Halperin v. Fitzpatrick
This text of 3 Fla. Supp. 34 (Halperin v. Fitzpatrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Miami-Dade County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This cause came on to be heard on a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Betty Roney Fitzpatrick and a similar joint motion filed by the defendants Samuel Bratter and Seymour Siegel, and after argument of counsel and from an examination of the file it is ordered that the said motions be and they are each overruled and denied.
[36]*36The cause was further heard on motions for a summary judgment filed with supporting affidavits by the defendant Fitzpatrick, jointly by the defendants Bratter and Siegel, and by the plaintiff S. J. Halperin.1
After argument of counsel for the respective parties, consideration of the pleadings and the motions and all affidavits filed in connection therewith, the court being advised in the premises, it is ordered that the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants be and the same are overruled and denied.
[37]*37It is further ordered that the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff Halperin be and the same is granted. In connection therewith the court makes the following findings from the pleadings as well as from the affidavits filed in support of the several motions for summary judgment, to-wit:
That the plaintiff Halperin is a duly and lawfully licensed real estate broker, under the laws of this state.
That N. B. T. Roney was the duly qualified, authorized and acting agent for his daughter, the defendant Betty Roney Fitzpatrick.
[38]*38That the plaintiff was given a listing to obtain a lessee under a 99 year lease for certain property owned by the defendant Fitzpatrick; that pursuant thereto the plaintiff interested the defendant Bratter in the property; that the plaintiff introduced Bratter to the agent of the defendant Fitzpatrick (her father) ; that as a result of negotiations instigated by the plaintiff, the terms and conditions of a 99 year lease were agreed upon and reduced to writing; that the aforesaid lease was reduced to writing in November of 1950; that the defendant Bratter declined to execute the lease in its then present form, [39]*39requesting that some concessions, or allowances, or provisions be made whereby the amount of rents to be paid by the lessee under the lease would be reduced in the event the lessee was delayed in erecting a building on the property.
That the plaintiff Halperin continued negotiations between Bratter and the agent of Fitzpatrick, attempting to reach an agreement on the provisions for a reduction of rents in the event construction of a building on the premises was delayed because of governmental building restrictions; that these negotiations were continued by the plaintiff up until the time he was [40]*40informed by the agent of Fitzpatrick that a lease had been entered into by Fitzpatrick.
That the plaintiff and the agent of Fitzpatrick agreed that the plaintiff should receive the sum of $15,000 as a real estate commission for negotiating the lease.'
That the defendant Siegel, although a registered real estate broker under the laws of this state, was at all times pertinent to the facts involved in this litigation listed as a non-active broker, and was employed by the plaintiff as a salesman; that under the laws of this state Siegel, as a non-active broker, was not lawfully authorized to consummate a real estate transaction, that he, as a non-active broker and operating as a salesman, was required to consummate all real estate transactions through his employing broker, who in this case was the plaintiff.
That on May 8, 1951 the defendant (Mrs.) Fitzpatrick, joined by her husband, entered into a 99 year lease with a [41]*41Florida corporation named 300 Lincoln Road, Inc.; that the terms, conditions and provisions of the lease were substantially the same as the terms, conditions and provisions of the lease originally prepared to be executed by the defendant Fitzpatrick, as lessor, and Bratter, as lessee, with the exception that the first year’s rental was reduced from $45,000 to $25,000; that the defendant Fitzpatrick, by and through her duly constituted agent, entered into an agreement to pay Siegel a broker’s commission for negotiating the lease with 300 Lincoln Road, Inc.; that the amount of commission to be so paid was $2,500 less than that agreed upon between the said agent and the plaintiff in this cause, and in addition, that the commission was to be paid to Siegel over a period of ten years — instead of being payable at one time, as was agreed upon between the agent of Fitzpatrick and the plaintiff.
That on April 26, 1951 the lease originally prepared for execution by the defendant Fitzpatrick and the defendant Brat[42]*42ter was exhibited to one Benn Bloom and was by him and through his then acting attorney accepted.
That on the same day, April 26, 1951, a corporation charter was issued by the secretary of state for this state to 300 Lincoln Road, Inc.; that the incorporators were dummy or nominal incorporators, having no real or beneficial interest in the corporation; that the incorporators were employees in the law office of the attorney then representing the defendant Bratter.
That the defendants assert by affidavits filed in support of their motions for summary judgment that Bloom was the actual owner of the corporation, 300 Lincoln Road, Inc., and was the actual lessee in the lease executed on May 8, 1951; that it appears, however, from these affidavits that Bloom was only the nominal lessee or nominal owner of the corporation, for immediately upon the execution of the lease the corporate assets were transferred to Bratter, and Bratter as owner of the corporation then executed a sub-lease for a small portion of the premises to Bloom.
That the defendant Bratter is the real owner of the corporation 300 Lincoln Road, Inc., and that he is in fact the real lessee in said lease; that the forming of the corporation was a subterfuge used by the defendants in an attempt to conceal the identity of the real and actual lessee and to deprive the plaintiff of the real estate commission earned by the plaintiff in negotiating and bringing about the execution of the aforesaid lease.
That no real estate commission could have lawfully been paid to the defendant Siegel.
That none of the defendants has any real, actual, bona fide defense against the claim asserted by the plaintiff in his complaint.
It follows that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, Betty Roney Fitzpatrick, Samuel Bratter and Seymour Siegel.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that judgment be and the same is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiff, S. J. Halperin, and against the defendants, Betty Roney Fitzpatrick, Samuel Bratter and Seymour Siegel in the amount of $15,000, together with interest thereon from the date hereof, together with all costs in this cause expended by the plaintiff, for which let execution issue.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
3 Fla. Supp. 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/halperin-v-fitzpatrick-flacirct11mia-1952.