, was untimely.
[11] Jurus responded that her claim was not for legal malpractice because she was
not a client of the attorney who prepared the deed. She asserted that her cause
of action was based on a contract she had entered into with Hamilton to
prepare a deed that was consistent with the sales contract. And she maintained
that, because her cause of action was one for breach of contract, a ten-year
statute of limitations applied and her complaint was not time-barred. The trial
court found that breach of contract was the “proper theory” for Jurus’ claim
because the settlement statement constituted a written contract and that her
complaint was subject to a ten-year statute of limitations. Id. at 20. Accordingly,
the court denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 6 of 16 [12] Hamilton filed its answer and, as an affirmative defense, again asserted that
Jurus’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Jurus then filed a motion
for summary judgment and argued that there was no genuine issue of material
fact and that Hamilton had breached its contract with her.
[13] In its order, the court noted that it had “already determined that [Jurus] entered
into a written contract with [Hamilton]” pursuant to which Hamilton was
required to “obtain and present for use at the closing a Warranty Deed
consistent with a contract for sale and purchase of real estate.” Id. at 23. The
court then found that “the evidence establishes that [Hamilton] breached its
contract with [Jurus] by tendering a defective deed” and that Hamilton’s breach
caused Jurus to incur expenses in order to “engage in litigation with a third
party to protect her interests.” Id. at 24. As such, the court granted Jurus’
motion for summary judgment and awarded her $26,979.51 “plus prejudgment
interest on that amount from February 24, 2022[.]” Id. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision Issue One: Motion to Dismiss
[14] Hamilton first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied Hamilton’s
Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Jurus’ complaint. As the Indiana
Supreme Court has stated:
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief. See Kitco, Inc. v. Corp. for Gen.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 7 of 16 Trade, 706 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.
A court should “accept[] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,” Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and should not only “consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but also “draw every reasonable inference in favor of [the non-moving] party.” Newman v. Deiter, 702 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
Trail v. Boys & Girls Club of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006)
(alterations in original).
[15] Hamilton contends that the trial court erred when it denied Hamilton’s motion
to dismiss because Jurus filed her complaint after the statute of limitations had
run. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [upon] which relief [can]
be granted is an appropriate means of raising the statute of limitations.” Brown
v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 85 N.E.3d 866, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[16] Hamilton specifically asserts that Jurus’ claim, while identified as one for
breach of contract, is actually a claim for legal malpractice, which is subject to a
two-year statute of limitations. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. And it is clear from the
complaint that Jurus filed her complaint more than two years after Hamilton
had prepared the deed. Jurus responds and maintains that her complaint is one
for breach of a written contract, which is subject to a ten-year statute of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 8 of 16 limitations, and that she filed her claim well within that time frame. I.C. § 34-
11-2-11.
[17] It is well settled that the “‘nature or substance of the cause of action, rather than
the form of the action, determines the applicable statute of limitations.’” Sollers
Point Co. v. Zeller, 145 N.E.3d 790, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting King v.
Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Thus, to determine which
statute of limitations applies, we must determine the substance of Jurus’
complaint. Hamilton alleges that the nature or substance of Jurus’ complaint is
legal malpractice because the warranty deed was prepared by an attorney,
which is required under Indiana law. See State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass’n v.
Northouse, 848 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind. 2006). As such, Hamilton maintains that
“the true nature of Jurus’ action is one for recovery predicated on acts of
malpractice.” Appellant’s Br. at 31. We cannot agree.
[18] Indiana’s rules of notice pleading do not require the complaint to state all
elements of a cause of action, but the plaintiff must still plead the operative facts
necessary to set forth an actionable claim. State v. Am. Fam. Voices, Inc., 898
N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 2008). And, here, Hamilton’s complaint sufficiently
stated a claim for breach of contract.
[19] “A contract is ‘an agreement between two or more parties creating obligations
that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.’” West Am. Ins. Co. v.
Cates, 865 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 318 (7th ed. 2001)). Jurus attached to her complaint the HUD
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 9 of 16 settlement statement, which demonstrates that she paid Hamilton $60.00 for
“Deed and Affidavit Preparation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39. Jurus also
attached the special exceptions section of the ALTA commitment which
specifically referenced the “[r]ights, terms, provisions, conditions, and
limitations contained in the contract for sale” entered into by Jurus and Bailey.
Id. at 45. And she attached the sales contract, which specifically provided that
Jurus would “retain[] a life estate in the real estate[.]” Id. at 33 (emphasis
removed). Thus, Jurus claimed that she agreed to pay Hamilton money, and, in
exchange, Hamilton agreed to draft closing documents, including a warranty
deed that met Jurus’ requirements. Those are allegations that state a claim that
a contract existed.
[20] Stated differently, the face of Jurus’ complaint and attached documents show
that she agreed to pay money to Hamilton and, by accepting that money,
Hamilton agreed to prepare a warranty deed that met Jurus’ requirements. It is
of no moment that the deed was drafted by one of Hamilton’s attorneys. Jurus
claimed that Hamilton agreed to draft an accurate deed consistent with the land
contract. And Jurus claimed that Hamilton failed to hold up its end of the
bargain when it did not draft a warranty deed that included the life estate,
which is a claim for breach of contract.
[21] Because Jurus’ complaint was one for breach of a written contract, the
applicable statute of limitations is ten years. See I.C. § 34-11-2-11. And Jurus
filed her complaint against Hamilton on February 24, 2022. Even assuming that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 10 of 16 the applicable date that the statute began to run was April 9, 2015, 1 Jurus filed
her complaint well within that ten-year limit. As such, the trial court did not err
when it denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss.
Issue Two: Summary Judgment
[22] Hamilton next asserts that the trial court erred when it entered summary
judgment in favor of Jurus. The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that
[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non- moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the
1 The parties dispute whether the discovery rule applies and whether the statute began to run when Jurus signed the defective warranty deed on April 9, 2015, or when she discovered that the deed was defective in October or November 2018. Since we hold that the applicable statute of limitations is ten years, we need not decide which date is correct as both dates fall within the required time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 11 of 16 grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (omission and some
alterations original to Hughley).
[23] Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its
summary judgment order. While such findings and conclusions are not required
in a summary judgment and do not alter our standard of review, they are
helpful on appeal for us to understand the reasoning of the trial
court. See Knighten v. E. Chicago Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015).
[24] On appeal, Hamilton challenges the court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of Jurus on her claim for breach of contract. To prevail on that claim,
Jurus was required to prove the existence of a contract, that Hamilton breached
the contract, and damages therefrom. Old Nat’l Bank v. Kelly, 31 N.E.3d 522,
531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Here, Hamilton contends that Jurus did
not prove the existence of a contract. Specifically, Hamilton contends that,
“[f]or all practical purposes,” the HUD settlement statement “functions as a
receipt.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. Hamilton further contends that there “is no
language in the Settlement Statement instructing Hamilton to draft a deed with
an express life interest.” Id. at 40. And Hamilton maintains that Jurus’
designated materials do not “eliminate all doubt surrounding what she and
Hamilton contracted for[.]” Id. at 45. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 12 of 16 [25] However, Jurus designated as evidence the HUD settlement statement, the
ALTA commitment form, and the sales contract between her and Bailey. And
the HUD settlement statement demonstrates that Jurus paid Hamilton $60.00
for “Deed and Affidavit Preparation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39. Further,
the special exceptions section of the ALTA commitment form specifically
referenced the “[r]ights, terms, provisions, conditions, and limitations contained
in the contract for sale” entered into by Jurus and Bailey. Id. at 45. And the
sales contract specifically provides that Jurus would “retain[] a life estate in the
real estate[.]” Id. at 33 (emphasis removed).
[26] Thus, contrary to Hamilton’s assertions, Jurus’ designated evidence outlines the
terms of the contract clearly. Jurus agreed to pay Hamilton a sum of money in
exchange for Hamilton drafting a warranty deed that included the life estate. As
such, Jurus met her burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
fact as to a determinative issue. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. That is, Jurus’
designated evidence showed the existence of a contract. In addition, the
designated evidence showed that Hamilton breached that contract when it
failed to prepare an accurate warranty deed and that Jurus was harmed by that
breach when she had to incur legal expenses to correct the deed.
[27] Jurus’ designated evidence showed an absence of a genuine issue of material
fact regarding her breach-of-contract claim. At that point, the burden shifted to
Hamilton to come forward with contrary evidence. But Hamilton did not
designate any evidence to the trial court to refute Jurus’ evidence regarding the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 13 of 16 existence of the contract, Hamilton’s breach, or Jurus’ harm. As such, the court
did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor of Jurus.2
Issue Three: Prejudgment Interest
[28] Finally, Hamilton contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered Hamilton to pay prejudgment interest. When reviewing a decision
regarding an award of prejudgment interest, “our standard of review is for an
abuse of discretion, focusing on the trial court’s threshold determination as to
whether the facts satisfy the test for making such an award.” Bopp v. Brames, 713
N.E.2d 866, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Further,
an award of prejudgment interest in a contract action is warranted if the amount of the claim rests upon a simple calculation and the terms of the contract make such a claim ascertainable. The test for determining whether an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate is whether the damages are complete and may be ascertained as of a particular time. The award is considered proper when the trier of fact need not exercise its judgment to assess the amount of damages.
Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(internal citations omitted).
2 In this issue, Hamilton again asserts that Jurus’ claim was barred by a statute of limitations. However, that claim is predicated on Hamilton’s argument that Jurus did not prove the existence of a written contract. Because we hold that the designated evidence proves that there was a contract between Jurus and Hamilton, we reiterate that the court correctly applied a ten-year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 14 of 16 [29] Here, the designated evidence shows that Jurus incurred almost $27,000 in legal
fees in order to reform the deeds and to defend an appeal in 2021 and 2022,
which fees were incurred only because of Hamilton’s error in drafting the
warranty deed. Thus, it is apparent that the trial court was not required to
exercise any discretion in determining the amount Hamilton owed to Jurus, and
there was no dispute as to what that amount was. As a result, Jurus was entitled
to prejudgment interest.
Conclusion [30] The trial court did not err when it denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss because
the face of Jurus’ complaint asserted that a written contract existed and that it
was breached such that her claim was subject to a ten-year statute of limitations
applicable to written contracts. The court also did not err when it entered
summary judgment in favor of Jurus because the designated evidence
demonstrated that a written contract existed between Jurus and Hamilton, that
Hamilton breached the contract, and that Jurus was harmed by that breach.
And the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Jurus prejudgment
interest. We therefore affirm the trial court.
[31] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 15 of 16 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Scott J. Fandre David M. Johnson Krieg DeVault LLP Mishawaka, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE John William Davis, Jr. Davis & Roose Goshen, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-2872 | July 3, 2025 Page 16 of 16