2026 IL App (1st) 242466-U No. 1-24-2466 Order filed March 20, 2026 Fifth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ MERSID HALVADZIC, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2023 M1 125620 ) ELITE SALES AND SERVICE, INC., ) Honorable ) Jim Ryan Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Wilson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where plaintiff failed to present a sufficiently complete record on appeal for our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of defendant.
¶2 Plaintiff Mersid Halvadzic appeals pro se from a trial court order entering judgment, after
trial, in favor of defendant, Elite Sales and Service, Inc. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial
court improperly denied him relief under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (CFDBPA) (815 ILCS § 505/1 et al. (West 2024)) and the implied warranties of No. 1-24-2466
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Because plaintiff failed to present a
sufficiently complete record on appeal for our review, we affirm.
¶3 The following background is derived from the limited record on appeal, which comprises
only the common law record.
¶4 On November 28, 2023, plaintiff filed a pro se small claims complaint against defendant,
alleging it owed him $10,000 because it sold him a vehicle with “engine issues.” Specifically,
plaintiff claimed that on August 22, 2023, he purchased a vehicle from defendant, which
represented the condition as “good.” While plaintiff drove home, a light on the vehicle indicated
inadequate coolant levels. Plaintiff returned the vehicle to defendant the following day. Defendant
told him that it could not resolve the coolant issue and that he must return with the vehicle “in a
couple days.” Before he could return, plaintiff heard a “knocking” sound in the engine. He
attempted to return the vehicle again, but defendant refused to accept the vehicle or fix the problem.
¶5 Plaintiff alleged that prior to filing suit, he reported defendant’s alleged misrepresentations
with the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General. Plaintiff
attached to his complaint a letter from the office of the attorney general, informing him it contacted
defendant, and providing him a copy of defendant’s response. In the response, defendant stated
that when plaintiff first dropped off his vehicle due to the coolant issue, defendant told him that
both vehicle lifts in its garage were in use, and, when a lift was available, defendant would examine
the vehicle. Plaintiff returned and demanded that the issue be fixed immediately. When defendant
refused, again citing the occupied vehicle lifts, plaintiff left with his vehicle.
¶6 On April 15, 2024, defendant answered plaintiff’s complaint, using a standardized form,
and denied his substantive allegations. On the same day, defendant also filed a motion to dismiss
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pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2024)). In the motion, defendant stated that the vehicle was sold to plaintiff “as is” along with a
third-party powertrain warranty. Defendant had acquired the vehicle from auction, where it had no
reported mechanical problems. Defendant stated that plaintiff admitted to “pushing” the vehicle to
test it as a sport car and was advised that the appropriate party to contact regarding the vehicle’s
engine issues was the third-party provider. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed because he did not prove he was entitled to $10,000 in damages. In the alternative,
defendant argued that the doctrine of laches would apply because plaintiff did not timely file a
claim with the servicer of his third-party powertrain warranty.
¶7 On May 3, 2024, plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion to dismiss. He argued that
defendant knowingly sold him a vehicle with a defective engine, and that defendant’s failure to
disclose the defect violated the CFDBPA, and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose. He also argued that laches does not apply because he timely reported the
vehicle’s issues to defendant and defendant did not suffer any prejudice due to his alleged failure
to timely disclose.
¶8 On October 9, 2024, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss that was identical to
the initial motion except for an attached exhibit, a copy of the third-party warranty provided to
plaintiff for the vehicle.
¶9 On October 30, 2024, the trial court entered an order continuing the matter to December 2,
2024, for “trial in person.” The court ordered the parties to “bring their evidence for trial on that
date.”
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¶ 10 On December 2, 2024, the trial court entered a trial call order, noting that plaintiff,
defendant, and counsel for defendant were present. The court entered judgment for defendant
“after trial.” Plaintiff timely appealed.
¶ 11 On November 18, 2025, this court entered an order taking the case on the record and
plaintiff’s pro se brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63
Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1978).
¶ 12 On appeal, plaintiff, citing Totz v. Continental DuPage Acura, 236 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1992),
contends the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of defendant because he presented a
valid legal claim that, under the CFDBPA, a seller is liable for not disclosing material defects that
affect the safety or value of a used vehicle.
¶ 13 As an initial matter, plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with the supreme court rules governing
appellate briefs. For example, plaintiff’s brief lacks an argument section containing citations to the
record on appeal, or to the relevant legal authority to support his claims. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (an appellant’s brief must contain a cohesive legal argument with clearly defined
issues and citations to relevant authority). Plaintiff’s argument section consists, in its entirety, of
the claim that the trial court made a mistake by “Applying law (815 ILCS 505/); Implied
Warranties (810 ILCS 5/2-314 and 5/2-315) [sic].” In addition, although plaintiff’s brief contains
a short statement of facts, it is argumentative and lacks reference to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (statement of facts to be stated “accurately and fairly without
argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal”).
¶ 14 A reviewing court is entitled to briefs that present an organized and coherent legal
argument in accordance with the supreme court rules. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality
-4- No. 1-24-2466
Franchising, Inc. 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001). “It is well established that this court is not
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2026 IL App (1st) 242466-U No. 1-24-2466 Order filed March 20, 2026 Fifth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ MERSID HALVADZIC, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2023 M1 125620 ) ELITE SALES AND SERVICE, INC., ) Honorable ) Jim Ryan Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Wilson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where plaintiff failed to present a sufficiently complete record on appeal for our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of defendant.
¶2 Plaintiff Mersid Halvadzic appeals pro se from a trial court order entering judgment, after
trial, in favor of defendant, Elite Sales and Service, Inc. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial
court improperly denied him relief under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act (CFDBPA) (815 ILCS § 505/1 et al. (West 2024)) and the implied warranties of No. 1-24-2466
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Because plaintiff failed to present a
sufficiently complete record on appeal for our review, we affirm.
¶3 The following background is derived from the limited record on appeal, which comprises
only the common law record.
¶4 On November 28, 2023, plaintiff filed a pro se small claims complaint against defendant,
alleging it owed him $10,000 because it sold him a vehicle with “engine issues.” Specifically,
plaintiff claimed that on August 22, 2023, he purchased a vehicle from defendant, which
represented the condition as “good.” While plaintiff drove home, a light on the vehicle indicated
inadequate coolant levels. Plaintiff returned the vehicle to defendant the following day. Defendant
told him that it could not resolve the coolant issue and that he must return with the vehicle “in a
couple days.” Before he could return, plaintiff heard a “knocking” sound in the engine. He
attempted to return the vehicle again, but defendant refused to accept the vehicle or fix the problem.
¶5 Plaintiff alleged that prior to filing suit, he reported defendant’s alleged misrepresentations
with the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General. Plaintiff
attached to his complaint a letter from the office of the attorney general, informing him it contacted
defendant, and providing him a copy of defendant’s response. In the response, defendant stated
that when plaintiff first dropped off his vehicle due to the coolant issue, defendant told him that
both vehicle lifts in its garage were in use, and, when a lift was available, defendant would examine
the vehicle. Plaintiff returned and demanded that the issue be fixed immediately. When defendant
refused, again citing the occupied vehicle lifts, plaintiff left with his vehicle.
¶6 On April 15, 2024, defendant answered plaintiff’s complaint, using a standardized form,
and denied his substantive allegations. On the same day, defendant also filed a motion to dismiss
-2- No. 1-24-2466
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2024)). In the motion, defendant stated that the vehicle was sold to plaintiff “as is” along with a
third-party powertrain warranty. Defendant had acquired the vehicle from auction, where it had no
reported mechanical problems. Defendant stated that plaintiff admitted to “pushing” the vehicle to
test it as a sport car and was advised that the appropriate party to contact regarding the vehicle’s
engine issues was the third-party provider. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed because he did not prove he was entitled to $10,000 in damages. In the alternative,
defendant argued that the doctrine of laches would apply because plaintiff did not timely file a
claim with the servicer of his third-party powertrain warranty.
¶7 On May 3, 2024, plaintiff responded to defendant’s motion to dismiss. He argued that
defendant knowingly sold him a vehicle with a defective engine, and that defendant’s failure to
disclose the defect violated the CFDBPA, and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose. He also argued that laches does not apply because he timely reported the
vehicle’s issues to defendant and defendant did not suffer any prejudice due to his alleged failure
to timely disclose.
¶8 On October 9, 2024, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss that was identical to
the initial motion except for an attached exhibit, a copy of the third-party warranty provided to
plaintiff for the vehicle.
¶9 On October 30, 2024, the trial court entered an order continuing the matter to December 2,
2024, for “trial in person.” The court ordered the parties to “bring their evidence for trial on that
date.”
-3- No. 1-24-2466
¶ 10 On December 2, 2024, the trial court entered a trial call order, noting that plaintiff,
defendant, and counsel for defendant were present. The court entered judgment for defendant
“after trial.” Plaintiff timely appealed.
¶ 11 On November 18, 2025, this court entered an order taking the case on the record and
plaintiff’s pro se brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63
Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1978).
¶ 12 On appeal, plaintiff, citing Totz v. Continental DuPage Acura, 236 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1992),
contends the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of defendant because he presented a
valid legal claim that, under the CFDBPA, a seller is liable for not disclosing material defects that
affect the safety or value of a used vehicle.
¶ 13 As an initial matter, plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with the supreme court rules governing
appellate briefs. For example, plaintiff’s brief lacks an argument section containing citations to the
record on appeal, or to the relevant legal authority to support his claims. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)
(eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (an appellant’s brief must contain a cohesive legal argument with clearly defined
issues and citations to relevant authority). Plaintiff’s argument section consists, in its entirety, of
the claim that the trial court made a mistake by “Applying law (815 ILCS 505/); Implied
Warranties (810 ILCS 5/2-314 and 5/2-315) [sic].” In addition, although plaintiff’s brief contains
a short statement of facts, it is argumentative and lacks reference to the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (statement of facts to be stated “accurately and fairly without
argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal”).
¶ 14 A reviewing court is entitled to briefs that present an organized and coherent legal
argument in accordance with the supreme court rules. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality
-4- No. 1-24-2466
Franchising, Inc. 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001). “It is well established that this court is not
required to search the record to determine what legal issues are involved in an appeal.” Id.
Plaintiff’s pro se status “does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with appellate rules,” nor
does his use of a form approved by the Illinois Supreme Court, as compliance with these procedural
rules is mandatory. Matlock v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2019 IL App (1st)
180645, ¶¶ 14-15; McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12.
¶ 15 This court may strike a brief or dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the supreme
court rules. Epstein v. Davis, 2017 IL App (1st) 170605, ¶ 22. However, a reviewing court may
review the merits of an appeal despite Rule 341 deficiencies “if the record is simple and the
claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee’s brief.”
Talandis, 63 Ill. 2d at 133.
¶ 16 That said, meaningful review of the merits of plaintiff’s appeal is hindered by the absence
of a report of proceedings. Given the deficient record, we cannot address any of plaintiff’s claims.
¶ 17 To succeed on appeal, plaintiff must establish that the judgment of the trial court was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Longo Realty v. Menard, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st)
151231, ¶¶ 19, 27. “ ‘A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an
opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and not
based on evidence.’ ” Id. ¶ 19 (quoting Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill. App. 3d 151,
154 (2001)).
¶ 18 As the appellant, plaintiff bears the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record to
support a claim of error. Ill. S. Ct. R. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); R. 323 (eff. July 1, 2017); Graves v.
Cook County Republican Party, 2020 IL App (1st) 181516, ¶ 39. Absent such a record, we must
-5- No. 1-24-2466
presume the trial court acted in conformity with the law and with a sufficient factual basis for its
findings. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts arising from the
incompleteness of the record must be resolved against the appellant. Id. at 392. Where the record
on appeal is inadequate to support a claim of error, this court may dismiss an appeal or summarily
affirm the trial court’s judgment. Graves, 2020 IL App (1st) 181516, ¶ 39.
¶ 19 Here, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant after trial. The record on appeal
does not contain a report of proceedings, nor has plaintiff provided an acceptable substitute such
as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a), (c), (d) (eff. July
1, 2017). Although the record reflects that plaintiff filed a proposed bystander’s report directly
with the circuit court, there is no indication that defendant received the proposed report or that the
court certified it. A bystander’s report “may not be included in the record unless it is certified by
the court or unless the parties stipulate to it.” Midwest Bulder Distributing, Inc. v. Lord & Essex,
Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 645, 655 (2007).
¶ 20 Without a report of proceedings or an acceptable substitute, we lack any knowledge of the
evidence, arguments, evidentiary rulings, and objections presented at trial. Therefore, we have no
way of determining whether the trial court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Thus, the record is insufficient for our review of the merits of plaintiff’s appeal. Stated
differently, the inadequate record precludes any opportunity for meaningful review of plaintiff’s
argument that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of defendant on his claim that defendant sold
him, and thereafter refused to repair, a defective automobile such that it is liable under either the
CFDBPA or, in the alternative, under the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
particular purpose.
-6- No. 1-24-2466
¶ 21 Affirmed.
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