Halverson v. Barclays Services LLC

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 BRIAN HALVERSON, Case No. 2:25-cv-00939-APG-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 BARCLAYS SERVICES LLC,

8 Defendant.

9 10 Pending before the Court are three overlapping Motions filed by Plaintiff. These Motions 11 include requests for a protective order, to limit communication, and to compel rules of professional 12 conduct. ECF Nos. 24, 25, 26. Plaintiff complains that an email sent by defense counsel asking 13 whether he would agree to arbitrate his claims included notice that Defendant would seek attorney’s 14 fees if forced to file a motion to compel arbitration. See ECF Nos. 24 at 3, 24-1 at 1.1 Plaintiff also 15 complains about a phone number on which he was called, the alleged tone of communications, and 16 various issues demonstrating some lack of understanding regarding the EEOC process that preceded 17 the case in court. ECF No. 24, generally 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) permits the Court to issue a protective order provided “[t]he motion 19 … include[s] a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with 20 other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” Further, Rule 21 26(c) requires the moving party to show good cause for the relief requested. Id. When “good cause” 22 is shown, the Court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 23 oppression, or undue burden or expense ….” Id. “To establish good cause, a party seeking 24 a protective order must set forth particular and specific demonstrations of fact, as distinguished from 25 stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Collins v. City & County of San Francisco, Case Nos. 13– 26 cv–03456–MEJ, 13–cv–05286–MEJ, 14–cv–01429–MEJ, 2014 WL 7665248, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27 30, 2014) (internal citations omitted). 1 The allegations made by Plaintiff do not warrant a protective order. The Court’s review of 2 written communication demonstrates defense counsel used a professional tone, engaged in no abuse, 3 and made no threats. ECF No. 24-1. While defense counsel advises Plaintiff of an intent to seek 4 attorney’s fees, there is nothing improper about doing so under the circumstances and in the manner 5 done here. Id. Further, calling a wrong number or being unavailable at the moment Plaintiff called 6 during a two hour window provided for a meet and confer, as alleged by Plaintiff (ECF No. 24 at 3), 7 do not establish improper conduct by defense counsel. 8 The Court understands Plaintiff may be frustrated with the litigation process. Litigation can 9 be complicated. There are many Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with which Plaintiff is 10 undoubtedly unfamiliar. Plaintiff also demonstrates some lack of familiarity with the process 11 frequently engaged in when attempting to file a stipulation,2 as well as the EEOC pre-litigation 12 mediation process that does not include arbitration. There is no Rule of Professional Responsibility 13 or other duty of which the Court is aware that imposes on defense counsel an obligation to advise an 14 opposing party that he or she is subject to arbitration based on an agreement that party signed. 15 In sum, the Court finds no basis for a protective order; no support for Plaintiff’s contention 16 that defense counsel violated any rule governing professional conduct; and no reason limit 17 communications between the parties. Professionalism, cordiality, and cooperation are required, but 18 these standards appear to be largely met. 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions for Protective Order, to 20 Limit Communication, and to Compel Rules of Professional Conduct (ECF Nos. 24, 25, 26) are 21 DENIED. 22 Dated this 14th day of August, 2025. 23

24 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26

27 2 Sending a proposed stipulation in a format that allows editing such as Microsoft Word, rather than in a PDF, is