Halston O. Lenentine, Jr. and Lorraine K. Downs v. Farm Service Agency

2017 DNH 144

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 26, 2017
• Docket: 15-cv-361-LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Halston O. Lenentine, Jr. and Lorraine K. Downs

v. Civil No. 15-cv-361-LM Opinion No. 2017 DNH 144 Farm Service Agency

O R D E R

Plaintiffs Halston Lenentine and Lorraine Downs brought

suit in state court against the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”),

seeking an ex parte restraining order and to enjoin the

foreclosure sale of their home. FSA removed the case to this

court. The court granted FSA’s assented-to motion to stay the

case, to allow plaintiffs time to sell a portion of their

property for a sum sufficient to pay off the amount due to FSA

under the parties’ mortgage agreements. Plaintiffs have been

unable to sell a portion of their property to pay off their

mortgage debt, and FSA now moves for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs do not object.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A movant is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that

it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). In reviewing the record, the court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmovant. Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108,

115 (1st Cir. 2013).

Where a summary judgment motion is unopposed, the motion is

not automatically granted. See Aguiar–Carrasquillo v. Agosto–

Alicea, 445 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). Rather, “the district

court is still obliged to consider the motion on its merits, in

light of the record as constituted, in order to determine

whether judgment would be legally appropriate.” Id. (internal

quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Pursuant to

Local Rule 56.1(b), “[a]ll properly supported material facts set

forth in the moving party’s factual statement may be deemed

admitted unless properly opposed by the adverse party.”

BACKGROUND

From June 2001 through August 2007, Lenentine and Downs

executed five promissory notes in favor of FSA in exchange for

five separate loans, each of which was secured by a mortgage on

their property in Holderness, New Hampshire. The five loans

were as follows: (1) $82,000 on June 1, 2001; (2) $40,680 on

April 25, 2002; (3) $128,476.80 on January 2, 2003; $132,084.89

on January 26, 2005; and (5) $139,963.80 on August 9, 2007.

Plaintiffs are in default of their obligations under each

of their five mortgage agreements with FSA and their obligations

2 under the August 9, 2007 promissory note.1 Each of the mortgages

contains a default provision allowing FSA to, among other

remedies, foreclose on plaintiffs’ property. FSA attempted to

foreclose on the property in September 2014, but plaintiffs

obtained a preliminary injunction from the Grafton County

Superior Court stopping the foreclosure days before it was

scheduled. See Case No. 215-2014-CV-319.

After the superior court issued the preliminary injunction,

FSA and plaintiffs, who were represented by counsel, entered

into an agreement, in which FSA agreed that it would not

exercise its right to foreclose on plaintiffs’ property until

March 30, 2015 (the “Agreement”). Under the Agreement,

plaintiffs agreed to sell their property or a subdivided portion

of the property to satisfy their debt to FSA in full. The

Agreement also stated that if plaintiffs failed to sell the

property and satisfy their debt in full on or before March 30,

2015, FSA would have the unconditional right to foreclose on the

property. In addition, the Agreement stated that if FSA

attempted to foreclose on the property,

Plaintiffs agree not to either individually or jointly file any bankruptcy petition, complaint or other action with the purpose to enjoin such sale in state or federal court; Plaintiffs will not take any other action intended to hinder or delay any sale scheduled by the FSA on or after March 30, 2015.

1 The record is unclear as to whether plaintiffs are in default of their obligations under the other promissory notes.

3 Between the date of the Agreement and the deadline set

forth therein (March 30, 2015), plaintiffs failed to sell any

portion of their property or pay their mortgage debt to FSA.

FSA scheduled a foreclosure sale for September 1, 2015. Despite

the terms of the Agreement prohibiting plaintiffs from filing an

action to enjoin the sale, plaintiffs brought this suit in

Grafton County Superior Court, seeking a temporary restraining

order and a permanent injunction to prevent FSA from foreclosing

on their property. In their complaint, plaintiffs failed to

disclose to the superior court that they had agreed not to

challenge any foreclosure sale.

The superior court granted plaintiffs a temporary

restraining order. FSA removed the case to this court and now

seeks summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiffs are in

default of their obligations under their mortgage agreements and

that, as a consequence, FSA has the right to foreclose on their

property. Plaintiffs agreed not to challenge any foreclosure

sale by FSA. Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to

interfere with FSA’s attempt to foreclose on the property and

FSA is entitled to summary judgment.

4 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (doc. no. 19) is granted. The clerk of court shall

enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

__________________________ Landya B. McCafferty United States District Judge

July 26, 2017

cc: Ernest James Ciccotelli, Esq. Michael T. McCormack, Esq.